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Agency to Property,  
from AI to IP
This book explores digital artists’ experiments with emerging 
technologies of artificial intelligence (AI) in order to formulate 
a critique of how AI is impacting and reshaping the concepts of 
agency and ownership. The concerns underlying this focus can 
be roughly summarized as follows: on the one hand, AI appears 
to gesture toward new paradigms of thinking, acting and being 
that promise a push beyond ideological horizons centered on the 
human(ist) agent; but on the other hand, AI is deeply entangled 
with socio-economic and political regimes that rely on precisely 
this subject position, often in problematic alignments with the 
capitalist logic of contemporary ownership models. AI, in this 
sense, exists in a diffuse border region between the compelling 
idea of emerging non-human agency (embodied in the very 
notion of ‘artificial intelligence’ itself) and the all-too human con-
texts in which contemporary AI tends to manifest (for example as 
algorithmic control mechanisms in the domains of work, govern-
ance, law, finance, or entertainment). Using AI art as my core 
subject of analysis and discussion, I want to consider what inter-
ventions can be staged in anthropocentric ownership models by 
10 rethinking agency in and through AI. I will argue that critical uses 
of AI in digital art can be ideally suited for disturbing conventional 
notions of the singular, unified artist figure, of the unique art-
work, and of anthropocentric perspectives on creativity as such. 
AI art can thus speculate on critical reconfigurations of creative 
agency—and therefore also on the potential destabilization of 
intellectual property (IP) models that continue to rely on the 
integrity the human(ist) agent as creator and owner.
My discussion is not going to echo spectacularizing assertions 
that AI is “becoming creative” in the sense of fully autonomous 
computational entities capable of matching and exceeding the 
aesthetic, artistic, and artful expressions of humans. In my view, 
claims of emergent AI creativity tend to be marred by problematic 
anthropocentric biases, both regarding the concepts of creativity 
perpetuated in such claims, and regarding the humanistic own-
ership models underpinned by these concepts of creativity. 
Rather than trying to imagine an AI art in which human artists are 
supplanted by human-like creative machines, I want to explore 
what collaborative entanglements exist between artists and AI, 
and consider the critical ends toward which such entanglements 
can be oriented. What new types of artistic practice, what recon-
figurations of the author function, what new forms of creative 
and critical expression can be seen to manifest, in what I will call 
the works and workings of posthumanist agential assemblages?
Given my focus on agency and ownership, two domains of critical 
thought are particularly important for this discussion. The first is 
law, and more specifically theories of intellectual property, which 
form a key critical interface between art, expressive agency, and 
the cultural and socio-economic environments within which they 
are embedded. The second is posthumanist thought, which I con-
sider to be among the most useful frameworks for exploring the 
critical valences of AI in digital art. The conjunction of legal theory 
and posthumanism allows me to foreground discrepancies and 
productive contradictions between the two frameworks when it 
comes to issues of creative expression, agency, and ownership. 
11Throughout, I draw on posthumanism in a sense similar to that 
in which Gary Hall has described it, namely as a perspective that 
“is concerned with the displacement of the unified, self-reflexive, 
and rational humanist subject from its central place in the world 
as a result of the erosion of the human’s ‘natural’ boundaries 
with the animal, technology, and the environment” (Hall 2016, 
93). In the context of AI art projects that recalibrate the shape 
and meaning of creative agency, such a perspective facilitates 
a departure from the “traditional liberal humanist model that 
comes replete with clichéd, ready-made . . . ideas of proprietorial 
authorship, . . . originality, fixity, and the finished object” (xiv).
A discussion of legal technicalities concerning copyright and 
authorship might seem at a considerable remove from key con-
cerns of AI art as such. But it must be kept in mind that a key 
effect of IP law is its codification of broadly accepted notions 
concerning the nature of creative expression and authorship—
notions that AI art frequently addresses quite directly. Practically 
speaking, IP laws are formulated with the aim of being inclusive 
and adaptive. Nevertheless, the law outlines prescriptive 
requirements regarding what an artwork can be, who (or what) 
its author can be, how a specific artwork can circulate, and how 
this circulation can be controlled. If IP law is understood as a key 
manifestation of broadly accepted views on and attitudes toward 
authorship and cultural ownership, then there is certainly much 
to discuss in relation to AI art projects that problematize or dis-
turb views and attitudes codified in the law. Such discussion has 
particular critical purchase in a number of contexts addressed in 
later chapters: for example where the algorithmic enforcement 
of copyright law is concerned, and where proprietary and black-
boxed algorithmic systems are used to implement complex legal 
norms and standards; or also where AI art implements tactics 
aimed at challenging the integrity of the ownership models that 
are expressed in IP law, in technology uses sanctioned by the law, 
and in humanist views on authorship and creative expression 
underlying the law’s prescriptions.
12 Building on Christiane Paul’s widely adopted definition of digital 
art (2016), I define AI art, most generally, as digital art that 
incorporates technologies of artificial intelligence as a medium. 
By this I mean that AI art utilizes AI, and that it implements AI 
practically even when it does not engage AI thematically. AI art, in 
other words, is not necessarily about AI. Other cultural theorists 
of AI have calibrated their focus quite differently: Joanna Zylinska, 
for example, proposes that “one of the most creative—and most 
needed—ways in which artists can use AI is by telling better 
stories about AI” (2020, 31; emphasis in original). In the context of 
my own discussion, I would agree that every AI artist (by which 
I mean every human artist working with AI) must speculate on 
the existence and potentialities of non-human creative agency. 
But I would also emphasize that there can be important dif-
ferences between narrativizing such speculation and developing 
it in a mode of practical experimentation. In my opinion, one 
such difference is that in the many fabulations of AI art, crucial 
details concerning the functionality or outputs of AI systems can 
be easily glossed over, simplified, or obfuscated (one example 
of this kind of rhetorical blackboxing of AI is addressed in my 
discussion of Portrait of Edmond Belamy in chapter 4). My main 
focus is therefore on AI art projects in which critical speculation 
is enacted structurally, based on a practical engagement with 
AI technologies. In the AI art projects discussed in the following 
chapters, this will be seen to manifest in a kind of hacking of AI 
that interrogates AI’s own abilities to hack concepts including 
those of agency, creativity, and ownership.
True to AI’s origins in the military-industrial complex, and true to 
the support its development now receives from corporate tech 
giants, mainstream implementations of AI tend to perpetuate 
and amplify very narrow perspectives on agency and own-
ership. This occurs in alignment with ideological frameworks that 
have been variously described, for example, as computational 
capitalism (Stiegler 2019), cognitive capitalism (Boutang 2011), 
communicative capitalism (Dean 2005), or surveillance capitalism 
13(Zuboff 2019). Mainstream AI, in other words, tends to serve 
socio-economic regimes that rely on the automation, high-speed 
calculation, data-intensive analysis, predictive techniques, 
and communicative abilities that computation affords. As a 
result, AI applications can constitute frightful surveillance tools, 
restrictive digital rights management systems, manipulative 
recommendation algorithms, biased personal assistants, Kaf-
kaesque algorithmic governance frameworks, or exploitative 
high-speed stock trading protocols. Based on these and other 
sinister realities of contemporary AI, Nick Dyer-Witheford, Atle 
M. Kjosen and James Steinhoff (2019) put forward the dark notion 
that the inhuman power of AI may end up emancipating cap-
ital from humanity, rather than the other way around. What I 
want to argue is that AI also offers important opportunities for 
practice-based experimentation that can recast the ideological 
imbrications of the underlying technologies very differently. This, 
perhaps, is the speculative core of my argument in this book: 
diverging from Nick Land’s notion of AI as a fundamentally cap-
italist technology (Land 2012), I want to explore how, in cultural 
contexts, AI might also be framed as a tactical anti-capitalist tool, 
at least in the sense that it is capable of producing and enacting 
new perspectives on creative practice, authorship, and the art-
work that challenge prevailing notions of human(ist) creative 
agency, and the cultural logic of intellectual property derived 
from it.
Today, the field of AI art can appear as a creative industries 
“sector” that is defined, driven and dominated by corporate 
funders. This impression is conveyed, for example, by the many 
AI art residencies and project grants sponsored by Google, 
Amazon, Facebook, Microsoft, and other corporate entities 
described by Bernard Stiegler as the “new barbarians” that are 
closing off horizons of technology-based possibility, in efforts 
to foreclose our ability to expand or reconfigure such horizons 
(2019). But the digital art communities within which AI art flour-
ishes have also been crucially shaped by open source culture, 
14 radical philosophies of open access to knowledge and technology, 
by the activist approaches of tactical media, the hacker ethics 
of the early internet, and the ideals of a cultural commons. It is 
against this background that I want to develop my discussion of 
AI art projects which problematize the humanist vision of the 
singular, unified human agent; of the spirited (genius?) individual 
as sole originator of creative expressions; of the human as self-
interested proprietor of the fruits of their labor; and of aesthetic, 
legal, and socio-economic paradigms that model restrictive 
property regimes around this kind of agent. In adopting a post-
humanist perspective, my emphasis is instead on the potential 
for AI art to instantiate agency as relational, decentered and 
plural, and to approach creative practice as fundamentally 
dynamic and embedded.
In what follows, current AI art projects (most of them under-
taken since 2018, or still in development at the time of writing) 
serve as the scaffolding for a broader discussion that spans 
overlapping discursive fields to integrate posthumanism and 
law with aesthetics, media theory, and political economy. Across 
all of these domains, the concepts of agency and ownership are 
key to understanding how human subjects have been idealized 
as presumptively free, self-determining, and self-owning; how 
this idealization feeds into still-prevailing definitions of creative 
expression, authorship, and the artwork itself; and how these 
definitions have helped to rationalize a framing of the artist as a 
quasi-neoliberalist free agent whose activities and desires align 
with predominant ownership models. Against this backdrop, how 
are agency and ownership inflected when artificial intelligence 
comes into the picture?
Mainstream AI development certainly contradicts the utopian 
tone of predictions that AI will be (or already is) capable of 
intelligent behavior, that it may soon display traits of agency 
previously reserved for natural persons, and that it is in 
the process of becoming creative. It points, instead, in the 
direction of AI-driven surveillance capitalism, corporate control 
15over networked communication systems, and the rampant 
financialization of everyday (digital) life. In these contexts, 
the centrality of the human agent persists, even if only in the 
interpellation of disembodied data subjects that continue 
to produce and consume, to own and owe in alignment with 
exploitative capitalist ideologies. In cultural contexts, likewise, 
the humanist, anthropocentric notion of the singular, unified 
artist figure persists, and even where digital culture courts 
ideals of sharing, free access, or easy reproducibility, much of it 
is nevertheless structured by a property-oriented fencing-in of 
individual creative agency. Overall, a key linchpin around which 
digital culture and digital art continue to turn is the cultural 
logic of intellectual property. A key question pursued in what 
follows is how this logic may be challenged when AI art pushes 
for a rethinking of agency beyond the centrality and supremacy 
of the human(ist) subject as author and proprietor, and when it 
reorients itself toward emergent forms of posthumanist agential 
assemblages that contradict existing property paradigms. As I 
will argue, in such configurations expressive agency is located 
beyond the confines of the human artist, and co-exists with 
them in productive, intra-actional entanglements that integrate 
anthropos with computer hardware, software, algorithms, and 
other tools, crafts, or knowledge on which the artist relies. As will 
be seen, this discussion does not abandon the humanist subject 
entirely, but rather recalibrates it in relation to the ecologies in 
which it shares.
Agency is most generally understood as the manifestation of a 
capacity to act. But the concept is also intimately tied to ques-
tions of self-determination, autonomy, expressive freedom, and 
the ability to own property. How, then, is agency constituted in 
the age of AI? Who or what is an agent now? What new aesthetic, 
legal, and socio-economic contours and limits of agency emerge 
in AI? How does human agency relate to its algorithmic and 
machinic others? What new horizons of critique become possible 
when creative agency, in its links to authorship and ownership, 
16 are rethought in and through AI, in speculative approximations 
of posthumanist agential assemblages whose works and 
workings push beyond anthropocentric and humanist ontologies 
of creativity and artfulness, intellectual property and cultural 
ownership?
Decentering Human Agency in AI Art
Let me offer two introductory examples that resonate with many 
of these questions. The first focuses on the work of the British 
artist Anna Ridler, who frequently uses machine learning (ML) to 
explore issues of creativity, authorship, and ownership. Among 
Ridler’s key strategies for doing so is the use of custom, artist-
assembled datasets. The artist has described this as a powerful 
political act that can help move past the exclusionary tendencies 
ingrained in mainstream AI (Ridler 2020). This approach is well 
exemplified in Mosaic Virus (2019), a three-channel video instal-
lation that depicts morphing formations of AI-generated images 
of tulips (fig. 1). The work focuses on the historical “tulip mania” 
phenomenon and explores enduring human obsessions with 
agency and ownership through the themes of monetary wealth 
and financial speculation. The tulip mania phenomenon dates 
to 1630s Holland, when tulips had become highly sought-after 
flowers, and certain tulip bulbs were seen as items of immense 
value. The perceived value of the bulbs was linked to rare color 
stripes caused by a plant virus, which would—unpredictably—
appear on some tulip petals. At the time, the behavior of the 
so-called mosaic virus was poorly understood, and botanists 
were unable to control how it propagated the prized petal stripes. 
This led to frantic trading in tulip bulbs, and what is now con-
sidered one of the first speculative financial bubbles. In Ridler’s 
installation, the unpredictable effects of the virus and its desta-
bilizing effect on the value of tulip bulbs allegorize the speculative 
desires that both art and finance can inspire. Specifically, Mosaic 
Virus links the instability of values bound in commodified 
artefacts to the perceived unknowability of the computational 
17technologies used in creating the work. The work thus thematizes 
a decentering of human agency, its redistribution across non-
human systems, and the impact of this redistribution on ques-
tions of monetary value and ownership.
[Figure 1] Anna Ridler, installation view of “The Abstraction of Nature,” solo 
exhibition at Aksioma, Ljubljana (2020). Photo credit: Domen Pal / Aksioma.
The use of a generative AI system is key to how this is conveyed to 
the viewer, because it extends questions of monetary value and 
ownership to the aesthetic realm and the concept of authorial 
control. To create Mosaic Virus, Ridler used a Generative Adver-
sarial Network (GAN), a type of machine learning technology 
capable of generating novel outputs on the basis of large 
datasets of pre-existing material. (In-depth discussion of GAN-
style generative image synthesis is offered in chapter 4, and also 
in Zeilinger 2021). The system was trained to generate ever-
changing images of (inexistent) tulips using an artist-created 
dataset of roughly 10,000 hand-labelled photographs of actual 
tulips, and the outputs were additionally inflected by the ever-
changing value of Bitcoin tokens (a speculative object of desire 
par excellence). Because the project uses a training dataset pain-
stakingly assembled by the artist, Mosaic Virus conveys a strong 
18 sense that the artist retains a high level of creative agency (fig. 1 
shows parts of the dataset exhibited alongside the video instal-
lation). The operational logic of GAN systems, however, lends the 
outputs a level of unpredictability, which is further amplified by 
the well-known volatility of Bitcoin token value. As a result, just 
as it may be impossible to authoritatively predict the value of 
tulip bulbs affected by a virus, so it becomes difficult to precisely 
locate creative agency in an artwork produced by a posthumanist 
agential assemblage of human artist, generative AI system, and 
erratic cryptocurrency valuation data.
Given the focus of this book, the nature of Ridler’s training 
dataset strikes me as a particularly important parameter in the 
conceptual equation of Mosaic Virus: it foregrounds the presence 
of the artist in the creative process, while also highlighting the 
limited agency Ridler has in controlling outputs of the AI system 
she designed. The chosen medium and thematic framing offer 
a good context for a self-reflexive exploration of the limits of 
agency: the triad of generative AI, cryptocurrency, and plant virus 
can serve as a fitting “blackbox” of unpredictability into which 
anxieties concerning the limits of human control (i.e., the control 
of both authors and owners) can be projected. Based on this 
reading, I see as a central critical aim of Mosaic Virus its reflection 
on emerging digitally-bound value systems in which speculative 
fantasies of power and wealth become linked to questions of 
authorship, ownership, and agency. Here, non-human spaces of 
presumptive unknowability—the viral, the algorithmic—run up 
against all-too human obsessions with monetary and aesthetic 
value and authorial control. In other words, faced with com-
plex non-human systems such as viruses, AI, or the blockchain, 
anthropocentric fantasies of control can dissolve into wild specu-
lation, and the centrality of human agency is recalibrated in much 
more complex distributions across posthumanist assemblages. 
Importantly, this reading is also somewhat undermined by 
Ridler’s own suggestion that human agency—enacted in the 
significant degree of control the artist exerts over the training 
19data—remains central to artistic uses of AI (2020). The artist’s 
process of hand-assembling datasets is incredibly onerous; it 
rightfully presents itself as craft, as an artful process through 
which human intervention in the workings of AI is rendered as a 
valuable creative act. Ultimately, this provokes an interesting con-
tradiction, since the project mobilizes the perceived unpredict-
ability of generative AI outputs as a playful challenge to the very 
assumption of human mastery.
A different example indicates that the theme of agency is also 
a powerful lure for AI artists who are less concerned with 
critical interrogations of the concept. Contrapposto (2020), an 
AI-generated sculptural work by the American artist Ben Snell, 
struggles to locate new forms of non-human agency and creative 
expression meaningfully in AI. The amorphous sculpture, visually 
reminiscent of Henry Moore bronzes, is part of the artist’s 
Inheritance series, which is “inspired by the classics” (presumably 
a nod to images of canonical sculptural work that constitute the 
training data) and “made from the pulverized computer that 
dreamt it” (Snell 2020; an image of the work is available to view 
on the referenced website). The sculpture thus consists of “flecks 
of silicon, copper, aluminum, plastic and pcb […]. Within these 
bits exist the memories, the thoughts and thought-making power 
of the machine which created it. Its existence comes full circle 
in this new form, embodied with a newfound aura and agency” 
(ibid.). This framing is both intriguing and confusing. The artist 
clearly wishes to attribute creative agency to the computational 
system used in creating the work; formally, however, absolute 
dominion over this same system is asserted. Given the material 
form of the sculpture and the method of how it was made, it is 
unclear how or where agency is supposed to be situated here. Is 
it centered around a particular entity (the machine, the algorithm, 
the artwork), or is it distributed across dissolving boundaries 
between them? Does it open up a new horizon of creativity (AI as 
a speculative signifier of emerging posthumanist subjectivity), or 
20 doesn’t it, rather, demarcate a limit (AI as a pseudo-autonomous 
tool used by a human artist)?
Contrapposto anthropomorphizes AI in the strongest terms. 
Visually, it invokes the master sculptors of the art history canon, 
and the series title positions the work as the literal offspring of 
these traditions. All around, the work is clearly meant to ges-
ture toward a new kind of creativity embodied in computational 
technology, which is described as being “reborn” in the sculpture, 
where its processing powers “live on” (Snell n.d.). But it is pre-
cisely through this anthropocentric framing that the work 
ultimately reverts to the domineering centrality of the humanist 
artist figure who, after all, has “ground the computers to dust” 
(ibid.) in creating the sculpture (see Vincent 2019 for images of this 
process). This makes it difficult not to read Contrapposto as still-
born (to stay with the anthropocentric jargon). If some new kind 
of non-human creative agency was indeed present in this work, 
then the artist’s production of the sculpture signals its exter-
mination and embalming. The work, in this sense, undermines 
its own claims regarding the existence of non-human expres-
sive agency, which is here immediately objectified in a clearly 
human-made, unique, commercially traded aesthetic artefact. 
Through this contradiction, the work nevertheless resonates with 
the conceptual rubric that organizes this book, and the sculpture 
offers a useful staging area for some of the central concerns I 
want to unpack in what follows. Where is the line between the 
anthropomorphized AI-system-as-artist and other, more radical 
new kinds of non-human expressive agency? How can digital art 
practices that draw on AI push beyond merely instrumentalizing 
the technology for the perpetuation of existing, anthropocentric 
views on authorship in new contexts?
What my brief discussion of Mosaic Virus and Contrapposto 
has not touched on so far is the problem of explicitly locating 
“authorship” across aesthetic, socio-economic, and legal con-
texts. I expect that most (human) audiences would approach the 
two foregoing examples as aesthetic artefacts that were clearly 
21created by humans. Does this mean that their invocation of 
non-human agency is merely a rhetorical conceit, a story that is 
being told about AI? In the following chapters, I will locate a key 
critical potential of AI in its ability to highlight and foreground 
generative processes that structurally undermine conventional 
assumptions concerning the integrity and centrality of human 
creative agency and authorship. Again, such an undermining 
does not necessarily imply that AI systems can become authors 
or artists. But it certainly helps with clarifying the contradictions 
inherent in claims of AI creativity that are themselves mod-
elled on anthropocentric, humanist frameworks of authorship. 
Such issues become particularly interesting in the context of 
competing (human) ownership claims linked to AI-generated 
artworks, and in legal disputes in which human artists may wish 
to deny their own creative agency by designating AI systems as 
authors.
AI and Creativity in the Intellectual  
Property Milieu
To rethink authorship in AI contexts inevitably requires a re-
assessment of key assumptions concerning the nature of creative 
expression. To my mind, influence, imitation, copying, and reusing 
are at the core of all artistic practice and (human) creativity. The 
lines between mimicry and mimesis are blurry, and the most fas-
cinating works of art often emerge out of approaches that entail 
appropriation, repetition, or iteration. Such approaches are well 
established and highly visible in everything from digital remix 
culture and audio sampling to appropriation art and the collage 
arts of the earlier 20th century. Appropriation-based artistic 
techniques in particular have always had a tendency to provoke 
much controversy because they challenge the socio-economic 
logic of authorship-qua-ownership, as well as the humanist ideals 
based on which intellectual property itself is conceptualized. This 
includes IP’s emphasis on originality and uniqueness as imprints 
22 of aesthetic and economic value, as well as its tight restrictions 
over how the knowledge and value bound in creative expres-
sions can circulate. Where art transgresses narrowly conceived 
ideals of cultural ownership, IP law is quick to step in. Copyright, 
with its emphasis on originality and exclusive authorship rights, 
is a prime example of the conceptual flattening that occurs 
when creativity, in my view a profoundly dynamic and relational 
phenomenon, is reshaped to fit property-oriented paradigms 
that position the individualized human agent (or its corporate 
proxies) as the “natural” owner of creative expressions.
The digital is at strong odds with such paradigms for many 
reasons, not least because of how fundamentally (and obviously) 
digital technologies rely on processes of copying and reusing. 
Notably, such processes also figure importantly in many of 
the generative behaviors that characterize AI, including the 
underlying “training” and “learning” techniques. I will argue, 
therefore, that in AI contexts the issues outlined here can be 
significantly amplified. As I will discuss in a later chapter, legal 
theory is beginning to consider, for example, whether the 
assembling and use of training datasets constitutes large-scale 
IP rights infringement similar to the unauthorized publication 
of copyrighted texts—even when the data in question remains 
blackboxed within AI systems and never takes “human-readable” 
forms. All of this becomes even more complicated (and more 
interesting) when AI-generated outputs are interpreted on the 
basis of anthropocentric ideals of originality and creativity. Then, 
the question is not only whether certain uses of AI may infringe 
the copyrights of human authors, but also whether IP paradigms 
could technically apply to AI systems themselves, so that these 
might have to be recognized as authors/artists, or will, at least, 
challenge the integrity of prevailing perspectives on the central 
role and status of the human author/artist. The functionality and 
outputs of GANs are particularly interesting in this context, since 
they tend to invoke “AI creativity” very compellingly even though 
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systems as new kinds of highly sophisticated copy machines. 
While IP law is becoming an increasingly important tool for 
negotiating the role of AI in the evolving socio-economic land-
scape, it is also becoming clear that AI can serve as a tool to elude 
the limits IP law has traditionally sought to impose on creative 
practices which involve copying activities. In this sense, AI art is in 
a good position to extend and expand the trajectory of appro-
priation art and other artistic approaches that stand opposed 
to the property-oriented logic of authorship, and which have 
long engaged critically with the reproducibility of information 
and aesthetic artefacts. If human artists’ practices of imitation, 
copying, or reproduction are thought of as likely breaches of 
IP restrictions, then there can be no doubt that generative AI 
technologies are increasing the critical stakes of such practices. 
As I will discuss in the chapters to follow, this is already triggering 
interesting controversies surrounding AI-generated artworks 
that challenge ideas of the traditional (human) artist figure and 
their exclusive rights, of the nature of the work of art, and of 
the art market as such. AI, in other words, has the potential to 
substantially disturb IP policy and political economies that have 
formed around the romantic ideal of the author as owner.
There is now a considerable body of research that links IP theory 
and AI discourse, yet there is no consensus, among legal scholars 
and cultural theorists of AI and IP, about whether artificially 
intelligent systems are capable of autonomously producing the 
kinds of creative expression to which IP law could conventionally 
be applied. Widely available mainstream AI tools used for 
generating novel digital imagery—for example AI apps capable 
of style transfer (see Yuan 2018) or GAN-style image generation 
tools (see ArtBreeder n.d.)—seem to indicate that AI is limited, 
at best, to the emulation of creativity in the anthropocentric 
senses of the term. When Nigel Shaboldt, the co-founder of the 
Open Data Institute, was asked if he believed that computational 
systems can be creative, he is said to have deflected the question 
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that there is indeed something behind the façade” (Miller 2019). 
Matteo Pasquinelli (2019), a key cultural theorist of AI, is similarly 
skeptical when he argues that state-of-the-art AI technologies 
have little to do with creativity as such, and are better under-
stood as highly sophisticated tools for statistical analysis.
Such criticism notwithstanding, there are also those who herald 
the coming of truly “creative” AI. In one of several recent mono-
graphs focusing directly on this subject, the mathematician and 
popular science writer Marcus du Sautoy frames creativity as a 
kind of “human code” (2019) which, in the author’s opinion, can 
be computed algorithmically with such efficiency that machine 
creativity must eclipse human creativity sooner or later. This 
perspective aligns problematically with what James Bridle 
(2018), echoing Bernard Stiegler and others, has criticized as a 
pervasive form of “computational thinking,” i.e., the application 
of computational logic to efforts of solving hard problems 
such as developing artificial intelligence and computer-based 
creativity. Indeed, computational thinking goes far beyond a 
basic understanding of algorithmic processes as “methods for 
solving problems that are suited for computer implementation” 
(Sedgewick and Wayne 2011, 3); sometimes criticized as “com-
putationalist,” it can pander to generalizing assumptions 
concerning the abstractability and programmability of human 
behavior, in ways that ignore or overlook crucial political issues 
(for influential contributions to such critiques see, for example, 
Dougherty 2001; Hayles 2005). AI systems certainly already are 
what Ed Finn has called “culture machines” (2017), at least in 
the sense that they contribute importantly to the socio-cultural 
fabric in which they are embedded. But this acknowledgement 
says little about whether creativity should indeed be considered 
as “effectively computable” (cf. Copeland 2020), i.e., whether 
AI systems could, at least theoretically, match the creative 
capabilities of the current top-of-the-line culture machine, the 
human agent itself.
25Inevitably, serious consideration of issues related to creative AI, 
and to computational creativity more generally, requires that 
some fundamental questions regarding the nature of intelligence 
must also be revisited. In cultural contexts, this is of course pre-
cisely what makes the concept of AI so compelling. Thus: what 
is meant by creativity in relation to AI, and what metaphysical, 
ontological, and hermeneutical frameworks are invoked to 
address the concept in such contexts? How do new perspectives 
on AI-inflected creativity function in conjunction with the pre-
vailing mix of aesthetic theories, socio-cultural norms, economic 
policy, and legal regulation concerning creative expression? 
Zylinska suggests that in much current AI research, the under-
lying concept of intelligence is somewhat of a blind spot, “either 
taken for granted without too much interrogation or molded at 
will and then readjusted depending on the direction the research 
has taken” (2020, 19). A similar observation applies to the ways in 
which the concept of creativity is invoked in AI contexts, where 
it is defined and used across human-exclusive and AI-specific 
contexts. For example, two prominent researchers of creativity, 
the psychology and human development researcher Robert J. 
Sternberg and the cognitive science scholar Margaret A. Boden, 
rely on similar sets of criteria in their definitions of creativity 
(these revolve, in a nutshell, around novelty, originality, unex-
pectedness, and usefulness), even though Sternberg’s work (2011) 
focuses on topics such as imagination, wisdom, and love, while 
Boden (1990) is a key reference for computer scientists’ efforts to 
program creativity in computational systems. My own approach 
to this issue will be to adopt a mix of prevalent definitions, and 
accept as creative those behaviors, phenomena, activities, and 
artefacts that can be meaningfully interpreted as such in the aes-
thetic, cultural, socio-economic, and legal milieus which creativity 
and art are understood to inhabit (more on this in the following 
chapter). This, I hope, is helpful for developing a perspective 
that does not discriminate by default between human and non-
human actants when navigating the diverse meanings and critical 
valences of creative expression in relation to digital art and AI, or, 
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that frame them.
As I have already suggested, any claim that a given artwork 
was created not by a human artist but instead by an AI system 
must contend, at least speculatively, with the existence of an AI 
author/artist. If taken seriously, the notion of creative AI must 
then be seen to potentially undermine humanist ideals and 
romantic fictions of the genius artist (human, of course) and 
their (historically: his) unique ability to create original, inspired 
artworks. Given the larger context of my discussion, this is 
important because of how these same ideals have long served 
to justify and perpetuate IP models. In brief, the law tends to 
link intellectual ownership claims in an aesthetic artefact to the 
(human) individual from whom it is found to have originated. The 
intellectual or creative labor exerted in the production of such an 
artefact generally entitles its author to a range of exclusive rights. 
Critical uses of AI in artistic contexts can disturb the integrity of 
all these assumptions significantly. In other words: when an AI 
system isn’t just understood as a tool used by human artists, but 
as an agential entity (or an assemblage of such entities) capable 
of “creative” expression, this then problematizes not only aes-
thetic assumptions regarding the nature of creativity and author-
ship, but by extension also socio-economic and legal assumptions 
regarding the ownership or, indeed, the very “ownability” of such 
expressions.
Overview
Throughout this book, the discussion of how artists working with 
AI link questions of creativity and agency to issues of cultural 
ownership forms a key part of my effort to sketch out a critical 
theory of AI art. As noted, my focus in this is on AI art’s potential 
for disturbing property-oriented frameworks that emerge 
out of humanist perspectives. Central to this project is the 
observation that key underlying concepts—AI, agency, creativity, 
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seize on this instability, for example in critiques of dataset bias, 
of AI’s impact on privacy, or of algorithmic governmentality. The 
targets of such critiques themselves may be obscured by extreme 
algorithmic complexity, blackboxed in proprietary technologies, 
or packaged in code and algorithms that operate at a scale that 
is inaccessible to human cognition, or which are simply not 
human-readable. Digital art can cross these thresholds and 
give more accessible shape to these issues and the underlying 
technologies. As I will argue, it can do so by approaching AI 
tactically, by appropriating it, and by redeploying it to different, 
critical ends. Throughout the following chapters, I will thus dis-
cuss the becoming-tactical of AI in critical artistic practice as a 
development that mobilizes AI’s emergent capabilities for inter-
rogating, exposing, problematizing, and challenging the aesthetic, 
ideological, or technological frameworks driving the commod-
ification and propertization of creative expression.
While this book is a fundamentally interdisciplinary endeavor, 
different chapters will focus on different elements of the broader 
discussion. This means that while the chapters add up (I hope) 
to a multifaceted whole that integrates arguments, problems, 
and perspectives from very different areas of theoretical inquiry 
and artistic practice, they can also be read individually. As such, 
chapter 2 and chapter 3 primarily (but not exclusively) deal 
in theory, and address ontological and definitional problems 
of agency, creativity, and ownership across the realms of 
philosophy, legal theory, and posthumanist thought. Chapter 4, 
chapter 5, and chapter 7 comprise in-depth analyses of separate 
AI art projects, to explore how these projects engage critically 
with the issues raised in the preceding chapters. Chapter 6 offers 
a counterpoint to this discussion, and considers how tactical 
aspects of critical AI practices can also manifest in strategic 
inversions, specifically in corporate AI applications in the digital 
culture mainstream. Chapter 8, finally, brings my discussion 
to a conclusion in sketching out a speculative framework for a 
28 posthumanist cultural commons that could accommodate the 
critical approaches to AI outlined throughout.
To offer a slightly more detailed summary: Chapter 2 begins 
to unpack what a critical art of AI could be. This includes theo-
retical elaboration on some key concepts that play into my 
overall project, including those of agency and creativity, as well 
as my attempt to define AI in the specific cultural context of 
contemporary digital art-making. This is framed with reference 
to relevant aspects of posthumanist theory, and with a more 
detailed introduction of my concept of the posthumanist agential 
assemblage, which, in the broader context of my discussion, is 
meant to offer a way to push AI art beyond the humanist subject 
of the singular, unified artist, their individualized voice, and their 
original and uniquely spirited creative expression. The chapter 
concludes with an initial discussion of tactical approaches to 
working with AI. This includes a brief analysis of Kate Crawford 
and Trevor Paglen’s collaborative project ImageNet Roulette (2019) 
and its highly effective critique of dataset bias, which offers a 
good segue to beginning a broader critical discussion of how 
agency is construed in and through AI.
Chapter 3 begins with a brief discussion of Michael A. Noll’s 
Gaussian Quadratic (1963), a generative work that here serves as 
an early example of the fraught interfacing between computer 
art and copyright law. This sets the stage for unpacking the inter-
related foundations of agency, personhood, and ownership in 
legal philosophy, with a focus on theories of IP in general. Also 
included is a consideration of how property itself is conceived 
philosophically, as well as some explanatory commentary on 
main histories of copyright. The chapter then surveys key issues 
of authorship in legal research on presumptively “creative” 
AI, highlighting in particular the anthropocentric biases that 
frequently characterize such work.
Chapter 4 extends these specific concerns to an in-depth discus-
sion of the controversy surrounding Portrait of Edmond Belamy 
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record sum of US$432,500, on behalf of a French group named 
Obvious Collective, amidst allegations that the work’s code base 
had actually been taken, without due credit, from the young AI 
artist Robbie Barrat. My focus here will be on spectacularizing 
claims that the work was “not the product of a human mind” but 
“a work of art created by an algorithm” (Christie’s 2018). Several 
aspects of the work itself contradict this claim, which is, in fact, 
conceptualized and produced in problematic alignment with 
humanist notions of authorship and cultural ownership. In light 
of the informal copyright and ownership debate that the contro-
versy provoked, I conclude this chapter by considering whether a 
tactical use of generative AI could render an artwork “unownable” 
when the use of the technology makes it difficult to recognize a 
conventional author figure.
In chapter 5, I explore possible answers to this question by 
analyzing one of the first formal copyright infringement com-
plaints involving a work of AI art. The work in question, the 
Canadian artist Adam Basanta’s AI-driven “art factory” All We’d 
Ever Need Is One Another (2018), serves as an excellent example 
of a tactical approach to working with AI. Manifesting as what I 
call a posthumanist agential assemblage, it affords the human 
artist who designed it a certain level of “deniability” of expres-
sive agency. In other words, the use of AI here destabilizes the 
anthropocentric concept of authorship to such a degree that the 
allegations of copyright violation leveraged against Basanta by 
another artist may become difficult to uphold.
Chapter 6 considers the conjunction of creative expression, 
AI, and the destabilization of authorship in a broader context. 
Temporarily stepping away from discussion of AI-driven digital 
art, in this chapter I analyze Content ID, the AI-based digital rights 
management system used by YouTube to enforce its copyright 
policy. In this context, the potential deniability of creative agency 
emerges not as an artistic choice (as in the previous chapter), but 
instead as a highly problematic curtailment. As I argue, Content 
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agency in AI, and instead reorients itself toward the enforcing 
of human non-agency through AI. Again, this has far-reaching 
implications for how notions of authorship, ownership, and 
agency play out at the intersection of humans and AI.
Integrating insights and arguments from the preceding chapter, 
chapter 7 speculates on a broader-scale becoming-tactical of AI 
art, and considers in more depth some critical implications of the 
destabilization of humanist ideals in and through posthumanist 
agential assemblages. This discussion begins with an analysis of 
two projects by the British AI artist Jake Elwes, Machine Learning 
Porn (2016) and Zizi (2019), both of which enact a deliberate 
“queering” of AI and dataset politics. Foregrounding the dyna-
mism of sexual identity and invoking issues of cultural ownership, 
these works draw on AI to problematize normative, anthropocen-
tric discourse on established subject positions. My final example, 
!brute_force, is an ongoing project by the Slovenian artist Maja 
Smrekar, which introduces canine intelligence into an experi-
mental AI training regimen in order to explore co-constitutive 
qualities of human and non-human ontologies of agency and 
knowledge production. A powerful example of a posthumanist 
agential assemblage, !brute_force goes to considerable lengths 
to create speculative systems of decentered, relational, and con-
tingent subject positions, with the effect that questions of agency 
and cultural ownership are reconfigured beyond anthropocentric 
horizons.
From the co-constitutive human-AI-canine knowledge ontologies 
envisioned in !brute_force to the defamiliarizing appropriation 
of AI functionality in Zizi, from the legal provocations of All 
We’d Ever Need Is One Another to the clumsy declamations of 
non-human creative agency in Portrait of Edmond Belamy, 
and from the uncloaking of AI bias in ImageNet Roulette to the 
problematic enactment of human non-agency in the Content ID 
system—what commonalities, productive contradictions, and 
critical potentialities reverberate across the examples discussed 
31throughout this book? The final chapter considers the new con-
ceptual space that is constituted by the becoming-tactical of AI 
in posthumanist agential assemblages. In revisiting my earlier 
suggestions that certain uses and outputs of presumptively 
agential AI can be fundamentally incompatible with anthropocen-
tric perspectives on creativity, originality, and authorship, I 
conclude by sketching out the concept of a posthumanist cultural 
commons, and by considering how—and to what critical ends—




What Does AI Hack? 
Scaffolding for a  
Critical Art of AI
My aim in this chapter is to consider in more detail what a critical 
art of AI could be. This entails some additional unpacking of key 
concepts that play into my project, including those of agency, 
creativity, and the notion of AI itself. Framing this discussion 
with reference to contemporary perspectives on agency as 
fundamentally relational and distributed then leads me to intro-
duce the concept of the posthumanist agential assemblage. 
Throughout this book, this concept will offer a way of exploring AI 
art and its critical implications beyond the humanist subject, and 
without having to rely on the restrictive conceptual framing of 
the traditionally singular, unified artist figure, their individualized 
voice, or the original and uniquely spirited creative expression. 
To locate AI art in the works and workings of the posthumanist 
agential assemblage also makes it easier to specify how a critical 
art of AI may disturb property-oriented frameworks derived 
from humanist perspectives. This initial discussion of the post-
humanist agential assemblage sets the stage for exploring, in the 
next chapter, how questions of AI agency play out in legal theory, 
where they connect much more directly to issues of authorship, 
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Crawford and Trevor Paglen’s critical AI art project ImageNet 
Roulette (2019), I conclude this chapter by defining what I will call 
“tactical” approaches to utilizing AI in artistic practice. Not all of 
the AI art projects discussed later on constitute posthumanist 
agential assemblages, nor do all of them operate in a tactical 
mode; all of them, however, will be considered in relation to these 
concepts, and the speculative horizon of a critical art of AI as it is 
laid out here.
To begin, I want to argue that to engage critically with AI, whether 
in digital art or in a theoretical capacity, is likely going to involve 
a conceptual and/or practical “hacking” of AI. For example, in a 
call for proposals for a workshop held at the 2020 Transmediale 
Festival, contributors were invited to adopt an “adversarial” 
approach, and “break into the technological abstractions of AI” 
(Transmediale n.d.) in order to consider what it might mean to 
produce new knowledge and critical literacies about artificial 
intelligence. Similarly, Ways of Machine Seeing and Machine Feeling, 
two event series organized at Cambridge University’s Centre for 
Research in the Arts, Social Sciences, and Humanities (CRASSH) 
between 2017 and 2019, sought to integrate practical and critical 
approaches co-developed by computer scientists, researchers, 
and artists, and encouraged critiques of AI that may also directly 
utilize the technology (see Impett 2017; Andersen and Cox 2019). 
I fully agree that AI, like all emerging technologies, should be 
subject to every manner of hacking efforts by activists, artists, 
researchers, engineers, and so on. It should be subjected, in 
other words, to theory- and practice-based structural analysis 
and ideological critiques that may materialize in speculative 
alternatives to existing AI implementation and development 
approaches. It strikes me that a good point of departure for doing 
this is to approach the issue from an inverse angle—by asking 
what is already being hacked in conventional uses of AI, or, to put 
it differently, what AI as such is capable of hacking. Among the art 
projects discussed in the following chapters, several approach AI 
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are in turn made possible by divergent uses of AI.
To elaborate some observations and arguments already intro-
duced in the previous chapter, I begin my discussion of critical 
AI art by offering two speculative claims concerning artificial 
intelligence, which converge in a third: AI hacks agency, AI hacks 
creativity, and AI hacks ownership. (All three require a fairly self-
evident disclaimer, namely that these hacks are not achieved, 
of course, by AI “itself,” but rather through practices that AI 
technologies facilitate.) In the most straightforward sense, the 
first claim, that AI hacks agency, can mean that AI is becoming 
a standard element of algorithmic control regimes. The validity 
of this claim is easy to test in various contexts, including the AI-
driven manipulation of consumer behavior (e.g., recommendation 
algorithms), the state-level use of facial recognition technologies, 
or the use of AI-based predictive technologies in the financial 
and insurance sector. In all of these areas, human agents’ ability 
of self-determination and politically informed expression—what 
Bernard Stiegler, in his last book, called “dreaming” (Stiegler 
2019)—are impacted and, to varying degrees, curtailed. This 
links to the second claim, namely that AI hacks creativity. By this 
I mean that emerging AI technologies impact how creativity is 
defined in a general sense, how specific creative practices are 
reconfigured as a result, and how shifts in the production and cir-
culation of creative expression are consequently negotiated and 
regulated. All of this manifests, for example, in debates around 
whether AI and its outputs could be claimed to be creative (or to 
be capable of becoming creative).
Where these two claims regarding the hacking capabilities of 
AI converge, a third can be formulated, namely that AI hacks 
ownership. In other words, a potential becoming-agential and 
becoming-creative of AI challenges key assumptions regarding 
humanist foundations of the concept of authorship and the 
nature of the work of art, and by extension also assumptions 
concerning how these foundations underpin current IP regimes. 
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systems that could soon compete with human artists suggests 
that it may become more challenging to assign authorship (and 
enforce ownership rights), and therefore also to maintain the 
integrity of these concepts. For another, ongoing efforts to make 
creativity machine-readable can enable AI systems to interpret, 
validate, and consequently control how creative expression cir-
culates digitally. This can already be observed in examples such 
as the use of AI-based digital rights management (DRM) tools for 
enforcing corporate copyright policy (the main topic of chapter 
6). As a consequence, the ability of a given agent (whether human 
or non-human) to express themselves creatively and critically, 
to access knowledge and information as part of expressive 
activities, and to participate freely in the production and circula-
tion of art and culture, could be severely impinged. It is here that 
AI’s impact on the question of agency and of creativity links most 
directly to current IP models. As I will argue, the various hacking 
capabilities of AI can be utilized strategically, i.e., in alignment 
with such models, but also in opposition to them. I describe the 
latter as tactical uses of AI, and will conclude the chapter by elab-
orating this notion, both as an extension of existing discourse 
on tactical media, and in the context of the kinds of critical AI art 
projects discussed throughout the book. 
Redefining AI in and through Artistic Practice
AI is a strange, chimera-like beast. Arguably, it is as much a 
science as it is a technology, as much a cultural phenomenon 
as it is a philosophical construct. And while AI can be said, quite 
plausibly, to be all of those things, it may also be argued that 
it is really just mythical fabulation, that it does not exist at all. 
While some argue that what is now called AI will continue to inch 
closer to a full exteriorization of “general intelligence,” and then 
on toward a “singularity” event (Kurzweil 2005), others insist 
that AI will remain a computational augmentation of human 
intelligence (as discussed in Markoff 2015). The difficulty of 
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the so-called “AI effect.” This occurs when technological advances 
lead to newly emerging behaviors of AI systems that would once 
have been thought of as proof of intelligence, but which are no 
longer accepted as such because the underlying computational 
processes are understood better (cf. McCorduck 2004). In other 
words, as the capabilities of specific AI applications are moving 
into the mainstream or are superseded by new developments, 
they are no longer seen as satisfying existing definitions of 
intelligent behavior, so that AI always remains an elusive “n+1”. At 
the 2019 Ars Electronica festival, the media art historian Andreas 
Broeckmann suggested that it might indeed be best to use scare 
quotes whenever “artificial intelligence” is invoked, while the 
media theorist Joanna Zylinska describes much of AI as “a so-
called intelligence” (2020).
But regardless of how broadly or narrowly AI is conceived, and 
regardless of whether “Artificial General Intelligence” (AGI) 
is framed anthropocentrically in terms of “true,” “strong,” or 
“weak,” or rather as something that human intelligence cannot 
even begin to fathom, there are some general characteristics 
that find broader, interdisciplinary agreement. For example, a 
general definition of AI that integrates widely held perspectives 
from the technical and social sciences as well as the humanities 
is likely to focus on the description of algorithmic tools that are 
capable of generating knowledge of some kind, often on the 
basis of iterative and generative processes that involve large-
scale analysis of datasets on which AI systems are trained. It is 
also generally accepted that machine learning technologies are 
increasingly responsible for how humans perceive the world, how 
they interact with it, and, consequently, who (and how) human 
agents can be in a world with AI. Definitions nevertheless diverge 
widely across different research domains. An influential definition 
by Russell and Norvig (2009) hints at this divergence nicely: their 
definition situates AI in a four-dimensional spectrum to con-
sider whether any given “intelligent agent” is designed to think 
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the work of Russell and Norvig has tended to focus on rational 
(non-human-based) action (as opposed to thinking), the authors 
acknowledge that more informally, the term AI is often used to 
describe systems that cross over between these definitional 
boundaries in direct imitation of functions associated with 
human cognition. Notably, all of this leaves considerable room for 
very different kinds of philosophical, technical, and ideological 
viewpoints.
To extend these broad characterizations into the cultural sphere 
and connect them to my discussion of critical artistic practice, I 
venture the following definition of AI: I will describe as artificially 
intelligent any assemblage of technologies, operations, functions, 
and effects that can be meaningfully perceived as resulting from 
intelligent (including creative) behavior, or which can be identified 
in outputs that are the results of such behavior. This formulation 
is deliberately inclusive, open-ended, and focused on perception. 
While it allows for the designation “AI”—with or without scare 
quotes—to be applied to technological systems such as advanced 
computational neural networks that approximate functions of 
the human brain, it can also describe the effects created when 
the behaviors of an otherwise dull machinic system are perceived 
as intelligent, or when its outputs are interpreted as creative. My 
definition therefore acknowledges that while inevitably there 
must be a non-human dimension to artificial intelligence, AI is 
nevertheless contingent upon human perception and interpre-
tation. Much like the co-originary nature of the human and the 
technical (cf. Stiegler 1998), AI is, in other words, co-constitutive 
with human intelligence. Further, because my discussion is 
framed by an interest in how AI interfaces with realms of art, 
culture, and politics, my perspective disregards the notion of AI 
as unfathomable for human cognition, and I emphasize, instead, 
that AI is in the eye of the beholder. Even so, my definition is 
positioned both against the anthropomorphizing of AI as human-
like, and against anthropocentrically biased definitions that 
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users. Importantly, I also want to avoid thinking of AI as bounded 
in any singular entity, such as an algorithm or a computer. This 
helps to accommodate the many ways in which AI is continually 
rethought, redefined, and newly instantiated in and across 
emerging technologies, new tools, as well as new ways of using 
and critiquing these. Most importantly, this leaves room for a 
final core element of my thinking on AI, namely that it can be 
understood to manifest in posthumanist agential assemblages 
that cut across human/non-human divides, and which may 
incorporate human (and other living) entities alongside com-
putational or machinic ones.
A broad definition such as the one just offered isn’t likely to 
satisfy everyone. Much more precise definitions can be found 
in virtually every field of research on which my own discus-
sion draws, from philosophy to computational creativity, from 
aesthetic theory to legal philosophy. My definition has the 
advantage, however, that it can accommodate the broader inter-
disciplinary focus through which I link agency and ownership 
issues to AI. Where necessary and useful, my broad conception 
of AI will, in any case, solidify into much more specific definitions, 
for example when discussing how artists use machine learning 
technologies such as Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs), 
or when considering the blackboxing of proprietary algorithms 
used for digital rights management (DRM) purposes. Ultimately, 
dipping in and out of the wide range of available technical def-
initions of AI makes it easier to connect them to the philosophical, 
aesthetic, legal, and political strands of my discussion, and to 
show how this can be incorporated into the self-reflexive and 
meta-discursive critiques that critical AI art leverages.
In discussions of AI, it is sometimes far from clear what exactly 
“intelligence” itself signifies. It might be objected, for example, 
that my own definition of AI can accommodate not only “true” 
intelligence (however that might be construed), but that it could 
also apply to the mere imitation or simulation of intelligent 
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philosopher John Searle’s famous “Chinese Room” argument 
(cf. Searle 1980 and Cole 2020), which concerned the difficulty of 
differentiating between the correct-but-meaningless manipu-
lation of linguistic symbols and an actual understanding of these 
symbols. The thought experiment describes how an entity, con-
cealed in a room, might convince an observer on the outside that 
it knows the Chinese language, even though it remains impossible 
for the observer to determine whether this knowledge expresses 
intelligence or merely a mute ability to convincingly simulate 
intelligence.
Importantly, this distinction loses much of its relevance when 
the focus is placed simply on whether the entity concealed in 
the room can be perceived, for all intents and purposes, as dis-
playing intelligent behavior. Even if true non-human intelligence 
were understood as being so profoundly different from our 
own that it could become unknowable for humans (as discussed 
in Bown 2015 and Bridle 2018, among others), what Searle’s 
example suggests is that I can only ever relate to AI through an 
inflection of my own, inevitably human-centric, understanding 
of what determines intelligence. In the baseline definition of AI 
that I have proposed above, it is for this reason that to identify AI 
means to interpret perceivable functions, effects, or behaviors as 
intelligent. This acknowledges that the theoretical frameworks I 
invoke are themselves interpretive paradigms, and it highlights 
that I am, of course, speaking from the perspective of human 
agency. To acknowledge this is also to open up AI toward the 
integration of posthumanist thought, where, as I discuss below, 
the agencies in which “intelligence” is grounded are understood 
as relational, dynamic, and multi-dimensional.
I have noted earlier that anthropocentric configurations of AI 
may manifest in surveillance technology, in financial applications, 
and in new algorithmic legal tools, where they build on and, 
indeed, amplify ideological frameworks that privilege (and also 
exploit) the human agent and the presumptively singular subject 
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discussion is the observation that something similar applies 
when presumptively “creative” AI is framed in anthropocentric 
terms that derive from longstanding notions of the singular, 
unified artist figure: the anthropocentric instrumentalization of 
AI in copyright contexts, for example, will ever only be able to 
enforce IP perspectives in which the human author/artist figure 
functions as the singular originator and proprietor of human-
made creative expression. Such an instrumentalization could 
hardly accommodate non-human authorship of—or ownership 
in—creative expressions.
To elucidate this, I offer two brief examples that will undergo 
closer analysis in subsequent chapters. The first concerns the 
Canadian artist Adam Basanta’s AI-driven installation All We’d Ever 
Need Is One Another (2018). Building on approaches familiar from 
appropriation art, the installation is designed to autonomously 
generate outputs and to circulate them as artworks if, and only 
if, they are determined by an AI system to closely resemble other 
existing artworks (see chapter 5). While this approach aligns with 
progressive views on creativity as multi-modal and relational, 
unsurprisingly it contradicts perspectives that are focused on 
identifying single (human) authors for unique artworks. And 
indeed, All We’d Ever Need Is One Another has provoked a legal 
complaint alleging that the installation violates another artist’s IP 
rights. Given the prominent role of AI in the generative process, 
my discussion of this case speculates that Basanta himself cannot 
be credibly accused of copyright infringement, and I argue that 
the accusation itself makes sense only as long as it hinges on an 
anthropocentric perspective on AI, authorship, and creativity. The 
second example is situated at the interstices between creative 
expression and commercial AI applications, and concerns You-
Tube’s AI-driven DRM system Content ID (see chapter 6). This tool 
is designed to flag and remove presumptively infringing media 
uploads by enforcing the assumption that creative expression is 
incontrovertibly linked to ownership claims based on identifiable 
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tent ID helps to integrate uploads into the platform’s for-profit, 
property-oriented media ecology. Additionally, it normalizes the 
highly problematic notion that complex legal norms concerning 
authorship, which are themselves intimately tied to long his-
tories of philosophical discourse on the subject, are effectively 
computable. On this basis, Content ID disavows more complex 
configurations of creative expression and agency, which it con-
sequently prevents from freely circulating.
The example of Content ID indicates that AI is capable of 
enforcing the notion of singular human agency, and in doing so 
of impeding divergent forms of creative expression that draw 
on relational, multi-modal, recombinant models. The example 
of All We’d Ever Need Is One Another, in turn, suggests that AI 
experiments which go beyond the anthropocentric paradigm of 
singular human creative agency can disturb the logic of the own-
ership models which systems such as Content ID are designed to 
safeguard. The project frames a new kind of AI-driven creative 
expression that no longer fits (conceptually or practically) with 
the familiar idea of unique expressions that are uniquely linked 
to artists/authors/owners, and which effectively challenges 
anthropocentric ownership models that tend to be amplified 
in current AI applications. My discussion of this kind of AI art 
espouses a move toward a position that does not privilege human 
agency above its various non-human interlocutors, and in this 
sense Basanta’s project will serve as a good example of what I 
describe as a posthumanist agential assemblage.
Whence and Whither Agency?
In all of this, agency reveals itself as a rather slippery idea. There 
are numerous ways in which the concept has been defined 
across different strands of philosophy, law, psychology, and 
neuroscience—not to mention poststructuralism, actor-network 
theory, postcolonial theory, feminist theory, and queer theory, 
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of a capacity to act (see, for example, Schlosser 2019, on which 
this brief summary in part relies, and Chopra and White 2011, who 
try to develop a legal theory of autonomous artificial agents). 
But things quickly get a lot more complicated. Contemporary 
philosophical perspectives on agency tend to take as a common 
starting point the “standard theory of action” (cf. Davidson 1980), 
which considers actions in terms of their intentionality. The 
theory assumes that an entity is capable of exercising agency if it 
is also capable of acting intentionally. In more detailed analyses 
of intentionality that also consider causation, will, or motivation, 
this leads onwards to theories of distinctly human agency (e.g., 
Frankfurt 1971; Taylor 1977). By some accounts, then, a human 
agent is simply a human who acts. But further obstacles appear 
when additional underlying questions are considered: What is an 
“agent,” in this sense, and what defines an “action”? What level of 
autonomy is required to warrant the designation “agential”? Who 
or what can be the judge of intentionality? Once agency becomes 
vested in human beings, it also becomes necessary to ascribe and 
account for mental states, as well as to consider socio-political 
dimensions of autonomy, conscious deliberation, and reasoning. 
It is here that human agency can easily become separated hierar-
chically from other, non-human forms of agency, resulting in a 
normative formalization of anthropocentric bias. Therefore, when 
the agency of artificially intelligent entities is considered, the 
standard theory of action, with its strong focus on intentionality 
and, by extension, mental states, becomes somewhat of a hin-
drance, rather than an aid, with the consequence that advanced 
AI systems might inevitably be relegated to the “lower” status of 
mere “minimally agential” entities (e.g., Barandiaran et al. 2009).
The views on agency I have presented so far are limited in the 
sense that they leave little room for considering the political 
dimensions of agency in socio-economic contexts. Their 
applicability to AI systems is also limited, and they certainly 
cannot easily account for an understanding of AI systems 
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paradigms. In this sense, it is the idea of AI itself that casts doubt 
on the centrality of the human when it comes to questions 
of agency. This notion reverberates powerfully through post-
humanist perspectives. Here, agency is no longer perceived as 
the exclusive domain of human subjectivity, nor even of animate 
bodies. Bruno Latour, for example, in formulating his actor-
network theory (ANT), heralded the use of the term “actant,” 
which he defined as “something that acts or to which activity is 
granted by others,” and which “implies no special motivation of 
human individual actors, nor of humans in general” (Latour 1996, 
373, emphasis in original). New materialism, to give a different 
example, ascribes “vitality” to inanimate matter that has the 
capacity, as Jane Bennett writes, “not only to impede or block 
the will and designs of humans, but also to act as quasi agents 
or forces with trajectories, propensities, or tendencies of their 
own” (Bennett 2009, viii). In extending these perspectives, some 
posthumanist strands of thought altogether veer away from 
the notion of a unified and singular host of agency, and instead 
foreground the fluidity and open-endedness of the assemblage 
or apparatus that comes to replace the once-singular agent. 
The quantum physicist and feminist theorist Karen Barad (2007) 
thus proposes an “agential realism” in which agency radiates 
not from a singular host but emerges through “intra-actional” 
entanglements that cut across the various materialities which 
form agential potentials. In much of this, boundaries between the 
human and non-human are entirely rejected, and unsurprisingly, 
this also broadly rejects humanist attitudes inscribed in familiar 
anthropocentric figurations of agency (cf. Braidotti 2013).
Taken together, these perspectives contest the notion of agency 
as clearly delineated, stable, and singularly grounded in the 
human subject. Agency here becomes relational, porous, fluid, 
and distributed. Where humanist and anthropocentric per-
spectives persist, they take form, for example, in the legal status 
of personhood. As a specific instantiation of (mostly) human 
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contemporary agential subjects, from the right to free expres-
sion to the ability to own property. But here, the dynamism 
and inclusivity of posthumanist perspectives is nowhere yet 
to be found (unless one were inclined to accept the concept of 
corporate personhood as a radical decentering of human sub-
jectivity). What is noticeable, however, is that anthropocentrically 
conceived norms and limits of agency are today increasingly 
upheld through AI technologies that are also potentially capable, 
as I argue, to disturb these same norms and limits. I have already 
mentioned examples of how non-human, computational entities 
can be instrumentalized to perpetuate narrow conceptions of 
agency in surveillance, governance, and IP contexts. It is pre-
cisely against this backdrop that AI must be engaged critically, to 
rethink what is meant by agency as such, and to explore radical 
implications of non-human expressive agency enacted through 
AI. The speculative scattering of agency across human-machinic-
algorithmic assemblages instantiated in critical artistic experi-
ments with AI are an ideal vehicle for just this kind of rethinking.
It is here that the critical potential of the posthumanist agential 
assemblage becomes more apparent. The concept offers a 
way to push AI—and AI art—beyond the humanist subject of 
the singular, unified artist, their individualized voice, and their 
original and uniquely spirited creative expression. In the works 
created by and with such assemblages, the artwork loses its 
humanist contours, while the dynamism and relationality of 
creative expression become manifest. And in their workings—in 
the operational logic, functionality, routines, protocols, and 
processes that characterize AI—the productive entanglements 
between different human and non-human elements find expres-
sion in manifold redistributions of agency across all participating 
elements. The works and workings of the posthumanist agential 
assemblage will continue to take shape throughout the following 
chapters. What all of the examples will be found to share is that 
they engage critically with the humanist horizons of a singular, 
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and intellectual property that rely on these.
In making the leap from intelligence to creativity, it is worth 
looking a bit more closely at the entanglements of AI and agency 
in the Turing test, as well as a few of its successors-in-spirit. Alan 
Turing (1950) proposed his original test as a hypothesis con-
cerning how human observers might identify a computer system 
as intelligent. Right away, the test’s most notable characteristic 
should be emphasized here, namely that to identify a computer 
system as intelligent means to mistake it for another human 
agent. While Turing’s setup is ingeniously simple, it also hinges 
centrally on a fairly obvious expression of anthropocentric bias. 
In response to this, as well as to eliminate how the Turing test 
potentially endorses the mere simulation of intelligence, Selmer 
Bringsjord et al. (2001) designed the hypothetical Lovelace test, 
which proposes that a computational system can be accepted as 
intelligent when it is capable of producing outputs that human 
observers will interpret as creative expressions. Bringsjord 
et al.’s test builds on Ada Lovelace’s oft-cited suggestion that 
computers cannot be said to possess intelligence because they 
“have no pretensions whatever to originate anything” (Lovelace, 
quoted in Baum 1986). It tests, in other words, for qualities which 
computers, according to Ada Lovelace, cannot possess. In this 
setup, a human observer is tasked with judging whether the pre-
sumptively artistic output of a computer is, indeed, creative. This 
is found to be the case if the human observer cannot explain how 
an output was generated, even when it is verifiably not based on 
a mere hardware error (Bringsjord et al. 2001, 9). Like Lovelace 
herself, Bringsjord and his co-authors assume that this is effec-
tively impossible, and conclude that (at the time of their writing) 
the hypothetical test was not likely to be beaten by any computer, 
in part because the machine would need to possess a “rather rad-
ical kind of autonomy” that they find difficult to imagine, let alone 
to design (ibid. 25).
47The ambition of the Lovelace test is to improve upon some of 
the Turing test’s perceived flaws, in part by replacing a judge’s 
subjectivity with a query regarding the algorithmic foundations 
underlying presumptively creative AI outputs. But it can be 
argued that the test merely replaces one subjective notion (an 
anthropocentric understanding of intelligence) with another (an 
anthropocentric understanding of creativity). This criticism can 
also be applied to more recent iterations of the Lovelace test. 
For example, based on the assumption that human creativity is 
fundamentally rule-driven and algorithmic, Marcus du Sautoy 
(2019) proposes his own Lovelace test, which is virtually identical 
to the version of Bringsjord et al. except for the slight twist that it 
should also be repeatable, i.e., not random. Lev Manovich’s Turing 
AI Arts test, to give a different example, shares the goal of the 
Lovelace test(s) before it, but is modeled more directly on Turing’s 
test design. Problematically, Manovich adds an elitist dimension 
to the anthropocentric bias of the original: in this version, the 
artistic nature of AI outputs is asserted only when “professional 
members of the art world recognize [them] as belonging to ‘con-
temporary art’” (2019, 1). What these proposed tests share is that 
their determinations of non-human creativity and intelligence 
are made on the assumption that all creativity and/or intelligence 
will resemble that of human agents. They all propose that if the 
test is passed, the non-human entities that are being evaluated 
are elevated to a realm of agency that renders them, oddly, more 
human-like. Again, I would argue that such a perspective can 
hardly accommodate dynamic and relational manifestations of 
agency in a posthumanist sense, nor new forms of perceived 
intelligence or creativity that these could frame.
In this context, “pretensions” and “originate” jump out from 
the Lovelace statement quoted above. The terms imply that if 
an AI system were capable of passing the test, it would exhibit 
the intention of creating outputs ex nihilo. This not only invokes 
the interrelated humanist notions of creativity, originality, and 
authorship, but also links to the ways in which IP theory has 
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determining the copyrightability of an expression. The privileging 
of a will to effect originality as a core prerequisite for creative 
agency is also implied by Bringsjord et al.’s formulation that 
AI creativity must satisfy the criterion of “unexplainability.” In 
current AI discourse, the concept of unexplainability invokes the 
idea that the nature of non-human intelligence (as well as the 
internal processes that lead to AI-generated outputs) may be 
unknowable from a human perspective. But when it is linked back 
to debates about AI creativity, the concept of unexplainability 
also invokes humanist ideals of authorial agency.
An important development in the trajectory from Turing test to 
Lovelace test is that more recent perspectives no longer seem to 
focus merely on identifying intelligence as such, but also on the 
idea that creative expression may be understood as an embodied 
and authentic manifestation of agency. The idea that creativity is 
an important marker of intelligence certainly seems valid; what is 
problematic is that the various tests introduced above appear to 
suggest either that creativity is effectively computable, or that it 
must be framed anthropocentrically. In any case, it would appear 
that, following this trajectory, it can be assumed that if AI is found 
to be creative, it must also be found to have agency. If it is further 
assumed that creative agency will be exteriorized in a form that 
can be grasped and evaluated by human observers (namely in 
presumptively creative AI-generated expressions), then inevitably 
there also arise difficult questions concerning the moral, legal, 
and economic statuses which AI-as-artist (as opposed to the 
human artist working with AI) and the AI-generated artwork 
might have to be granted.
The question of whether AI can be creative interests me only 
insofar as it represents an opportunity to rethink what is actually 
meant by creativity, and how such a rethinking can impact the 
technological, socio-economic, legal, and, ultimately, ideological 
entanglements of emerging forms and constellations of creative 
agency. Since creative agency implies authorship, any assumption 
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the beginning of this chapter, namely that AI is capable of hacking 
ownership, anthropocentrically conceived. It must therefore 
also be asked what ownership itself signifies in the context of 
agential AI. The conceptual underpinnings of the IP paradigms 
currently in place would seem to suggest that if AI can achieve 
human-like creativity, it should also be entitled, like a human 
author, to control the fruits of its labor. In mainstream debate on 
creative AI and AI art, the alarmist response to this suggestion 
tends to be that AI will disrupt the art market (see my discussion 
in chapter 4). I would argue that this should not be taken to mean 
only that AI will begin to “compete” with human authors, but 
also that critical AI art has a powerful opportunity to upend the 
value propositions of anthropocentric and humanist approaches 
to authorship. This can happen, for example, by emphasizing 
relational reconfigurations of agency and creative expression that 
move toward a decentering of the humanist (and human) subject 
that grounds anthropocentric property models.
The concept of property itself, even when it is narrowly con-
ceived, always delineates a relational constellation (between 
owner and property, and between owners of property). 
Additionally, any notion of a property enclosure also entails, at 
least speculatively, the potential for a commons (I will return to 
this in my final chapter). As such, property rights, despite their 
notional exclusivity, are mostly situated in environments that 
delineate ownership as porous and malleable. The logic of IP, for 
example, situates copyright as a core mechanism through which 
the expressive agency of individuals solidifies into exclusive prop-
erty rights. But this logic is recursive, since it is itself based on 
philosophical traditions (including Hegel’s personality theory, dis-
cussed in the next chapter) that construe property as that which 
helps to solidify individuality, personhood, and thus agency. 
When critical uses of AI propose the emergence of posthumanist 
expressive agency, this effectively begins to undermine the 
recursive logic of IP.
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A critical art of artificial intelligence appropriates AI’s capability 
of hacking agency, creativity, and ownership, and opposes it 
tactically. In doing so it strongly contrasts with what I would 
describe as strategic uses of AI. The distinction between strategic 
and tactical practices has been most prominently theorized in 
Michel de Certeau’s Practice of Everyday Life (2011). De Certeau’s 
discussion of tactics in cultural contexts has greatly influenced 
the work of new media art activists such as the Critical Art 
Ensemble (2001), and even though the concept of tactical media, 
as theorized, for example, by Rita Riley (2009), fell out of fashion 
relatively quickly, de Certeau’s concept of tactics continues to 
resonate with a broader canon of media theoretical work from 
the left, for example Alexander Galloway’s (2004) discussion of 
control protocols in decentralized communication technology, 
McKenzie Wark’s influential A Hacker Manifesto (2004), or more 
recently the manifesto published by the Critical Engineering 
Working Group (Oliver et al. n.d.).
In de Certeau’s formulation, the purpose of strategy is to serve 
administrative and managerial agendas by drawing on system-
inherent control architectures, often with the purpose of con-
taining critical or divergent elements within a system. Examples 
might include the organization of work processes on a shop floor, 
or the algorithmic ordering of consumer behavior. Strategy is 
described as goal-oriented, and focuses on instrumentalizing the 
structural affordances of the environmental/social/technological 
substrate in which it is embedded. In this sense, strategic 
approaches to AI (and perhaps even strategic critiques of it) are 
likely to align with what I have earlier discussed as computational 
thinking, and strategic implementations of AI might manifest, for 
example, in applications that reinforce or amplify anthropocen-
tric ideological frameworks in surveillance, finance, or IP con-
texts. In artistic contexts, strategic utilization of AI may employ 
the technology to reinscribe anthropocentric configurations of 
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count AI works such as Contrapposto, discussed in the intro-
ductory chapter, as well as Portrait of Edmond Belamy, which is the 
subject of my analysis in chapter 4.
Tactics, by contrast, are described by de Certeau as the recal-
citrant and oppositional response to strategic operations. In de 
Certeau’s thinking, to proceed tactically is to practice the “art of 
making-do,” i.e., to operate from a position that is responsive, 
fluid, and embedded in the system or technology that is being 
challenged. In comparison to strategy, tactics is less goal-
oriented. It operates along open-ended vectors of resistance, 
rather than pursuing the ossification of a situation in strategically 
advantageous positions of dominance. As such, tactical 
approaches are associated with oppositional viewpoints, cunning, 
and shrewdness (see Scott 1998, discussed in Zeilinger 2017). 
In AI contexts, this can translate into approaches that “hack” AI 
in precisely the ways introduced earlier in this chapter. Tactical 
AI, in this sense, is likely to resist strategic approaches that 
blackbox knowledge, restrict access, or reinforce narrow concep-
tualizations of agency. In the given context of my general project, 
this also means that tactical approaches to working with AI align 
themselves with characteristics of the posthumanist agential 
assemblage, specifically its challenges to humanist frameworks 
of singular, unified agency and anthropocentric perspectives on 
cultural ownership.
Kate Crawford and Trevor Paglen’s ImageNet Roulette (2019) 
is a good example of a critical work of AI art that proceeds 
tactically. Utilizing mainstream image recognition technology, 
the project was designed to expose bias inherent in the data 
used for machine learning purposes, and consequently also in 
the algorithmic procedures derived from them. As such, the 
project articulates a powerful critique of how agency and cultural 
ownership are construed in and through such systems (Craw-
ford and Paglen 2019b). ImageNet Roulette (which, for reasons 
explained below, is no longer available for online viewing or use) 
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self-portrait, which would then be evaluated and interpreted by 
a purpose-built image recognition system. This system had been 
trained on the ImageNet dataset, a compilation of over 14 million 
labelled images that includes everyday objects as well as portraits 
of individuals, and which is widely used for the development 
of machine vision applications by researchers, government 
agencies, and in corporate contexts (ImageNet 2016). Importantly, 
the initial labelling of the dataset contents had been carried out 
by clickworkers, (individuals who typically receive extremely low 
per-task remuneration for repetitive data-entry activities carried 
out remotely). The experience of interacting with ImageNet 
Roulette somewhat resembled the popular personality quiz 
apps that circulate on social media; in return for private user 
information, such apps customarily offer free and exhilarating 
feedback, such as pseudo-psychological profiles or astrological 
advice. Often, such offerings disguise app developers’ ulterior 
motives of data-extraction for commercial or political purposes. 
In the case of ImageNet Roulette, a user’s reward for uploading an 
image of themselves was to have the system analyze and eval-
uate the uploaded image, to potentially shocking effect. 
The intention behind ImageNet Roulette was that as part of this 
evaluation process, it would become clear to the user that beyond 
the artifice of presumptively objective computational processes, 
artificially intelligent systems are in fact deeply saturated with 
human bias. The subjectivity and extreme bias ingrained in 
the ImageNet dataset meant that a “photograph of a woman 
smiling in a bikini” might be classified as a “slattern, slut, slovenly 
woman, trollop” (Crawford and Paglen, 2019b). To give another 
example, in a review of the project for The Guardian, a journalist 
of Asian descent found herself identified as “gook, slant-eye” 
(Wong 2019). By subjecting users to this kind of system-inherent 
offensive feedback, ImageNet Roulette very successfully managed 
to challenge popular assumptions regarding the presumptive 
objectivity and interpretive validity of computational processes; 
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or otherwise not human-readable; to raise awareness of the 
exploitative labor practices behind biased labelling practices; to 
highlight data mining practices that link machine learning and 
private user information; and, by implication, to raise ownership 
issues related to dataset compilation practices and “big data” 
more generally.
Exposure to the hard-coded bias of the ImageNet dataset con-
fronted users of ImageNet Roulette with the realization that 
outputs generated by non-human computational systems still 
express the all-too human prejudices injected into such systems, 
and that these systems are themselves part and parcel of the 
ideological frameworks that produce them and within which they 
circulate. In the context of discussing tactical approaches to AI, 
the achievement of Crawford and Paglen’s project is to radically 
disturb the public image of machine learning technologies by 
appropriating and repurposing the data that forms the subject of 
the critique. As such, the project made it easy for non-specialist 
users to grasp that while the non-human, algorithmic eval-
uation of image characteristics cannot avoid human bias, such 
technology is certainly a good way of obfuscating and disguising 
this bias.
ImageNet Roulette thus forced an awareness that presumptively 
agential algorithmic systems can powerfully deny human users 
their own agency; in the case of this project, the evaluations 
received in response to uploading an image were likely to vio-
late a user’s sense of ownership with regard to their self-image, 
identity, and the interpretation thereof. Like the AI-based eval-
uative tools mimicked by ImageNet Roulette, the project itself 
flaunted a seemingly objective capability to produce new and 
valid knowledge about human users. But because ImageNet 
Roulette simultaneously worked to undermine this appearance, 
it also activated users’ resistance to the workings and outputs of 
ImageNet.
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Crawford and Paglen raised awareness concerning the potential 
misappropriation of image content circulating online, specifically 
with regard to the web-scraping of dataset contents, a practice 
that frequently exploits legal loopholes in existing IP frameworks. 
Again, ImageNet Roulette approached this subject tactically, by 
emulating the functionality of popular online tools offering free 
services in return for permission to use private user data. While 
ImageNet Roulette itself was explicit about not retaining copies of 
uploaded images, the project format nevertheless drew attention 
to image ownership questions concerning the underlying dataset. 
For example, while the operators of ImageNet (the project is 
maintained in a collaboration between Princeton University 
and Stanford University) state that they do not hold copyrights 
in any of the images in the dataset, this does not mean that the 
individuals captured in the dataset images have consented to 
their use. Originally, online documentation for the project noted 
that ImageNet recognizes copyrights held in “the images in their 
original resolutions” (ImageNet Download FAQ). But this implied 
that the institutions maintaining the project may well claim own-
ership in the collections of low-resolution thumbnails with which 
labels and classifiers are paired, or likewise in the compilation of 
URLs linking back to the original images. Additionally, the project 
website clarifies that copies of all images in the dataset are kept 
on non-public servers, where they can be made available, upon 
request, for certain non-commercial and/or educational uses. 
While this formulation suggests that ImageNet is not meant for 
commercial exploitation, it is very difficult to control the contexts 
within which tools derived from ImageNet are used.
The achievements of ImageNet Roulette consist in the efficiency 
with which the project reconfigured the existing structure and 
functionality of ImageNet into a powerful critique of the under-
lying technology, as well as in the impact that the project had on 
public perceptions of dataset bias. As such, the project exem-
plifies how tactical artistic approaches can disturb, complicate, 
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a good context for beginning to explore how agency is construed 
in and through AI. Within less than a year of the project’s release, 
hundreds of thousands of images and image descriptors were 
being removed from the ImageNet dataset (see Yang et al. 2019; 
Rea 2019), at which point the project was taken offline.
Tactical uses of AI, as I have described them above, denote critical 
modes of practice that proceed along vectors of flexibility, deter-
ritorialization, and resilience. In contrast to the computational 
thinking encoded in strategic AI (such as ImageNet itself), tactical 
AI ultimately emphasizes the need for broader systemic under-
standing in computational contexts. It exemplifies a push toward 
what Bridle calls a fluency “not only in the language of a system, 
but in its metalanguage” (2018). Arguably, ImageNet Roulette 
aimed to steer its users toward such a critical systemic literacy 
of AI. Ed Finn describes this as the ability to develop practices of 
“algorithmic reading,” i.e., the ability to develop and implement 
a “critical frame for interpreting objects that are also interpre-
ting you” (Finn 2017, 55). In the following chapters, I will expand 
my discussion of AI art to projects which, like ImageNet Roulette, 
address issues of agency and cultural ownership, but which link 
these issues more directly to intellectual property, expressive 




Agency, and Property  
in AI
When the American engineer and computer artist Michael A. 
Noll attempted to register his copyright in Gaussian Quadratic 
(1963), a software-generated plotter graphic that is now con-
sidered a foundational work of software-based generative art 
(fig. 2), he encountered difficulties linking questions of creative 
agency to questions of intellectual property (IP), in a prefiguration 
of similar issues that are now playing out in AI art contexts. 
Copyright registrars at the U.S. Library of Congress had concerns 
regarding the general eligibility of Gaussian Quadratic for such 
legal protection, and repeatedly denied Noll’s request before it 
was finally granted.1 Gaussian Quadratic had been created at Bell 
Labs, where Noll, who, throughout his career, has persistently 
resisted identification as an artist, was employed as an engineer 
and researcher (cf. Taylor 2014, 32ff.). As Noll (1994, 41) recalls, 
1 Readers with specialist knowledge of copyright law may wonder if Noll was 
attempting to register the underlying software code as a literary work, or 
instead to register its outputs as individual artistic works. Unfortunately, 
Noll’s (1994) own anecdotal retelling of the episode offers little clue, and no 
digital record of the copyright registration is available.
58 the work was initially deemed ineligible for copyright protection 
because the registrars viewed it as the creation of a computer 
system, rather than that of a human artist. This might seem like 
a progressive interpretation, but in a pragmatic sense it simply 
meant that from the copyright registrars’ perspective, the law’s 
requirement for an identifiable author/creator did not appear 
to be met. In response, Noll clarified that the graphic is, in fact, 
based on code written by a human, and explained that his 
program incorporates randomness to generate ever-different 
outputs. His second request was then also denied, this time 
based on the concern that even if a human author had been at 
work here, the randomness characterizing the work violated 
the “fixity” requirements of copyright law, i.e., the need for the 
work to exist in a fixed expression. Copyright protection for 
Gaussian Quadratic was finally granted when Noll rephrased his 
request a third time, insisting that even though the outputs of 
his generative algorithm are unpredictable, the human-authored 
code substrate represents an original and stable text, whose 
creativity is constituted precisely through its capacity to generate 
dynamic results.2
The contradictory chain of interpretations involved in the process 
of registering copyright in Gaussian Quadratic invokes the various 
kinds of speculation regarding non-human creative agency that I 
2 Today, Gaussian Quadratic is considered as one of the first copyright- 
protected works of computer-generated art. Noll writes that AT&T and 
Bell Labs, his employers at the time, were hesitant to publicly support his 
creative activities. Indeed, permission for him and his collaborator Bela 
Julesz to claim intellectual property ownership in their work appears to have 
been granted in order to divert public attention away from the corporate 
entities themselves, perhaps on the assumption that the creative experi-
ments would be of little commercial value, or even harmful to corporate 
image and strategy. It is worth mentioning that this general attitude would 
soon reverse, with prominent artist residency programs springing up at Bell 
Labs and many other IT corporations. A corollary of this development is that 
permission for participating artists to retain exclusive IP rights is now much 
less likely to be granted. On the emergence of artist residencies in corporate 
technology contexts, see Scarlett 2020.
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have described in the previous chapter, and foreshadows how AI 
projects are now interfacing with similar questions of creativity, 
agency, and ownership. To me, the hesitations of the Library 
of Congress registrars indicate humanist and anthropocen-
tric biases underlying their interpretation of Noll’s work for the 
purpose of determining its eligibility for copyright protection. In 
[Figure 2] Michael A. Noll, Gaussian Quadratic (1963). Copyright Victoria and Albert 
Museum; image used by permission.
60 this sense, the initial rejection of Noll’s request suggests that the 
registrars may have humored, at least speculatively, the notion 
of a redistribution of creative agency from a human to a non-
human entity; at the same time, the rejection shows that legally 
speaking, the registrars were unable to accept a computer as 
the artwork’s author in the conventional sense. If the graphic 
was to be considered as the output of an autonomous computer, 
this meant that no valid author figure could be identified, and 
the graphic itself could not, consequence, be recognized as a 
copyright-protectable work of art. When Noll insisted that he 
himself was indeed the creator of the work, the Library of Con-
gress registrars then questioned his creative agency, given that 
by his own admission he was not fully in control of his program’s 
outputs. Ultimately, in order to be granted the protection that 
IP law commonly affords artists, Noll had to rescind on the 
main speculative implication enacted in this algorithm-driven 
generative work, namely that a shared creative agency existed 
between him and the technological system he used. (This 
implication resonates with the position of other early computer 
artists, including Frieder Nake, who similarly insisted that his 
work emerged from a collaborative working-together of human 
and computer.) From the perspective of the copyright registrars, 
Gaussian Quadratic could only exist as a copyright-protectable 
work of art if Noll asserted his authorial control over the 
generative system.
Compared to the complex and data-intensive computational 
tools available to contemporary artists working with AI today, the 
algorithm used to generate Gaussian Quadratic is quite straight-
forward. I would nevertheless argue that the work plays with the 
speculative possibilities of the posthumanist agential assem-
blage and its instantiation in computational functions, effects, 
technologies, or processes whose outcome can be interpreted as 
creative. Arguably, the copyright registrars acted in recognition 
of just such an interpretation when they initially rejected Noll’s 
request. As such, the work highlights how, in an environment 
61in which validation of a creative expression through IP mech-
anisms has become the norm, artistic experimentation with tools 
that are artificially intelligent (or interpreted as such) requires a 
rethinking of copyright issues in relation to agency and creativity.
Historically, the exclusive and exclusionary mechanisms through 
which agency and personhood have been granted (or with-
held) have often served to disadvantage and exploit margin-
alized groups based on gender, race, ethnicity, sexual identity, 
political conviction, and other criteria. To dispute the agency of 
an individual, group, or community has often meant to withhold 
not only rights to personal freedom, self-determination, and free-
dom of expression, but also rights to own property. As discussed 
below, some humanist perspectives closely link agency and 
ownership, to the point of considering them as co-constitutive. 
In order to explore further how speculative figurations of agency 
in AI systems might disturb the aesthetic and socio-economic 
frameworks in which they are embedded, it is necessary to 
unpack how these frameworks themselves draw on anthropocen-
tric conceptions of agency. This is my aim in the present chapter: 
to elaborate, based on underlying philosophical tenets and legal 
theory, conceptual links between agency, personhood, and own-
ership—first with a focus on how these links form a foundation 
of IP principles, and then in consideration of how such principles 
can (or cannot) be applied to AI. This paves the way for my discus-
sion, in the subsequent chapters, of AI art projects that interfere 
drastically with contemporary ownership models.
AI Authorship According to Hegel
A good starting point is to explore links between legal concepts 
of property and philosophical conceptualizations of personality 
and personhood. I will do so by way of Hegel’s personality theory 
(1821), which continues to serve as a significant reference point in 
explanatory and justificatory frameworks for private property. 
The theory assumes the following: unless a clear sense of self 
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begin to know itself as such, cannot begin to fathom its own 
subjectivity, and as a consequence those around it will be unable 
to relate to it as an individual. When these externalized manifes-
tations of self become an individual’s property, the individual’s 
legitimate ownership claims co-constitute its personality. Who 
would I be, in other words, without some kind of externalization 
of “me” that is expressed in material and/or immaterial con-
structs and artefacts over which I can assert control? This per-
spective thus posits property and personality as co-constitutive 
and inextricably linked. It underpins the anthropocentric ideal of 
the emergence of an autonomous agent that is philosophically, 
legally, socially, and economically recognized by its ability to own 
property.
As the legal philosopher Peter Drahos notes, property is so 
important in Hegel’s concept of identity and personality because 
it is through its acquisition and management that the mind, in 
Hegelian terms a free and unbound entity, manages to “achieve 
[a] concrete form of existence in the world” (Drahos 1996, 76). 
This concrete form manifests as personality “through the appro-
priation of things” (ibid.), to which, Hegel writes, any individual 
should have an absolute right. Significantly, for Hegel it is not 
only material objects that are subject to such appropriation, 
nor are tangible artefacts the only medium in which the self can 
find expression. Rather, as Drahos observes, “mental aptitudes, 
erudition, [and] artistic skill” (77) play a similarly important 
role in Hegel’s concept of the formation of personality. Once 
externalized in tangible form, these “inner possessions” there-
fore also render the individual as a person. The agency of 
an individual as constituted by its ownership of externalized 
artefacts thus hinges fundamentally on the “objectification” of 
the individual’s will (cf. Palmer 2005, 139), or, in Hegelian terms, on 
the imposition of a concrete form (“occupancy”) on an externality.
While some contemporary critical positions contest this 
Hegelian perspective, the logic of its compelling notion of 
63authorship-as-ownership persists in IP theory and policy. Noll’s 
Gaussian Quadratic is a case in point. The artist’s difficulties in 
registering the work exemplify legal requirements according to 
which creative expressions need to be traceable to an originator; 
if these requirements are not satisfied, the aesthetic artefact is 
not eligible for copyright protection, and it becomes difficult for it 
to be owned, traded or gifted within the parameters that intellec-
tual property law provides. If, in other words, no recognizable 
author of an aesthetic artefact work can be identified, then for 
many intents and purposes the artefact in question is no “work” 
at all. But if such an aesthetic artefact is indeed recognized as the 
original, creative expression of an identifiable author, this has 
significant implications for the nature and identity of this author 
figure.
A question raised by the copyright eligibility issues surrounding 
Gaussian Quadratic is what complications might arise when 
artificially intelligent agential assemblages become involved in 
creating (im)material artefacts which, following the Hegelian 
perspective, can be understood to engender personhood. 
What happens when such assemblages begin to operate auto-
nomously, and detach from human subjectivity and knowability 
to such a degree that it is no longer possible to say, with any 
degree of authority, whether their outputs are “my” creations, 
and whether their decision-making processes and interpretations 
of information emerge from “my” thinking?
When non-human agential entities come into the picture, the 
anthropocentric logic underlying the Hegelian perspective—that 
personality forms through the externalization of will and the sub-
sequent instantiation of this externalization as property—can be 
short-circuited. In such a situation, the “becoming-agent” through 
which, in a humanist framework, the individual is cast as creator 
and owner of things, is subject to various disturbances. What if, 
for example, an AI system is used in the making of an artwork 
in such a way that the human artist involved can no longer with 
certainty be considered as the creator of the work in question? 
64 When Christie’s promoted the auction sale of the AI-generated 
artwork Portrait of Edmond Belamy in October 2018 by invoking 
this suggestion, many observers argued that the sale could 
significantly disrupt the author- and ownership relations which 
conventionally structure the art world. While the work certainly 
raised a number of interesting questions, in the following 
chapter I will argue that the presumptive non-human creative 
agency manifest in Portrait of Edmond Belamy actually relies on 
strongly anthropocentric models of authorship, and ultimately 
perpetuates the ownership models the work was said to be dis-
rupting. The example suggests, nevertheless, that the emergence 
of presumptively creative AI, even when it appears as part of 
agential assemblages that also include human artists, signals a 
potential decentering of human agency, and the destabilizing of 
the processes by which agency (and thus ownership) have been 
traditionally assigned and recognized.
If an AI system were to be accepted as creative in an 
anthropocentric sense of the term, what kind of status would it 
be assigned as it pushes beyond aesthetics and into the domains 
of ethics, law, and economy? Sketching out an answer to such 
a question requires a more detailed consideration of whether 
authorship/ownership claims could become vested in AI. As 
noted in the previous chapter, property is a fundamentally 
relational construct; it establishes and maintains relationships 
between owner and non-owners in respect of the owned prop-
erty, and is demarcated by a clearly definable set of rights and 
responsibilities. But a property relation is also always dynamic, 
in the sense that at any given moment it is both fixed (i.e., prop-
erty rights are clearly assigned and enforceable) and subject to 
change (i.e., property rights are generally alienable). Because 
property rights assume and/or assert the existence of an owner, 
they have conventionally relied on some concept of personhood 
through which the subject of the legal rights and duties linked to 
ownership can be defined. What is not always spelt out clearly, 
however, is whether the legal person thus constituted must in 
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theorist Margaret Radin has suggested that any entity can in 
theory hold property rights, as long as the law can recognize this 
entity as an owner (Radin 1982; for a critique of Radin’s position, 
see Schnably 1993; an early exploration of these arguments in AI 
contexts can be found in Solum 1992). In practice, however, this 
recognition has long been tied to a de facto requirement that an 
owner must not only be a legal person but also human. There 
are, by now, a few contexts in which legal and economic theory 
have opened up traditional conceptualizations of personhood 
toward what might be described as a trans-human perspective 
on agency: non-human corporate entities, for example, are now 
recognized virtually everywhere as legal persons. AI, however, 
has for now not been afforded such a status. When it comes to 
intelligence and creativity, anthropocentric biases persist.
Legal theory generally links personhood to agency by way of the 
assumption that when an action occurs, it can be traced to an 
agent who has, presumptively, acted with intention. Hegel’s per-
sonality theory illustrates how this perspective negotiates the line 
between philosophical perspectives on agency and legal theories 
of property; it also suggests that the conceptual foundations 
of intellectual property themselves express anthropocentric 
ideals of authorship and creativity (cf. Hughes 1988; Radin 1993; 
Schroeder 2006). The Hegelian perspective—“that the person 
becomes a real self only by engaging in a property relationship 
with something external” (Radin 1982, 972)—assumes both that 
an individual’s personality is actualized externally through the 
institution of property, and that property functions as a pre-
requisite for the formation of an individual capable of recognizing 
itself and of being recognized as such by others (Hegel 1952, 42). 
When this logic is extended to AI, and when artificially intelligent 
technological systems are interpreted as exhibiting creative 
agency comparable to that of human agents, AI inevitably begins 
to undermine anthropocentric IP models.
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individual personhood and self-ownership, it is possible to derive 
from it the assumption that both the creator of an IP artefact 
and its owner must be natural persons (cf. Hughes 1988). In 
digital contexts, such an assumption can become grounds for 
the argument that AI, because it cannot qualify for “natural 
person” status, cannot author artworks, nor hold property rights 
in its expressions. With regard to agency, a similar logic can be 
applied: considering the personhood status that is required so 
that individuals can be recognized as authors, the agency that 
enables an individual to own property rights becomes linked to 
the agency that enables persons to express themselves crea-
tively. As a consequence, copyright law has tended to assign 
ownership rights over any given creative expression to its pre-
sumptively human creators. The U.S. Compendium of Copyright 
Practices spells this out explicitly: “The U.S. Copyright Office will 
register an original work of authorship, provided that the work 
was created by a human being” (§306). But this formulation is 
open to challenges in contexts where it is unclear whether the 
human agent involved in the expressive act can, indeed, be 
meaningfully acknowledged as the creator. A good example is 
Naruto v. Slater (2018), a legal dispute in which People for Ethical 
Treatment of Animals (PETA) accused a photographer of copyright 
infringement, suing him on behalf of a monkey that had used the 
photographer’s unattended camera for a series of now-famous 
“monkey selfies” (see Jiang 2019).
Can IP Law Accommodate Artistic AI?
I have already suggested that to speculate on the creativity of 
AI means inevitably also to speculate on AI agency, and thus to 
contend with the possibility of authorship and ownership rights 
vested in AI. Without a certain kind of creative agency, one cannot 
create; without a certain kind of legal agency, one cannot own. 
But if the U.S. Library of Congress’ copyright registrars found 
it difficult to determine the legal status of a relatively simple 
67generative graphic such as Noll’s Gaussian Quadratic, then it is 
clear that advanced AI raises the stakes significantly. Yet, as the 
law and technology scholar James Grimmelmann notes, in many 
legal systems copyright law appears to have concluded, at least 
for the moment, “that it is for humans only” (Grimmelmann 2016).
The history of legal philosophy indicates that in addressing 
questions of legal personhood, law has typically either ignored 
the biological status of its subjects or has been ignorant of it 
(cf. Chopra and White 2011, 153). Considering this lack of clear 
direction regarding requirements for a legal subject to be human, 
the law and technology scholar Robert van den Hoven van 
Genderen suggests that any non-human person could theo-
retically be “in an equal position as an individual and natural 
person, unless otherwise provided by law” (van den Hoven van 
Genderen 2018, 30, referencing Naffine 2003). Concerning the 
legal concept of personhood, van den Hoven van Genderen 
summarizes three noteworthy perspectives: 1) “personhood 
means nothing more than the formal capacity to be a carrier 
of legal rights and duties;” 2) “a (legal) person is any reasonable 
human creature;” 3) a person is a “rational, responsible actor.” 
Only the first and the third of these definitions can potentially 
be extended to AI; the third, additionally, has the potential to 
exclude some human agents (ibid., 35ff.). The question, then, is 
whether these perspectives can be linked to the kind of agency 
implied by the broader concept of authorship, which is being 
ever more closely approximated by expressive AI assemblages 
that might involve human participants, software, hardware, and 
algorithmic operations alongside one another, in enacting what I 
have described as a relational, multi-modal kind of posthumanist 
creative agency in the previous chapter.
But debates concerning new ontologies of authorship that 
branch off from existing paradigms remain strongly marked by 
anthropocentric bias. Here, once again, AI-generated outputs 
tend to be compared to human-made expressions, which 
can result in some rather strange logic. The legal scholars 
68 Yanisfky-Ravid and Velez-Hernandez (2018), for example, suggest 
that many works produced by what they call creative robots 
would surely be copyrightable—if only they had been created 
by humans. This perspective may seem like a challenge to the 
above-cited sentiment that copyright is “for humans only,” but it 
also assumes that machine creativity is, essentially, like human 
creativity. The authors’ suggestion to extend copyright eligibility 
to machine-made artworks thus hinges on a self-contradictory 
anthropomorphization of expressive AI, robots, and other non-
human entities as human-like.
Oliver Bown, a researcher in the field of computational creativity, 
is among many who have voiced concerns regarding such a per-
spective, by pointing out that if the possibility of non-human 
creative agency is taken seriously, it must be accepted that 
machine-creativity might not function “in particularly human-
like ways” (2015, 18). It might instead match what Ray Kurzweil 
and others (Kurzweil 2005; Bridle 2018) have invoked as the 
specter of fundamentally unknowable non-human intelligence. 
Thus returns the underlying issue of whether or not creativity 
itself is a fundamentally human quality. In the editorial intro-
duction to a topical special issue of Philosophy & Technology, David 
Gunkel observes that “the one remaining bulwark of human 
exceptionalism appears to be creativity and artistry” (2017, 263). 
As Gunkel himself notes, this opinion of course does not stand 
unchallenged, and some might argue that invocations of such 
exceptionalism are, in fact, at the core of the anthropomor-
phizing rhetoric that is often applied to AI. If creativity is truly 
unique to humans, then any admission that AI could also act 
creatively is either a radical rethinking of “the human,” or already 
an anthropomorphization of artificial intelligence. Accordingly, 
machine-generated artworks can help at least to “stress-test” 
(264) prevalent assumptions, definitions, and categories con-
cerning what it means to be human (or not), what it means to 
have creative agency (or not), and how to disentangle com-
plications regarding the anthropomorphization of AI.
69A recent essay by the legal scholars Carys Craig and the late Ian 
Kerr offers one of the most comprehensive critiques to date 
of the anthropomorphizing tendencies with which emerging 
AI technologies are sometimes approached (Craig and Kerr, 
2021). Writing from an interdisciplinary perspective, the authors 
adopt Kate Darling’s HCI/HRI concept of “anthropomor-
phic framing,” which describes tendencies to conceive of AI 
functionality and “behavior” in human terms—for example by 
giving robot humanoid shapes, by naming AI systems, or by using 
anthropocentric terminology to describe AI activities (Darling 
2017, cited in Craig and Kerr, 32).3 As Craig and Kerr show, much of 
the discourse that links artificial intelligence to creative expres-
sion works not only by way of anthropomorphizing AI, but also, 
importantly, by way of an elaborate replaying of the myth of the 
romantic author figure. In other words, one of the most powerful 
ways of positing AI as “author” is to attach to it romantic notions 
of creativity, such as the fictions of ex nihilo creation and of the 
unified, singular author figure. This approach is exemplified by 
Arthur I. Miller’s (2019) recent book-length survey of AI art: the 
book is an impressively comprehensive endeavor, but its notion 
of creativity is predominantly derived from human “genius” 
figures, whose superior brains serve as the models to which 
the presumptive creativity of computer “brains” is compared. 
Here, an oddly inverted mirror image of the idea of creativity’s 
“effective computability” (see chapter 1) emerges, in the form of 
Miller’s insistence on the all-too human(ist) nature of genius.
A reliance on humanist ideals that have traditionally framed 
definitions of human creativity may be helpful for arguing that 
AI is capable of acting independently in producing expressions 
that satisfy the cognitive scientist Margaret Boden’s widely used 
creativity criteria of novelty, originality, and unexpectedness 
3 While my discussion adopts this concept, I use the phrase “anthropocen-
tric framing” instead, to reflect the fact that my focus is less on the 
anthropomorphization of AI than it is on tendencies to design and interpret 
AI functionality from anthropocentric viewpoints.
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spective draws, this line of argumentation will likely ignore the 
dialogic and relational processes that ultimately constitute 
human authorship. In other words, such a view on AI creativity 
perpetuates assumptions regarding the exceptional uniqueness 
and supremacy of the humanist, individualized subject that 
post-anthropocentric, posthumanist critical thinking wishes to 
critique. A conclusion to be drawn from Craig and Kerr’s insightful 
discussion is thus that even when the idea of AI creativity is pro-
posed as a radical counterpoint or extension to human creative 
agency, at its heart this often represents a particularly problem-
atic type of anthropocentric framing.
To approach AI creativity through an anthropocentric lens is to 
keep creative expression at a remove from its relational, social, 
communicative, and collaborative aspects, which are also ignored 
in the romantic rhetoric of original genius, and which are, for the 
most part, incompatible with the narrowly conceived perspective 
of IP law. In this way, an idealized concept of the singular creative 
spirit that has served to underpin the propertization of creative 
expression is reproduced in many perspectives on AI creativity 
and AI authorship. This is precisely how Miller’s survey of AI art 
proceeds, and it is not surprising that the author’s anthropocen-
tric bias prevents him from imagining anything radically new 
or different in AI art. In Miller’s account, the human geniuses 
that form the basis for his definition of creativity delineate a 
genealogy that is almost exclusively male, white, and occidental. 
Much like a dataset with poorly labelled contents, Miller’s 
discussion therefore reproduces the biases inscribed in long-
standing fantasies of creative genius and singular authorship, 
which feminist theorists of law and culture including Rosemary 
C. Coombe, Ann Bartow, Carys Craig, and many others, have long 
criticized as a gendered, patriarchal, and elitist subject position 
(e.g., Coombe 1994, 1998; Bartow 2006; Craig 2015). Regardless 
of the angle from which issues of AI creativity, AI authorship 
and AI agency are approached, for now the majority of legal 
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clusions. The first is that because AI cannot technically claim a 
capability for authoring creative expressions, it does not have 
agency. The second inverts this logic, to suggest that because 
AI cannot technically be assigned agency, it cannot therefore 
be meaningfully understood as capable of authoring creative 
expressions. Both perspectives are impaired by the same cen-
tral fallacy of imagining AI creativity in anthropocentric terms, 
and the assumption that the creative abilities of AI simply do not 
resemble those of human agents enough to warrant the legal 
recognition of AI systems as potential authors.
As van den Hoven van Genderen (2018) and others have noted, 
in most legal systems the concept of personhood is much more 
flexible than the concept of copyright. Specifically, while broader 
legal theories of personhood tend not to specify that the person 
under consideration must be a human agent, copyright statutes 
often do include such a requirement.4 Unsurprisingly, these dis-
crepancies themselves are likely to generate considerable debate 
both in favor and against the idea of formally extending the kind 
of agency required for authorship to AI. Pamela Samuelson, a 
key theorist of IP issues in relation to emerging technologies, has 
addressed some of the challenges AI can pose in this context as 
early as 1985, but research continues to be mired in fundamental 
definitional disagreements. (A comprehensive survey of con-
flicting opinions is included in Guihot and Rimmer, 2019.)
The law and technology scholar Annemarie Bridy, for example, 
considers contemporary AI as “authors-in-fact” that simply 
cannot (yet) be recognized as “authors-in-law” (2016). Craig and 
Kerr conclude that AI is not currently capable of authorship 
4 At the time of writing, Copyright Acts that cannot accommodate AI-
generated works on the basis that they are not authored by human agents 
exist, for example, in the U.S., in Germany, in Australia, and in Japan; in 
the UK, copyright can be extended to AI-generated works, but the right is 
assigned to the human creator of the computational system (see Yamamoto 
2018; UK Copyright, Designs and Patent Act, s.9(3)).
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culturally embedded processes that characterize creativity; 
as they note, the anthropomorphic framing of AI merely “rein-
force[s] the illusion that machines possess a kind of intelligence 
and expressive agency that they do not—and cannot—in fact 
have” (2021, 70). Similarly, Aaron Hertzmann, writing against the 
background of computer science and art history, argues that 
“art is something created by social agents, and so computers 
cannot be credited with authorship of art in our current under-
standing” (2018, 1). Grimmelmann, finally, notes that computers 
cannot currently be said to be capable of authoring anything at 
all because of the prevailing legal requirements, which leads him 
to propose that the designation of “computer-generated” (2016) 
works is overall more accurate. By contrast, an argument in favor 
of the (full or partial) extendibility of copyright to AI-generated 
works could be that the law’s technical definitions are always 
intended to be inclusive. Originality and creativity thresholds pre-
scribed by copyright statutes, for example, tend to be relatively 
easy to satisfy, and generally don’t take into account aesthetic 
considerations. The evolving history of copyright law includes 
many precedents that point in this direction.5
A further relevant thread in research on this subject is that 
even if AI cannot be granted full authorship status, it must be 
acknowledged at least that AI “assists” human authors, a point 
already highlighted in Pamela Samuelson’s (1985) early writing 
on the topic. This view lends itself to the suggestion that existing 
work-for-hire rules could be applied to AI outputs (e.g., Yanisky-
Ravid and Velez-Hernandez 2017; Hristov 2017). The work-for-hire 
concept represents a contractual twist to traditional notions 
5 The legal literature on this subject is vast. Relevant case law includes Feist 
Publications, Inc v. Rural Telephone Service Co [1991] USSC 50 (U.S. context); 
Infopaq International A/A v Danske Dagblades Forening [2009] ECJ 17 (EU con-
text); Telstra II (Aus); CCH Canadian Ltd. v Law Society of Upper Canada [2004] 
SCC 13 (Canada). Legal theoretical scholarship on the topic includes, for 
example, Samuelson 1985; Farr 1989; Bridy 2012; or Yu 2017.
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under contract, whose IP rights are relegated to the human or 
corporate entities in whose employment they are. In human 
contexts, this type of arrangement applies to a growing majority 
of practitioners in the so-called creative industries, and has 
been theorized as an exploitative construct that undermines 
human agency and ownership rights (see, for example, Hes-
mondalgh 2012). When this concept is transferred to AI con-
texts, anthropocentric bias again becomes apparent: the idea 
of applying work-for-hire rules to AI requires that AI entities are 
implicitly viewed as authors before their creators’ rights can 
be relegated to those owning or controlling the AI system. AI, 
in this scenario, would have to be understood as laboring for 
human agents, which also means that critiques concerning the 
exploitation of human creative labor in work-for-hire schemes 
could be extended to the labor presumptively exerted by AI. For 
the moment, such concerns would be counteracted, for example, 
in the argument that AI-as-instrument merely assists human 
creativity and/or labor as a kind of tool (see, for example, Steinert 
2017; Hertzmann 2018), or that it represents, at best, a “medium” 
of expression (Mazzone and Elgammal 2019).
My survey of how questions concerning creative agency play 
out at the intersection of law and AI is far from comprehensive. 
It shows, nevertheless, that there is no agreement, among 
legal theorists, law makers, and policy advisors, on how best 
to go about acknowledging, disavowing, or plainly ignoring the 
speculative emergence of AI agency along with all of its critical 
implications. Diverging perspectives, often revolving around 
more practical concerns, continue to evolve. The Australian 
Copyright Act, for instance, bases its requirement that any 
author must be a human agent not on philosophical, aesthetic, 
or ethical concerns, but on much more pragmatic reasoning: the 
argument here is that because copyright in a work is designed 
to expire a certain number of years after its author’s death, a 
machinic non-human agent cannot be recognized as an “author” 
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perpetual copyright. Here the notion of the author as “the person 
who brings the copyright work into existence in its material 
form” logically implies that this author must be not only a legal 
person, but also (undying genius notwithstanding) mortal, since 
no appropriate expiration date of the copyright could otherwise 
be calculated (High Court of Australia, cit. in Guihot and Rimmer 
2019, 18). But there are also some developments that may even-
tually put IP discourse on a trajectory toward accommodating 
posthumanist perspectives on agential AI. The European Com-
mission, for example, has sought to sidestep the kind of conun-
drum addressed by the High Court of Australia not by rethinking 
the status of AI, but instead by suggesting that perhaps the 
fundamental legal requirements for copyright eligibility need to 
be dissociated from concepts of authorship which automatically 
assume the human nature of all legally recognizable creators (cf. 
Ramalho 2017, 17).
In closing this chapter, let me return to my focus on AI art more 
directly. What I want to suggest with this discussion is that when 
familiarity with the definitions, processes, and functioning of 
IP law enters into the conceptual instrumentarium of artists 
working with AI, or into the apparatus of AI itself, the technology 
can become a useful vehicle for critiques of the contradictions 
and flaws inherent in IP. Speculative propositions concerning 
non-human creative agency embodied in AI systems can then 
begin to significantly disturb the ways in which anthropocentric 
perspectives on agency figure in legal frameworks that regulate 
cultural ownership. As such, posthumanist agential assemblages 
that manifest in AI art projects can not only serve to highlight 
anthropocentric biases embedded both in AI discourse and in the 
law, but additionally challenge the conventional property models 
that are, on this basis, enacted in contemporary IP regimes. In 
exploring this proposition further, the next two chapters will turn 
to discussions of art projects in which the socio-legal dimensions 
of creative agency, as I have unpacked them here, figure very 
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surrounding the AI-generated work Portrait of Edmond Belamy, 
and elaborates on strategic approaches to working with AI. The 
second analyzes Adam Basanta’s generative “art factory” All 
We’d Ever Need Is One Another, which approximates more directly 
what I would describe as a tactical approach to using AI, in that it 
speculates on the possible deniability of human creative agency 
in response to allegations of IP infringement.

[ 4 ]
Copies Without Originals? 
AI-Generated Artworks 
and All-Too-Human  
Ownership Claims
The posthumanist agential assemblage raises difficult ques-
tions concerning the speculative possibility of non-human 
creativity. In particular, it can disturb intellectual property (IP) 
models that presuppose identifiable human creators as the 
originators and owners of creative expressions. As I argued 
in the preceding chapter, what complicates this discussion is 
that the concepts of creativity and authorship themselves are 
often framed anthropocentrically. Anthropomorphizing and 
anthropocentrically biased rhetoric also persists in digital art. 
One consequence is that some of the new issues AI art provokes 
regarding questions of authorship, provenance, and IP end up 
playing out along familiar vectors of all-too human ownership 
disputes. In this chapter, the first major auction sale of an AI-
generated work of art serves as an example of how AI art can end 
up reproducing strategic frameworks of AI instrumentalization, 
and thereby close off speculative posthumanist horizons of non-
human agency embodied in or enacted through AI.
In October 2018, the canvas-based, AI-generated work titled Por-
trait of Edmond Belamy (2018) was sold for the record-setting price 
78 of US$432,500 at a well-publicized auction at Christie’s. Judging 
by commentary from art critics and the mainstream press, the 
event appeared to suggest that an existential identity crisis was 
unfolding in the world of contemporary art (see Shaw 2018; Saltz 
2018; Pepi 2018). Produced by the French Obvious Collective, 
Portrait of Edmond Belamy was generated using a Generative 
Adversarial Network (GAN), a type of machine learning 
technology increasingly popular among digital artists. Mounted 
in a gilt-edged frame, the square canvas of Portrait of Edmond 
Belamy depicts the eerily diffuse portrait of a male figure and 
features tonal and compositional details reminiscent of classic 
portraiture, with perhaps a hint of Francis Bacon’s iconic style (fig. 
3). Significantly, the information panel displayed next to the work 
at the auction preview did not give an artist name. Instead, the 
piece was described as being “not the product of a human mind” 
but “a work of art created by an algorithm” (Christie’s 2018).
Christie’s claim drew significant attention in the popular press, 
particularly since the work was to be sold alongside high-priced 
artworks whose creators fit very neatly with humanist notions 
of the genius artist figure. The suggestion that no such figure 
had been involved in creating Portrait of Edmond Belamy caused 
a stir in the high-end art market, where the commercial value of 
artworks is generally tied not only to aesthetic value and consid-
erations of artistic mastery, nor only to a work’s uniqueness or 
scarcity, but also to the personage and pedigree of its creator(s). 
Artists and theorists alike have worked to disrupt humanist con-
ceptions of the artist figure over the course of the past century or 
so; but in the institutional, commercial, and critical mainstreams 
of the art world, “the artist” tends to persist in the figuration of 
the singular, unified, individualized creative spirit embodied in 
a human agent. As I have suggested in the previous chapter, the 
importance of this figure persists also because without it, an art-
work cannot easily enjoy the protections conventionally offered 
by IP legislation, and it may consequently be difficult to attach a 
stable monetary value to such a work.
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The romantic fi ction of the author fi gure serves well to uphold 
eff orts to link scarcity to aesthetic value, and furthermore to 
pinpoint the “natural” owner of any given aesthetic artefact. 
This ideal also continues to be cultivated in the institutionalized 
art world, where all kinds of stakeholders, from commercial 
galleries and art fairs to museums, private collections, and art 
critics assign aesthetic value by invoking principles that align 
closely with IP’s core mechanisms for identifying and controlling 
monetary value bound in creative expressions. It is hardly an 
exaggeration to suggest that in certain contexts, an artwork 
to which no creator can be attributed is undesirable because 
it cannot easily be captured by the frameworks through which 
[Figure 3] Obvious Collective, Portrait of Edmond Belamy (2018). Public domain image 
source: Wikimedia Foundation.
80 value would conventionally be attached to it. In this sense, 
the excitement and anxiety inspired by the auctioning of Por-
trait of Edmond Belamy expressed a concern that if a clearly 
identifiable (human) author figure could indeed be supplanted 
by a new type of non-human creative agency, or perhaps even 
by an agential assemblage that lacks an identifiable center, the 
value propositions that buoy the art world would be radically 
undermined.
The excitement in the lead-up to the auctioning of Portrait of 
Edmond Belamy conveyed several concerns: if the embodiment 
of value in artworks relies on the principle of scarcity and the 
esteem of a clearly identifiable artist figure, then any work that 
can be meaningfully interpreted as having been autonomously 
created by a non-human entity must cause a significant dis-
turbance. Without an identifiable author, and perhaps also 
eluding legal definitions of the “work” as such, such an aesthetic 
artefact might become unownable, in the sense that no stable 
value could be fixed to it. The auctioning of Portrait of Edmond 
Belamy was therefore a risky (or at least provocative) under-
taking. Christie’s aim was, of course, to demonstrate that a high 
commercial value can very well be attached to a computer-
generated, presumptively authorless aesthetic artefact. But in 
doing so, Christie’s was also contributing to a development that 
could pose a potential threat to the art market’s viability: if an 
artwork created by an algorithm could be sold for a substantial 
amount of money, might this not suggest that authorial mastery 
and pedigree are not, after all, supreme tools for controlling an 
artwork’s aesthetic-qua-monetary value?
By the time Portrait of Edmond Belamy achieved its aston-
ishing sale price of more than forty times of the estimate, the 
excitement surrounding the work had somewhat shifted in 
focus. The work, intended to model a new form of non-human 
creativity, was now also the subject of a much more con-
ventional controversy that replayed familiar human-centered 
authorship disputes. As it turned out, the members of Obvious 
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that generated Portrait of Edmond Belamy, had in fact appro-
priated much of the code substrate for the work from the young 
American AI artist Robbie Barrat.1 Portrait of Edmond Belamy thus 
offers a good context not merely for asking how AI art might 
challenge existing perspectives on creative agency, authorship, 
and ownership, but also how the intention to do so can mis-
fire, and end up achieving little more than putting a twist on 
anthropocentrically framed authorship disputes.
Some art market stakeholders and the mainstream press were 
keen to celebrate the sale of Portrait of Edmond Belamy as proof 
that AI-based machine creativity is not only possible, but has 
already become a reality. From this perspective, the high auction 
price was understood to have reified the portrait as a valuable 
artwork, perhaps much more reliably than any art critic could 
have done. AI theorists, AI developers, and digital artists offered 
less favorable responses, and argued instead that AI creativity 
in the anthropocentric sense remains impossible, that Por-
trait of Edmond Belamy is conceptually and technically shallow, 
and that established norms of cultural ownership would not 
be fundamentally shaken by AI-generated aesthetic artefacts. 
Importantly, this criticism also highlighted the extent to which 
Obvious Collective relied on the unacknowledged reusing of the 
work of another (human) artist (see Vincent 2018).
The controversy surrounding the collective’s appropriation of 
Robbie Barrat’s code and data inflects the claims concerning the 
1 Readers will have noticed that the images on the book cover bear a striking 
similarity to Portrait of Edmond Belamy. The images were created by the Aus-
tralian AI artist and researcher Tom White, in an effort to test the claim that 
Obvious Collective had indeed copied Robbie Barrat ’s work (see Artnome 
2018 for a Twitter thread debating the similarities and implications). Using 
the underlying code shared by Barrat on Github, the results achieved by 
White suggest that Obvious Collective may well have worked with Barrat ’s 
code. In the spirit of transparency, White also published a software 
repository elucidating his process as well as his use of Barrat ’s original 
model (White n.d.).
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ways. For context: Barrat (n.d.) had freely shared the code-base 
used for his own work on the online repository and collaboration 
tool GitHub, used by many programmers for sharing software 
code. Based on Barrat’s use of Creative Commons copyright 
licenses, the collective’s use of his material was, in legal terms, 
permissible. The “misappropriation” under discussion here is 
thus primarily ethical in nature, rather than a by-the-books vio-
lation of IP rights; accordingly, the issue was never addressed 
in court, but rather in the online tribunals of Twitter feeds and 
Reddit threads, where violations of informal cultural ownership 
norms are frequently deliberated (see Zeilinger 2012). Never-
theless, Barrat’s (2018) complaint and the attention it garnered 
mark a shift from the lofty speculative-philosophical heights of 
“creative AI” toward more familiar grounds of anthropocentric 
IP ownership issues. Here, the central question is no longer just 
whether the machine learning system that had generated the 
portrait should be considered a creative/artistic entity, but also 
how the dispute between Barrat and the Obvious collective is 
impacted by claims concerning the AI origins of Portrait of Edmond 
Belamy. In other words, what is at stake here is the question of 
how to culturally and legally negotiate ownership disputes in 
instances where non-human entities become involved in creative 
processes.
GAN “Creativity”
For the creation of Portrait of Edmond Belamy, the Obvious 
collective relied on GAN-based machine learning technology, 
which has become a favored tool among AI artists working with 
image synthesis (see also Zeilinger 2021). GAN—Generative 
Adversarial Network—refers to a type of artificial neural net-
work that can be trained to generate novel content on the basis 
of training processes that rely on large datasets of pre-existing 
materials. The technology has become relatively accessible in 
recent years, and part of what makes it so attractive to digital 
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predictability and unexpectedness. Because GAN outputs can 
satisfy requirements featuring in widely accepted definitions of 
creativity and originality (e.g., Boden 1990), GANs have become a 
playground for much artistic speculation on AI creativity.
In-depth technical explanations of the technology have become 
widely available, along with step-by-step tutorials to guide users 
through the setup of GAN systems trained on openly accessible 
datasets. A more detailed description is nevertheless useful 
here, as it allows me to demonstrate how, beyond anthropocen-
tric analogies between human and computational creativity, 
GAN technology undermines the integrity of the unified, singular 
artist/author figure even while it appears to emulate it. GAN 
technology is thus best understood as aligned with a progres-
sive posthumanist notion of expressive agency, learning, and 
creative expression. This contradicts romantic ideals of creativity 
and originality, and resonates with the tactical potentials of AI as 
introduced earlier.
Conventionally, GAN systems consist of at least two discrete 
computational neural networks that are described as “Generator” 
and “Discriminator.” In the iterative training processes that 
characterize GANs, these discrete units are understood to 
function as “adversaries”—one produces outputs, the other 
compares them to a training dataset and validates or rejects 
them. To train the system (or for the system to be able to “learn”), 
a dataset of appropriate example images is assembled, most 
commonly based on readily available collections or by using 
scraper tools that collect relevant images online. The Generator 
network will then begin to produce image outputs until the set 
goal, that is, a novel image that satisfies certain criteria (often 
with a focus on similarity to the training set, i.e., perceived 
“authenticity”) is reached. Importantly, the Generator does not 
have access to the dataset of pre-existing images; it begins its 
image-creation process without “knowledge” of what the desired 
84 output should look like, and relies on the Discriminator network 
for feedback.
With no information to go on, it can be expected that the 
Generator’s first image output will consist of randomly placed 
pixels, which will then be passed to the Discriminator network 
for validation. In contrast to the Generator, the Discriminator 
has access to the training dataset of pre-existing images, against 
which each of the Generator’s image outputs is now compared. 
When the Discriminator rejects an output, this evaluation is 
communicated back to the Generator. Depending on the con-
figuration of the system, the feedback may consist of a simple 
binary response, but it might also include additional information, 
for example regarding the accuracy of color content or com-
positional details. The Generator now compares the feedback 
received with information concerning its previous outputs, 
adjusts its rendering algorithms, and iterates its next output, 
which is again passed for evaluation to the Discriminator. And so 
on. 
Over a large number of iterations, which can reach into hun-
dreds of thousands of repetition-and-difference cycles, the 
Generator “learns” from its mistakes and improves its outputs, 
which will begin to match the training data more and more 
closely until a threshold of accuracy is reached, beyond which 
the Discriminator is no longer able to distinguish the Generator 
outputs from the “real” contents of the training dataset. At some 
point, the GAN system as a whole could thus be understood 
to have successfully “learned” to produce, with a constant and 
predictable success rate, images that sit above the threshold of 
what can be meaningfully interpreted, both by the Discriminator 
and by human observers, as part of the image set that makes 
up the training data. To generate a complex image such as the 
semi-realistic portrait of a human figure depicted in Portrait of 
Edmond Belamy, the Discriminator network will require access to 
a relevant training dataset of existing portraits. Portraiture, of 
course, has long been a key area of artistic production and art 
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easy to assemble.2
Significantly, in lay descriptions of GAN functionality the iterative 
back-and-forth between Generator and Discriminator is often 
characterized as a competition, a kind of cat-and-mouse game in 
which the Generator attempts to convince the Discriminator that 
its outputs are “real.” In the context of artistic outputs, this logic 
would characterize the Generator as a kind of art forger trying 
to trick a master artist into accepting a masterfully executed 
copy as a genuine original, and to misinterpret “fake” as “real,” or 
“copy” as “original” (see Zeilinger 2021 for a more detailed analysis 
of this terminology). This invokes Lev Manovich’s “AI art Turing 
test,” (2019): in Manovich’s test scenario, the “creativity” of an AI 
system is meant to be determined by its ability to fool a human 
art critic into erroneously believing that the output under con-
sideration was created by a human artist. As discussed in chapter 
2, an immediate issue with this approach is that it conceptualizes 
creativity and artfulness in fundamentally anthropocentric 
terms, in the sense that the threshold for AI creativity is here 
understood as its ability to successfully pass itself off as human 
creativity. Nevertheless, what can be usefully derived from 
Manovich’s version of the Turing test is that an expressive 
machine learning system such as a GAN is, in essence, a new 
type of highly sophisticated copy machine. Importantly, this 
perspective reveals itself as both correct and misleading. Strictly 
speaking, the Generator’s outputs can never constitute copies or 
reproductions of anything at all, since the system does not have 
the kind of direct access to source materials that is implied by the 
anthropocentric analogies of the forger, copyist, or apprentice 
imitator. However, while the Generator, in other words, cannot be 
said to copy the training data in any conventionally meaningful 
sense of the term, a GAN system’s conjuring up of romantic ideals 
2 Many lists of relevant open datasets can be found online (e.g., ArtNome, 
n.d.; Coding Dürer, n.d.; and Berkley Library, n.d.).
86 of creativity and artistic expression also disturbs these same 
ideals. 
Despite the nominally adversarial nature of the interaction 
between Generator and Discriminator, the two discrete units 
work in tandem to form what can be described as a sophisti-
cated appropriation machine, capable of approximating style, 
content, and other desired qualities of the training materials 
without directly copying these source materials. Conceptually, 
it is thanks to this capability that GANs bear resemblance to the 
creative minds of human agents: not in the traditional sense of 
the spirited original genius figure who produces unique creative 
works, but rather in a more progressive sense of creativity as a 
fundamentally relational, embedded, and dialogic process. To 
turn things on their head a bit, following this logic it is entirely 
feasible not only to describe computational creativity with 
reference to the way humans learn, but also to describe human 
creativity by borrowing from the conceptual register of machine 
learning: in such a formulation, creativity becomes the ability to 
generate novel content by iterating derivative approximations 
of pre-existing materials, to the point where imitation, aston-
ishingly, dissolves into unexpected outputs that can pass as 
original and, potentially, as creative.
Clearly, this observation stands in stark contradiction to 
traditional ideals of artistic genius. It resonates, instead, with the 
more progressive view that influence, imitation, mimicry, and 
copying form the core of how human agents acquire language, 
learn a craft, and, indeed, create art (see Boon 2010 for an 
elaborate rethinking of creativity and originality in relation to 
copying practices). In this sense, it would be wrong to entirely 
reject analogies between GAN-style machine learning and human 
creativity. We should hold on to this analogy at least because 
it does a good job of undermining the notion of the romantic 
(human-only) artist figure who creates from tabula rasa. In 
other words, to acknowledge the dialogic interactions between 
Generator and Discriminator (or even entanglements between 
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good way of re-emphasizing the relational dimensions of human 
creativity itself. 
This means that GAN-based generative tools and their outputs 
can serve to inscribe the operational logic of machine learning 
with a notion of creative expression that challenges perspectives 
of the centrality and supremacy of the unified, singular, and 
spirited human artist, and their unique ability to create original 
expressions. A GAN-based AI art practice that engages with 
agency and ownership issues tactically mobilizes the compli-
cated entanglements of Generator and Discriminator with the 
corpus of training materials in order to link the operational logic 
of GAN systems with a progressive notion of creative expression 
that approximates the posthumanist perspectives introduced 
earlier. I will return to this point in my concluding chapter, where I 
discuss GANs as “generative adversarial copy machines” that are 
inherently incompatible with any rhetoric framing of creative AI 
that relies on traditional, anthropocentric notions of creativity.
“What matter who’s speaking”
Portrait of Edmond Belamy fails to mobilize these critical aspects 
of GAN technology, and instead attempts to sketch out a much 
more traditional kind of author figure. The complexities of GAN 
functionality, and its critical implications for how creativity as 
such might be rethought in AI contexts, do not figure into this 
narrative. In fact, the stories told by Christie’s and Obvious 
Collective to position Portrait of Edmond Belamy as a creative 
expression produced autonomously by an AI system resolve into 
stark contradictions that emphasize, rather than erase, the work’s 
anthropocentric framing.
When Robbie Barrat asserted his authorship of the code base 
used for creating Portrait of Edmond Belamy and challenged 
Obvious Collective regarding their appropriation of his code 
and data, he fundamentally questioned the idea that the work 
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argued, human agents had very clearly (and inevitably) inter-
vened at every stage of the algorithmic and technical process of 
generating the work in question. In the case of a GAN-generated 
image like the one under discussion here, a number of such 
human interventions can be easily identified. For example, one or 
more human agents will inevitably be involved in the processes 
of: 1) designing and setting up the machine learning network 
used; 2) compiling and/or labelling the data on which the system 
is trained; 3) deciding the criteria for “successful” outputs; 4) 
monitoring outputs and making determinations regarding 
the continuation/termination of the iterative learning/output 
process; and 5) curating the resulting outputs. A similar spec-
trum of human involvement in the facilitation of AI outputs has 
been noted by various researchers, and also by Robbie Barrat 
himself (cf. Manovich 2019, 5; Elgammal et al. 2018, 2; Bailey 2018). 
These observations may appear quite self-evident, but they help 
to foreground the human stakes in GAN-based AI art, thereby 
complicating the picture of presumptive AI creativity. As noted, 
this does not mean that the notion of such creativity should be 
disavowed, but rather that AI art enacts new kinds of entan-
glements between human and non-human agential entities (or, 
indeed, between non-human entities, such as the Generator and 
Discriminator components of a GAN system). This perspective is 
entirely ignored, however, in how Christie’s and Obvious sought 
to frame Portrait of Edmond Belamy.
Two specific aspects of the work are noteworthy in this context. 
The first one involves a peculiar numerical cipher found on the 
canvas, which was included in place of an artist’s signature to 
underpin the conceit that the work had been authored by an 
AI system (the signature can be seen in fig. 3). Christie’s (2018) 
promotional material interpreted this as an indication that 
Obvious Collective had ceded authorial claims to the AI system. 
But by which convention does the quasi-authorial inscription of 
an algorithmic cipher-signature here signal the existence of (or, 
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the work could be attributed? As an index of the presence of 
creative AI, this suggestion is immediately undermined by the 
anthropomorphizing nature of the gesture itself: to sign a work 
of art is the supreme signal of human authorship. The gesture 
is also closely linked to the ownership models that have devel-
oped around the notion that authors should be entitled to the 
expressions in which their creative labor is inscribed. In the given 
context, the cipher-signature is thus ultimately self-contradictory: 
on the one hand, it is meant to suggest that the computational 
entity responsible for the creation of Portrait of Edmond Belamy is 
“like” a human agent; on the other hand, the manifestation of the 
signature in algorithmic form is interpreted as an assertion that 
this agency is, precisely, not human. I would argue, on this point, 
that a signature is a particularly unsuitable way of signaling a 
shift of creative agency from the human to the non-human.
The second issue is that in addition to having appropriated the 
code base for the work from Robbie Barrat (a human author-
specter who, despite the initial lack of attribution, will forever 
haunt this AI-generated artwork), Obvious Collective also draw 
attention to a further author figure. As the members of the 
collective have themselves stated, the algorithm that is partially 
reproduced in the image was authored not by themselves nor 
by Barrat, but by Ian Goodfellow, a key developer in the AI 
community whose contribution the collective wished to honor. 
With this background information, the partial inclusion of the 
algorithm on the canvas gains additional significance—not as an 
authorial index asserting provenance or authenticity as a work of 
art created by a non-human entity, but instead as a reference or 
citation. Goodfellow is widely credited for the invention of GAN-
type machine learning (Goodfellow et al. 2014). The achievement 
has earned him the nickname of “GANfather,” a designation 
that invokes godfather-like powers of patriarchal-qua-authorial 
control, and which suggests quite the opposite of a relegation of 
creative agency to a non-human entity. To round out this broken 
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referenced in the title of the work itself: “Belamy” is a Frenchified 
version of the GANfather’s last name, and thus yet another way 
for the collective to inadvertently draw Portrait of Edmond Belamy 
into a complex network of human and non-human collaborations. 
Ultimately, the collective’s citation-as-signature undermines the 
proposition that the technology used is capable of independent, 
autonomous creative expression. This highlights—but does not 
acknowledge—the relational qualities of the creative processes 
that made the output possible.
How, then, should the processes involved in the production 
of Portrait of Edmond Belamy be characterized? Following the 
arguments I have developed here, it would be wrong to recognize 
Obvious Collective as the creators of the work; but neither 
can its members be considered as stewards or facilitators of a 
new form of non-human creative agency. Furthermore, even 
though the GAN system used by the collective draws on code 
and training data authored by others, it is also incorrect to call 
them plagiarists, since the system rendered an output that fits 
many definitions of originality and novelty, and which, in any 
case, hovers outside the bubble of IP and authorial influence as 
it is conventionally understood. In my view, the most interesting 
characterization of the collective would be one that perceives its 
members as participants in a new form of agential assemblage; 
unfortunately, this is not a role that the members of the collective 
have embraced. Instead, the speculative relegation of creative 
agency to AI by way of the various flourishes injected into Portrait 
of Edmond Belamy reveals itself as human-made artifice, of a sort 
that was perhaps felt to be necessary in order to render “creative 
AI” credible in the mainstream, property-oriented context for 
which the work was produced.
There is, I would argue, an additional reading of the presump-
tively non-human creative agency that is manifest in this 
work: I view Christie’s anthropocentric framing of creative 
AI as an implicit assurance that a paradigmatic change in 
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constituted by the emergence of creative AI) need not dis-
rupt existing practices of tying an artwork’s value to a clearly 
determinable, singular author figure. This, of course, also doubles 
as an assurance that AI art will not disrupt, but rather extend the 
value propositions of the art market. If a new form of AI-based, 
non-human expressive agency could channel value into an aes-
thetic artefact while remaining under the control of an underlying 
human proprietor, IP claims in the resulting work could be easily 
managed in familiar ways, and such an “authorless” work of AI 
art could become a highly desirable commodity indeed. Perhaps, 
this is precisely what the high sales price achieved in the auction 
indicates.
In this reading, the way in which Portrait of Edmond Belamy 
mobilizes AI technology reveals itself as strategic—rather than 
tactical—in nature. Despite surface appearances, and despite 
the rhetoric framing of the work, the specter of creative AI is here 
posited as something that remains intimately tied to humanist 
concepts of creative expression, authorship, and the markets 
they serve. In other words, Portrait of Edmond Belamy speculates 
on non-human expressive agency for the purpose of reasserting 
quite conventional notions of creativity, and it does so by drawing 
on an authorship concept that perpetuates the cultural logic of IP. 
Nothing about this logic is challenged, let alone changed, by the 
way in which Portrait of Edmond Belamy attempts to transpose a 
conventional authorship concept into a non-human context. Put 
differently, the work does not extend Foucault’s notion of the 
“author function” (1980) forward into a posthumanist context of 
generative AI, where the unifying functions of traditional author-
ship could be reconfigured, or potentially dissolved. Rather, the 
work is oriented toward reproducing, in the context of pre-
sumptively non-human creative expression, a romantic notion 
of authorship that continues to serve as a “privileged moment 
of individualization,” as Foucault famously put it, in a way that 
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creative expression.
The narrative surrounding the work and its auction sale sought 
to position Portrait of Edmond Belamy as indicative of AI’s 
ability to express itself creatively without relying on human 
computer artists. But Obvious Collective’s implementation of 
this suggestion appears clumsy and ultimately self-defeating. 
Given the highly conventional nature of the AI author figure that 
is proposed here, in concluding I would argue that if Portrait 
of Edmond Belamy is to be understood as putting forward any 
radical proposition at all, then this has nothing to do with the 
speculative emergence of posthumanist AI creativity. Rather, the 
proposition here appears to be that a viable market for digital 
art that can pretend to not rely on human artists is indeed pos-
sible, and already emerging. Portrait of Edmond Belamy does not 
gesture toward a decentering of human agency in an aesthetic 
or socio-cultural sense, nor to any political implications of such 
a move, but instead toward a reinscription of anthropocentric 
ownership models in AI art contexts. The story told by Obvious 
Collective and Christie’s concerning a speculative decentering of 
human agency enacted through Portrait of Edmond Belamy does 
not proceed along tactical vectors that might disturb IP. Instead, 
the work represents a strategic effort to transpose a humanist 
ideal of authorship into an AI context, such that the art market’s 
existing value propositions can continue to function.
[ 5 ]
AI Art and the Deniability 
of Human Creative Agency 
In the previous chapter, I argued that when Portrait of Edmond 
Belamy speculates on the relegation of creative agency to AI, it 
proceeds strategically. The work aligns AI art with the traditional 
value propositions of the art market, as well as with the humanist 
figuration of “author” on which it relies. Here, AI is not mobilized 
in an effort to form new types of agential assemblages that 
might critique and recalibrate existing property models. Rather, 
Portrait of Edmond Belamy utilizes GAN technology in a spirit 
of perpetuating and reinforcing the anthropocentric logic of 
cultural ownership in AI contexts. The controversy surrounding 
the work is, in this sense, also a reminder of how intellectual 
property (IP) discourse has always struggled, and often failed, 
to accommodate emerging technologies and their impact on the 
social and economic spheres within which and upon which they 
act (for influential critiques linked to this issue, see Coombe 1998; 
Vaidhyanathan 2001; Wirtén 2004; Lessig 2004; Halbert 2005; or 
McLeod 2007, among many others). This chapter turns to the 
Canadian artist Adam Basanta’s AI-driven installation All We’d 
Ever Need Is One Another (2018), another AI art project that has 
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particular project critiques established anthropocentric notions 
of creative agency that are expressed in contemporary IP models. 
In contrast to Portrait of Edmond Belamy, All We’d Ever Need Is One 
Another represents a step toward a more critically charged—
tactical—utilization of AI, which embodies important character-
istics of what I have earlier introduced as the posthumanist 
agential assemblage.
In my discussion of Portrait of Edmond Belamy, an implicit sugges-
tion has been that there is a tendency, in current AI art, to resort 
to anthropocentric perspectives and analogies in attempts 
to frame non-human expressive agency. This can ultimately 
perpetuate humanist ideals of authorship and cultural own-
ership. By contrast, the playful invocation of the prospect of 
non-human creativity in All We’d Ever Need Is One Another pro-
vokes fundamental speculative challenges of such ideals. The 
installation forces a reconsideration of how AI-based expres-
sive agency might interfere with established assumptions 
concerning authorship, as well as the ownership models IP law 
legitimates. As discussed below, this has also had the unintended 
consequence of a copyright infringement complaint against 
Basanta. Functioning as an independently operating “art factory” 
(Basanta 2018), the installation links approaches familiar from 
appropriation art with the notion of the autonomous, creative 
AI assemblage. In doing so, All We’d Ever Need Is One Another 
formulates an implicit critique of current IP conventions and 
their inability (now as always) to accommodate many of the new 
expressive modes that emerging digital technologies afford 
digital artists.
(In)validating Artfulness
All We’d Ever Need Is One Another was first exhibited in 2018 at 
Ellephant Gallery in Montreal (fig. 4). It has since gone through 
several iterations, and continues to be shown online as well 
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as in physical exhibition spaces (e.g., Arsenal Contemporary 
Toronto 2019). In its original form, the installation featured two 
flatbed scanners, a number of networked desktop computers, 
a large printer, as well as a project website and several social 
media accounts associated with the work. This setup constitutes 
a system capable of independently generating images in an 
automated multi-step process, and of instantiating these images 
as artworks both in material form (as printouts) and digitally 
(by distributing them online). During the exhibition at Ellephant 
Gallery, a limited run of images produced by the system were 
made available for sale as unique canvas prints; additionally, 
automatically generated printouts were available for sale as 
unique poster editions (in subsequent presentations, these prints 
[Figure 4] Adam Basanta, installation view of All We’d Ever Need Is One Another (2018), 
Galerie ELLEPHANT, Montréal. Image used by permission of the artist; photo credit: 
Simon Belleau.
96 accumulated on the gallery floor and were freely available for 
gallery visitors to take away). Overall, All We’d Ever Need Is One 
Another reveals itself quite clearly as an artwork that involves 
a human artist. But with regard to the generative aspects of 
the installation, especially those that reach beyond the work’s 
material instantiation in an exhibition space, the project also 
casts doubt on the creative agency that this human artist is able 
to exercise during the creative process. In other words, the notion 
of authorial control does not easily attach to the functioning 
and outputs of All We’d Ever Need Is One Another. I would argue, 
in fact, that the work is conceptualized with the specific aim of 
eliminating, as completely as possible, all potential for human 
intervention in the generative process.
In this sense, a key characteristic of the project is precisely the 
kind of speculative decentering of expressive agency that I have 
described as an important aspect of the posthumanist agential 
assemblage. In the installation’s generative processes, the notion 
of an independent, singular, supreme human creative agency 
from which the artwork originates is thus negated, or, at the 
very least, strongly put in doubt. This occurs in several steps. In 
the first step, the system generates images without relying on 
human input. It does so by using two (or more) flatbed scanners 
which are placed on their sides, so that their scanning surfaces 
face each other. Once turned on, the scanners are controlled 
by custom software that continuously puts the devices through 
successive scanning cycles. The software also randomizes the 
device settings between cycles, in such a way that their outputs 
vary dramatically without any need for additional manipulation 
or external (human) input. The setup of the scanner array thus 
eliminates the artist’s ability to interfere with or control the 
scanning process itself; in the gallery setup, the arrangement 
of the scanners presents itself as a physical and visual barrier 
against interference, highlighting that human participation is 
effectively shut out. Suggestive of a kind of generative machine 
introspection, the devices only ever scan each other, or more 
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their glass surfaces, perhaps in the form of reflections bouncing 
off of the devices they are facing. The outputs thus generated do 
not rely on any source images, and Basanta estimates that the 
system can create between 1,000 and 1,500 images over a 24-hour 
period (roughly one every minute-and-a-half).
In the next step, these images are subjected to an automated 
validation process that is designed to identify presumptively 
artful images among the generated outputs. With regard to this 
process, Basanta has explained that if a scan is “similar enough 
to a work that the art market or international collections have 
deemed art-worthy, then that image, which is similar to it, is 
also art-worthy. It becomes art” (Hannay 2018). It strikes me 
as important that the threshold of “artworthiness” here is not 
simply an aesthetic measure: instead it is based on whether or 
not a matched work is circulating as a (more or less) valuable 
commodity. The system’s validation process is thus directly linked 
to the art market dictate of commercial valorization. Basanta’s 
art factory compares its outputs to existing artworks, and, in a 
tongue-in-cheek fashion, identifies some of its own randomly 
generated images as artful if—and only if—the installation 
recognizes them as satisfying a system-immanent similarity 
threshold. The system, in other words, is trained to consider 
its own outputs as artworks only if they register as “copies” of 
existing artworks. As I will go on to argue, this designation is not 
as straightforward as it may seem, and this complication is cen-
tral to the critique of traditional ownership models that All We’d 
Ever Need Is One Another formulates.
The system-immanent validation process is carried out using 
a content recognition protocol that draws on a large image 
database of existing artworks. This database is assembled by 
a custom scraper tool that scans freely accessible online image 
repositories of existing artworks, and which collects relevant 
images as well as metadata such as the original artist’s name, 
the title of the work, and the year it was created. Based on 
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searches for “matches” between the auto-generated scans and 
the collected images. While Basanta has noted that the system 
searches for matches that exceed 83% similarity, exhibitions of All 
We’d Ever Need Is One Another have not included detailed infor-
mation regarding the precise parameters that would determine 
such a match. Anthropocentric and ocularcentric pragmatism 
might suggest that a match will occur when a generative output 
“looks like” an existing artwork. But importantly, in Basanta’s 
system this is rarely the case. Thus, an additional conceptual twist 
is introduced, since All We’d Ever Need Is One Another does not 
appear to root its determinations of artfulness in standard def-
initions of “copy” and “original.” Instead, an algorithmic process 
that focuses on parameters including aspect ratio, composition, 
form/shape detection, and color distribution across the canvas 
determines when a successful match has occurred. Importantly, 
this process relies on perceptual hashing algorithms that are used 
in medical imaging research and, notably, in automated copyright 
infringement detection. Overall, this highlights an intriguing 
implication, namely that the validation process based on which 
Basanta’s system determines artfulness is not human-legible.
Details regarding the functionality of the search-and-match 
algorithm remain confined within the system itself. Like the 
blackbox of a proprietary algorithm, the decisions of All We’d Ever 
Need Is One Another are difficult to fathom for human observers. 
This could be taken as a nod to the inexplicability of the inner 
workings of many AI systems, in which, as I have noted earlier, 
blackboxing can occur as a strategy of corporate secrecy, as an 
IP-protection mechanism, or as a result of the sheer complexity 
of the computational processes that are being carried out by the 
system. In the given context of All We’d Ever Need Is One Another, 
I interpret the validation process as a playful invocation of the 
humanist notion of creative genius, in which the presumptive 
unknowability of a great artist’s mind also constitutes a kind of 
blackboxing. Additionally, in Basanta’s project the unknowable 
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the deletion of all generated images that don’t match existing 
artworks. This inverts the conventional anthropocentric logic 
of creative expression: the system permits only matching items 
(“copies”?) to become instantiated as artworks, while non-
matching items (“originals”?) are erased before ever taking 
human-legible form on screen or in print.
The successful matches (Basanta has noted that the system can 
produce between twenty and fifty per day) are then submitted 
to the final step in the auto-generative process, in which the 
outputs are furnished with titles that reference the matched 
artworks. This echoes established conventions familiar from 
appropriation art, whereby title, creator’s name, and other 
details may be explicitly included in the appropriation itself. (For 
a well-known example, recall Sherrie Levine’s series After Walker 
Evans from 1981, which consists of photographic reproductions 
of Depression-era photographs by Walker Evans). In Basanta’s 
project, the full title of a finished piece includes the degree of 
similarity to its match, the name of the matched work’s creator, 
the title of that work, and the year it was made. One example of 
an “artful” output of All We’d Ever Need Is One Another is thus titled 
85.81%_match: Amel Chamandy ‘Your World Without Paper’, 2009, 
and references a photographic artwork titled Your World Without 
Paper (2009), by the Canadian artist Amel Chamandy (the two 
images can be compared in fig. 5 and 6). To the human eye, the 
two images bear little resemblance, aside from a reliance on a 
shared color range that favors deep purple and bright pink hues. 
The suggestion encoded in the work’s title—that the generative 
output is 85.81% identical to Chamandy’s artwork—is certainly 
not immediately obvious to the human observer. It was enough, 
however, to provoke a complaint of copyright and trademark 
infringement, filed by Chamandy against Basanta in the Quebec 
Superior court in August of 2018 (the case is still pending at the 
time of writing).
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[Figure 5] Amel Chamandy, Your World Without Paper (2009). Copyright Amel 
Chamandy; image used by permission.
[Figure 6] Adam Basanta, 85.81%_match: Amel Chamandy ‘Your World Without Paper’, 
2009 (2018). Image used by permission of the artist.
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In the complaint, Chamandy alleges that Basanta’s work vio-
lates her copyright in the photographic work Your World Without 
Paper, as well as a trademark registered in her name. Chamandy’s 
copyright infringement allegation asserts, among other things, 
that “the process used by the Defendant to compare his 
computer generated images to Amel Chamandy’s work nec-
essarily required an unauthorized copy of such a work to be 
made” (Statement of Claim, para. 30, cited in Scassa 2018). In 
an email to Basanta, disclosed as part of the legal proceedings, 
the legal counsel representing Chamandy and NuEdge (a gallery 
she owns in Montreal), also wrote that the alleged infringement 
“illegally divert[s] internet traffic away from NuEdge’s website 
and allows [Basanta] to unduly benefit from the goodwill and 
reputation associated with the name and trademark AMEL 
CHAMANDY” (Hannay 2018). In the original complaint, Chamandy 
claimed statutory damages of CAN$40,000 for the commercial 
misappropriation of her copyrighted work and her trademark; 
this has since then been updated to CAN$122,000, on the basis 
that many more of Chamandy’s artworks were allegedly web-
scraped and copied.
The explicit accusation here is two-fold: first, that the process by 
which the work in question was created involves the copying of 
Chamandy’s work, and that the copying process was unauthor-
ized and unfair; and second, that the project’s invocation of 
Chamandy’s name benefits Basanta and poses financial harm 
to her. In the context of my broader discussion, I note that the 
legal complaint seeks to frame this issue in a conventional IP 
context. This aligns with current legislation and the interests of 
the litigant, but it ignores the conceptual thrust of the allegedly 
infringing work, specifically its speculative exploration of a 
posthumanist, non-human form of creative expression that 
is incompatible with anthropocentric property enclosures. 
Evidently, any complaint operating within the established 
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tion of what sort of creative agency and authorial control Adam 
Basanta can actually be argued to have had in the creation of the 
work in question.
A closer look at this legal dispute emphasizes the implicit critique 
levelled in All We’d Ever Need Is One Another against the aesthetic, 
ethical, and socio-economic assumptions underpinning prevailing 
IP models. Chamandy’s complaint alleges that Basanta’s use is 
commercial in nature. However, 85.81%_match: Amel Chamandy 
‘Your World Without Paper’, 2009 is not for sale, and Basanta does 
not appear to derive advertisement income from his project 
website or the associated social media accounts (Scassa 2018). 
Chamandy’s claim regarding the commercial nature of the appro-
priation is difficult to prove, but it also represents an inevitable 
necessity for the claimant’s case: to acknowledge that Basanta’s 
use is non-commercial in nature would likely disqualify the 
trademark infringement complaint, and support the conclusion 
that the copying undertaken as part of the generative process is 
covered by the Canadian Copyright Act’s fair dealing exception 
(which outlines permissible, non-infringing uses of copyright-
protected materials, including their copying and reusing).1 In 
any case, Chamandy now faces the burden of having to show 
that Basanta drew direct commercial benefit from the alleged 
infringement—perhaps by having increased his reputation as 
an artist, or by improving his ability to attract funding for his 
practice; as the Canadian legal scholar Teresa Scassa (2018) has 
pointed out, such claims are exceedingly difficult to prove.2
1 ‘Fair dealing’ and ‘fair use’ exemptions to copyright restrictions are dis-
cussed in more detail in the following chapter. For the moment, it suffices 
to note that while non-commercial uses are generally more likely to be 
considered fair (i.e., non-infringing), the commercial nature of a use is not 
necessarily a determinative factor in fair dealing deliberations.
2 The trademark allegation is very unlikely to have any merit, and I will not dis-
cuss it any further here. As another commentator has noted, “Chamandy will 
have the impossible task of proving that Basanta’s use of her trademarked 
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tion is whether Basanta himself has illegitimately undertaken 
the copying of Your World Without Paper. At first sight, there are 
several indications that this might be the case. In the art historical 
traditions of 20th century appropriation art, the referencing of 
a “source” work in the title of a new artwork tends to express an 
explicit and provocative admission that a copy was indeed made. 
In this sense, the title of the work in question could be under-
stood as an indication that, firstly, the piece represents a copy 
that is 85.81% identical to Amel Chamandy’s Your World Without 
Paper and, secondly, that it is indeed derivative in nature, since 
Chamandy’s referenced original was, without doubt, created 
nine years prior to the alleged misappropriation. From this 
angle, Chamandy’s legal perspective echoes the controversies 
that appropriation art has often provoked (many of them are 
collected, for example, in McClean and Schubert 2002, and in 
Evans 2009). The added speculative twist here is that the involve-
ment of a non-human, artificially creative system might make it 
much harder to pin down who or what is responsible for the act 
of appropriation itself.
What the complaint does not acknowledge is the fundamentally 
dialogical and relational nature of Basanta’s project, and of 
creative expression in general (including Chamandy’s own 
practice). In this sense, All We’d Ever Need Is One Another can be 
well described using terminology used by Craig and Kerr: the 
artificially intelligent generative system at work here is marked by 
“relational autonomy” and enacts, at least speculatively, a form 
of “dialogic authorship” (2021, 83) that works across the different 
components of the system and the intertextual information on 
which it draws (see also Nedelsky 2011, on which the authors 
draw). In other words, insofar as All We’d Ever Need Is One Another 
is assumed to be capable of generating creative expressions, it 
name to bolster his own reputation constitutes advertisement in association 
with a service” (Burrell 2019).
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and in its outputs) explicitly proposes that artworks exist in 
continuums in which they are linked to other, already-existing 
creative expressions as well as the agencies that produced them. 
This perspective is fundamentally at odds with Chamandy’s legal 
complaint, which must construe 85.81%_match: Amel Chamandy 
‘Your World Without Paper’, 2009 as an artwork created by a uni-
fied, human author figure on the basis of an intentional copying 
of her work.
In my reading, All We’d Ever Need Is One Another destabilizes 
conventional assumptions regarding what it means to create 
artworks in AI contexts, and, by extension, what it means to 
copy and to own creative expressions in such contexts. As noted, 
Chamandy’s allegation hinges on the idea that Basanta has 
created an unauthorized copy. However, the offending image 
results from generative processes that make it not only unnec-
essary, but in fact impossible for Basanta himself to participate 
or intervene in its creation in a conventional sense. Functioning 
as an independent art factory, the project quite plainly cuts the 
traditional author figure out of the equation. Conceptually and 
practically (if not legally), the setup of the installation disqualifies 
Basanta as the default creator of any of its image outputs, 
including the disputed image. All We’d Ever Need Is One Another 
constitutes a posthumanist agential assemblage in which the 
human artist is participant rather than creator. Basanta’s role is 
decentered, and his capacity to function as author is significantly 
limited. Within the speculative framework of how the installation 
operates, this puts into doubt the human artist’s responsibility 
for the alleged infringing action.
The human participant’s creative agency is here negated by 
design, since the generative processes of All We’d Ever Need Is 
One Another are shielded from his interference such that he 
cannot direct, anticipate, or control the outputs (unless, perhaps, 
if he were to turn the entire system off). Both from a legal and 
from a philosophical perspective, this raises a difficult question 
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course: to which extent can Basanta be held liable for an alleged 
infringing action even when it is agreed that he did not “author” 
the offending image, but merely “authorized” an autonomous 
machinic action that happened to result in its production? With a 
focus on the aesthetics and conceptual thrust of the installation, 
it seems less than certain that Basanta can be called the author 
of 85.81%_match: Amel Chamandy ‘Your World Without Paper’, 2009. 
I would argue, on the contrary, that an important design feature 
of Basanta’s installation is precisely to permit the human agent 
involved in its operation “deniability” with regard to their pre-
sumptive authorial control over the outputs.
At least two speculative defences against Chamandy’s allegation 
of copyright infringement are conceivable. A first line of defence 
could be for Basanta to claim, simply, “I have no agency with 
regard to the creation of the image; I am not its author.” As 
noted in a previous chapter, most copyright legislation currently 
presumes human agency as a prerequisite for any creative 
expression to be legally recognized as authored. The speculative 
implication here is that if that the possibility of non-human 
creative agency is taken seriously, it will become difficult to assert 
the sole accountability and culpability of human agents who play 
peripheral roles in shared creative processes. If, in response 
to such an argument, it is objected that Basanta has, after all, 
designed and built All We’d Ever Need Is One Another for the 
specific purpose of creating near-identical matches of already-
existing artworks, and that he uses the AI-based validation 
process merely as an instrument for this process, a further retort 
comes to mind: since the matches are validated on a machine-
readable spectrum of similarity that isn’t legible to the human 
perceptual apparatus, they cannot be said to constitute copies in 
a sense that fits with anthropocentric, ocularcentric ontologies 
of “similarity” that human agents can meaningfully interpret as 
such. In this sense, the creation of 85.81%_match: Amel Chamandy 
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IP law or theories of art could recognize.
These objections can form the basis for a second line of critical 
defence, this one focusing more directly on how the artistic use 
of AI technology problematizes aesthetic and legal perspectives 
on the nature of originality, copying and, by extension, creativity. 
Technically speaking, the consumer-grade scanners used for All 
We’d Ever Need Is One Another are high-resolution copy machines 
designed to reproduce images to a very high degree of accu-
racy. But in the specific constellation of Basanta’s project, this 
standard purpose of the scanner—quite simply to render copies 
of originals at the behest of the human agents who operate 
them—is undermined. In this particular context, the images cre-
ated by these high-precision copying devices must themselves be 
regarded as originals, since no input is required and no source is 
ever reproduced. In relation to Chamandy’s claim, this means that 
the similarity registered in the validation process does not follow 
the sequential logic normally associated with a copying activity, 
according to which a pre-existing original is copied to create 
a derivative. Instead, the generative process employed here 
renders outputs that are always “original,” just as the outputs 
of generative GAN-style systems (as discussed in the previous 
chapter) cannot be meaningfully perceived as “copies” of their 
training dataset contents.
As noted, All We’d Ever Need Is One Another begins by outputting 
random images, some of which are then validated as artworks 
through the use of an automated comparative process that 
involves pre-existing artworks. But importantly, the link between 
the installation’s outputs and the pre-existing artworks is drawn 
in a retrospective manner, enacting an inversion of the con-
ventional causality of “original” and “copy.” There is no doubt 
that the creation of the pre-existing artwork with which a scan 
might be matched predates the creation of the scan itself (in 
other words, Chamandy clearly created her artwork nine years 
before Basanta built and activated a system that then produced 
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alone does not in itself mean that the output of Basanta’s system 
is indeed a derivative or transformative work. This is because the 
image was generated with no a priori knowledge of Chamandy’s 
pre-existing artwork: the similarity between the two emerges 
only after the fact. In copyright law, such an observation can 
fuel a so-called “independent creation” defence. This refers to a 
scenario in which reproduction of a copyright-protected creative 
expression occurs without awareness of the existence of the 
original, with the consequence that the new expression may not 
legally constitute a copy at all.3 A legal opinion by the American 
judge and philosopher of law Learned Hand (1872–1961) sum-
marizes this conundrum well: “if by some magic a man who had 
never known it were to compose anew Keat’s Ode to a Grecian 
Urn, he would be an ‘author,’ and, if he copyrighted it, others may 
not copy that poem, though they might of course copy Keat’s” 
(Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 1936; the passage has 
been invoked by many legal scholars—see, for example, Saint-
Amour 2003 and Patry 2005). Following this logic, outputs created 
by the complex pseudo-copy machine that All We’d Ever Need Is 
One Another constitutes are therefore no copies at all, regardless 
of the degree of their claimed similarity to other artworks.
Updating Learned Hand’s dictum to the digital context within 
which All We’d Ever Need Is One Another operates, I would argue 
the following: in this particular situation, the disputed image 
was created by a hardware-software-human agential assem-
blage that contains a sandboxed generative system. This system 
operates in isolation, without knowledge of the pre-existing 
works to which its outputs might later be matched. Technically, 
this system can ever only churn out originals, since creative 
copying requires some foreknowledge, i.e., a kind of intertextual 
awareness, or at least embeddedness in a relational system 
3 On emerging questions concerning the applicability of independent creation 
defences in AI contexts, see Asay 2020.
108 of signification (cf. Sanders 2006, discussed in Zeilinger 2009). 
The generative components of All We’d Ever Need Is One Another 
are specifically denied such access. In the end, it is only the 
referential titling convention employed in Basanta’s system that 
makes its outputs human-legible as “copies.” This conceptual 
stance appeals provocatively to the anthropocentric sensibilities 
of human audiences, habituated as they are to relatively clear-cut 
differentiation between original and copy. In this case, however, 
the particular relationship between the system’s outputs and the 
existing artworks to which they are matched undermines this 
differentiation, since no clear view is provided on where and how 
creative agency is situated in the installation.
Copying and Human-Non-Readability
As it stands, the legal complaint against Basanta might succeed 
on the granular level of scrutinous doctrinal analysis, if it focuses 
on legal definitions of copying activities in technological systems. 
The infringement allegation hinges on the assertion that even 
though Basanta may not have published or commercially dis-
tributed copies of Chamandy’s artwork, a copy of this work 
must surely have been made as part of the database used in the 
automated validation process of scans. This argument targets a 
blind spot in existing legislation regarding the legality of copying 
processes as part of data-mining and data-analysis activities 
(Scassa 2018; Burrell 2019; Guihot and Rimmer 2019; Sag 2019). 
These processes tend to occur on a computational level and are 
not directly facilitated, accessed, or even perceived by human 
agents. Consequently, their legal status is, for now, not entirely 
clear. Chamandy’s complaint implies that such processes—spe-
cifically the automated, quasi-non-human copying undertaken 
by the scraper tool as part of the validation process—violate 
her copyright. But if this perspective can be upheld, many of the 
copying processes on which machine learning fundamentally 
relies would also become subject to legal contestation.
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of All We’d Ever Need Is One Another and Chamandy’s artwork 
could only occur if the generative system had access to a copy of 
her image. It is uncertain, however, whether this use (unauthor-
ized though it may be) is indeed illicit. Writing in the U.S. con-
text, the law and technology scholar Matthew Sag (2019) argues 
that “non-expressive uses” of expressive works, of the kind that 
occur in data-mining for machine learning purposes, should be 
considered as fair uses to avoid fundamental conflicts between 
copyright law and “copy-reliant technologies” (cf. Sag 2009). If 
data-mining for machine learning purposes were to be regarded 
as an infringing copying activity, this would cast considerable 
doubt on the legality not only of art projects such as Basanta’s, 
but also, for example, on key practices in the digital humanities, 
from Franco Moretti’s “distant reading” through Paul Martin 
Eve’s computational close reading techniques to Lev Manovich’s 
“cultural analytics” (see Moretti 2000, also Ascari 2014; Eve 2019; 
Manovich 2020).
This would also problematize the legal status of most GAN-
based art that relies on Internet-scraped training data. The only 
exceptions would then be formed by the work of AI artists who 
use custom-compiled, “original” training data, such as Helena 
Sarin and Anna Ridler, who have argued that this approach 
enables them to retain artistic control over the resulting 
generative outputs (see Zeilinger 2021). For now, it remains 
unclear whether unauthorized compilation and use of copyright-
protected material for AI training purposes indeed amounts 
to copyright infringement. Conventionally, such infringement 
is characterized not only by the production of unauthorized 
copies, but also by their publication and distribution. But copies 
created for data mining and machine learning purposes are 
rarely circulated in this way. In the case of All We’d Ever Need Is 
One Another, for example, scraped data is not technically pub-
lished or distributed, since the source materials are never 
compiled for human use. Here, the copyright-protected data is 
110 “perceived”—i.e., read, viewed, or otherwise interpreted—only 
by a computational system, and it is doubtful whether such a use 
can be easily characterized as infringing.
Scassa has noted that challenging the legitimacy of this kind of 
copying activity “opens a window into the potential impact of 
statutory damages in text and data mining activities” (2018). If the 
compilation of datasets that are ever only machine-readable were 
to become subject to narrowly interpreted copyright restrictions 
(on the basis of restrictions that already apply to human readers), 
there can be no doubt that the same chilling effects that 
expansive IP regimes already have on human expressive agency 
will also negatively impact AI. An avalanche of legal actions 
brought against those who design the automated compilation, 
circulation, or use of such datasets—and more importantly, 
against those who own or control them—would likely follow.4 
Within the conceptual framework of AI art I am outlining in this 
book, I would argue that allegations of illegitimate copying such 
as Chamandy’s have little merit. To highlight the complicated 
relationship between AI art and traditional notions of authorship 
4 Tech corporations and research institutions have already begun to respond 
to such concerns. This is evident in recent deletions of large datasets that 
had been widely used for research and training purposes in machine vision. 
When it was reported, in early 2019, that the commercially used dataset 
MS-Celeb-1M, owned by Microsoft Corporation, contained roughly 10 million 
images of about 100,000 individuals harvested from online sources, it took 
only a few days before online access to the dataset was removed; Duke 
University and Stanford University followed suit and took down two other 
large datasets of similar type, called Duke MTMC and Brainwash, respec-
tively (see Murgia 2019a, 2019b). Officially undertaken because of privacy 
concerns, the deletions also indicate growing uncertainty regarding the IP 
status of database contents. As the Financial Times reported, MS-Celeb-1M 
only harvested images covered by Creative Commons (CC) licenses; it is not 
clear, however, what specific CC licenses (some of which expressly prohibit 
commercial use) were attached to the images. A research paper published 
by Microsoft software engineers involved in building the dataset does not 
clarify this point, and refers only to the use of “freebase” data, i.e., content 
from a Google-owned (now-defunct) entity that has since been replaced by 
Google’s Knowledge Base (see Guo at al. 2016).
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discussing them. Here, new types of posthumanist techniques of 
reproduction and creative expression emerge, and it is not sur-
prising that the logic of IP, with its anthropocentric prioritization 
of conventional property enclosures, cannot easily accommodate 
them.
It is unclear how the law will ultimately deal with the kind of 
massive-scale, gray-area data appropriation that corporations 
and research institutions have undertaken for years. There will 
likely be a move toward regulating big data mining and analysis, 
for example by creating IP licensing schemes that govern the use 
of dataset contents. But this will almost certainly occur against 
the background of economic considerations, rather than with a 
focus on cultural implications. The problematic effects of this can 
already be observed in some isolated instances. For example, the 
publisher Elsevier—notorious in academic circles for its relent-
less pursuit of outlandishly high profit margins—appears to have 
realized that regulation of data-mining allows for the creation 
of a new revenue stream for corporate content owners, and has 
designed new subscription solutions to re-monetize its vast port-
folio of digitized texts for use in AI training applications (Elsevier 
n.d.). 
In contrast to these developments, the UK Supreme Court has 
fairly recently re-asserted the argument that intra-computational 
activities of viewing, reading, and other forms of data-analysis 
are not likely to constitute copyright infringement (UKSC 18, 
2013). In line with this perspective, UK copyright law already 
provides an important exception to copyright restrictions that 
allows the copying of works “for text and data analysis,” as long 
as the analysis is “for the purpose of non-commercial research” 
and the copy is, where reasonably possible, “accompanied by 
sufficient acknowledgment” (UK Copyright and Rights in Per-
formances Regulations 2014, section 29A). In a roundabout way, 
this dovetails with the view that “machine reading” is non-
infringing, and also neatly inverts the meaning of Grimmelmann’s 
112 suggestion, as cited earlier, that copyright law is “for humans 
only” (2016, 674).
On this basis, I would argue that the kind of computational 
viewing and reading of web-scraped content that characterizes 
the functionality of All We’d Ever Need Is One Another must be 
considered to be permissible. The use is non-commercial, the 
vast majority of the used material never leaves the blackbox of 
the system itself, and those images that the system validates 
as artful are immediately furnished with a clear acknowledg-
ment of the referenced work. As a posthumanist agential 
assemblage capable of generating outputs that can be inter-
preted as creative (or which are, in any case, framed as such), All 
We’d Ever Need Is One Another enacts a kind of creativity that is 
unknowable in anthropocentric paradigms of originality, human 
creative labor, or original genius. Consequently, it is perhaps also 
unrecognizable within the legal systems that these paradigms 
have spawned. Ultimately, it is only thanks to the system’s own 
validation process and titling convention, which exteriorizes the 
generative outputs as human-legible (i.e., labelled) artefacts, 
that any infringement allegation becomes possible at all. But 
by invoking appropriation art practices, the same process also 
places the outputs within an ontology of art that operates beyond 
the traditional logic of copy and original.
In the realm of creative expression, the speculative post hoc 
“anti-copying” of All We’d Ever Need Is One Another is reminis-
cent of other thought experiments that complicate the logic of 
original creation and appropriation. The “infinite monkey theo-
rem,” for example, postulates that a group of monkeys sat at 
typewriters will, if given enough time, end up (re)writing William 
Shakespeare’s entire body of work in the form of randomly 
assembled texts that cannot technically be regarded as copies 
(cf. Hattenbach and Glucoft 2015). Jorge Luis Borges’ short story 
Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote, raises the same ques-
tion in a different constellation: the story is about the chance 
rewriting of Cervantes’ Don Quixote, authored by a writer named 
113Pierre Menard who worked without any prior knowledge of the 
already-existing novel (Borges 1941). As Borges’ protagonist 
argues, Menard’s text is no copy at all, but a sensational artistic 
achievement that must be accepted as an entirely new work, even 
though it matches the prior expression down to the last comma. 
Like Basanta’s project, Borges’ short story forces a reconsid-
eration of the deceptively simple question of how an original 
might be defined, what constitutes a copy, and what significance 
these definitions bear on our understanding of creativity, as well 
as of the identity, responsibilities, and ownership rights of an 
author figure.
But there is also a key difference here, and this, again, points 
beyond human-legible ontologies of expressive agency. In Borges’ 
story, readers are invited to suspend their disbelief, and to try 
to accept two plainly identical works, created by two separate 
human agents, as equally original. By contrast, Adam Basanta’s 
art factory produces matches that are not easily identifiable 
as such to the human eye. Here, the matches exist first of all in 
and for the “eye” of the machine, and are interpreted not for the 
sake of a human observer, but for that of a closed-circuit com-
putational system. Only in the very last step of the validation 
process is the output reified as artful in a human-legible sense. 
It strikes me as important that this does not occur through the 
specialized agency of someone like an art critic (as in Manovich’s 
AI art Turing test, which, as I have argued in a previous chapter, 
amplifies anthropocentric bias instead of dissolving it), or a lit-
erary scholar (as in Borges’ short story). Instead, in the case of All 
We’d Ever Need Is One Another it is the computational system itself 
that reifies its outputs for human audiences. I would describe this 
as a tactical inversion of the anthropocentric framing discussed 
by Craig and Kerr. Instead of human agents framing AI systems 
such that they can fit with anthropocentric notions of intelligence 
or creativity, here the generative system frames its own outputs 
in such a way that they become recognizable as art (and perhaps 
delegitimized as copies) for an all-too human audience.

[ 6 ]
From Non-Human Agency 
to Human Non-Agency: 
Creative Expression in 
the Age of Algorithmic 
Copyright Enforcement 
Is human agency the “ghost in the machine” of AI art, something 
that can be conjured rhetorically, or is it hidden inside a 
computational blackbox, and not easily erased? My dis-
cussion throughout the previous chapters has implied that 
spectacularizing stories of a becoming-creative of non-human 
computational entities are naively overwrought. Undeniably, 
human expressive agency persists in digital art that is produced 
with and by AI—as is evident, for example, in Anna Ridler’s 
emphasis on artist-compiled datasets, in the manifold inter-
ventions enacted by Obvious Collective in its use of a GAN 
system, and even in Adam Basanta’s design of an art factory 
that speculatively cuts the human artist out of the creativity 
equation. In any case, as Joanna Zylinska (2020) also notes, to 
ask whether computers can be creative is a misguided question. 
What I have been asking instead is how expressive agency is 
being redistributed in artificially intelligent agential assemblages, 
and how, consequently, the concepts of agency and creative 
expression have become subject to critical recalibrations. I have 
asked, in other words, how AI acts upon human creative agency, 
116 and what the critical stakes of this impact are. My proposition 
has been that the agential assemblages through which AI art 
emerges can operate tactically, along posthumanist vectors that 
decenter romantic fictions of human authorship and creative 
genius, and which thus also disturb the integrity of ownership 
models building on these fictions. But conversely, AI can also 
be deployed strategically, and perpetuate the humanist ideal 
of singular, unified human agency that translates so easily into 
narrow conceptions of authorship and restrictive norms of 
cultural ownership. As a specific example of this kind of strategic 
AI deployment, YouTube’s AI-based digital rights management 
(DRM) tool Content ID is the subject of this chapter.
Content ID is a proprietary tool designed to enforce YouTube’s 
corporate perspective on copyright policy. Access to its 
functionality is sold as a subscription service to large scale 
content owners. Since Content ID and the YouTube platform 
itself operate in the realm of mass media, the following analysis 
broadens the scope of my discussion beyond the speculative 
interventions that digital art can stage when it uses AI tactically. 
But my discussion will also frequently link back to Adam 
Basanta’s art factory, discussed in the previous chapter, in order 
to draw out significant contrasts between the reconceptualization 
of appropriation techniques present in All We’d Ever Need Is 
One Another, and the property-oriented operational logic of a 
copyright enforcement tool such as Content ID. Both, I will argue, 
represent new types of agential assemblages in which agency is 
redistributed across human and non-human entities. However, 
the two systems form conceptual inversions of one another, 
with the former engaging AI tactically to open up new horizons 
of expressive agency, and the latter proceeding strategically 
to streamline and amplify restrictive intellectual property (IP) 
enclosures.
In elaborating these contrasts, my discussion of corporate IP 
perspectives and mainstream entertainment media feeds back 
into my broader points concerning the impact of AI on issues of 
117agency and ownership, and, by extension, concerning the critical 
potential of AI in these contexts. Like the art projects discussed in 
the previous chapters, Content ID sits at the intersection between 
questions of expressive agency, AI, and IP. But there is a cru-
cial difference: whereas a work such as All We’d Ever Need Is One 
Another uses AI to problematize the notion that unified, singular 
agency is embodied in the author-qua-owner, the purpose of Con-
tent ID is instead to amplify the idea of singular, unified author-
ship, which it reifies in its algorithmic enforcement of over-sim-
plified IP enclosures. Functioning as a blackboxed computational 
system furnished with the power to monitor, analyze, and impede 
human expressive agency, Content ID effectively forecloses even 
the speculative possibility of the posthumanist agential assem-
blage in the broader digital cultural landscape.
In my discussion of Adam Basanta’s work in the previous chapter, 
the construction of such an assemblage, and the proposition that 
it can shield the system’s presumptively creative processes from 
human intervention, has framed a kind of deniability of human 
creative agency. But this should not distract from the fact that 
even in such a construct, a human participant’s relinquishing 
of their authorial control remains an enactment of expressive 
agency. Artists’ efforts to erase their own authorial control are 
familiar from conceptual art, surrealism, certain tendencies 
within computer art, and many artforms that rely on chance 
operations. When creative expression interfaces with algorithmic 
DRM tools, however, the divestment of agency is no longer nec-
essarily a conceptual stance: now, it may be imposed on human 
agents, rather than being adopted by them. When powerful AI 
systems become governance tools (whether in surveillance, 
commercial contexts, or law enforcement), they begin to act 
upon human agency in a capacity that can take on more or less 
automated and autonomous forms. AI-driven DRM systems are a 
case in point. They instrumentalize AI for the purpose of mon-
itoring and controlling expressive activity, and are ultimately 
capable of curtailing or even outright denying agency, even 
118 before something such as a creative expression can ever be 
instantiated in human-readable form. Many everyday internet 
users will likely have experienced this first hand, when their 
attempts to upload audio or video content containing “non-
original” elements to platforms such as YouTube, Facebook, or 
Twitter were automatically denied by an algorithmic DRM system.
In such contexts, what I have discussed in chapter 3 as the 
Hegelian exteriorization of the self cannot occur in the first place, 
because the DRM system interprets an upload as the attempted 
authoring of a digital artefact that may trespass on the intellec-
tual property of another author. In the logic of Hegel’s personality 
theory, this also means the denial of an expression that would 
be co-constitutive of an individual’s personhood and agency. In 
IP contexts, this can be rephrased as follows: if copyright norms 
are algorithmically encoded such that they can be monitored by 
and enforced through AI systems, a problematic shift occurs—
away from the potential emergence of new forms of non-human 
expressive agency embodied in AI, and toward new forms of 
human non-agency enacted through AI.
The rights afforded by copyright law are intended to foster 
creativity, to protect artists’ interests, and to safeguard the 
integrity of authored works. In this sense, copyright itself can be 
understood as a mechanism for administering, regulating, and 
protecting expressive agency, something that the law aims to do 
by granting certain exclusive rights to authors. But in order to 
achieve this equitably and fairly, copyright cannot be absolute or 
perpetual, and must be limited both in scope and duration. These 
limits are crucial for the law to be able to effect a finely calibrated 
balance between the IP rights of content owners, and the access 
rights and needs of those whose expressive capabilities rely on 
the use of potentially copyright-protected materials (including 
artists, researchers, or journalists). It is understood, in other 
words, that if the restrictions encoded in copyright law are too 
extensive or too rigid, they may be able to protect the eco-
nomic interests of content owners more efficiently (and more 
119profitably), but they will then have a chilling effect on the benefits 
any community can derive from the creativity and expressive 
agency of its members.
To avoid this, copyright law seeks not only to protect artists 
from having their IP rights infringed, but also to ensure that IP 
rights do not unfairly impact the expressive agency of others. 
Ideally, this is achieved through exceptions to the restrictions 
imposed by the law. These exceptions are designed to permit 
“fair” access to and “fair” uses of copyright-protected materials, 
even where such uses are not authorized by rights holders; in 
fact, the exceptions make it unnecessary for users to obtain 
authorization from legally recognized authors and owners. In 
the United States, these exceptions are covered by the “fair use” 
doctrine; in the U.K. and other Commonwealth jurisdictions, 
similar exceptions are covered by the principle of “fair dealing.” 
While there are important differences between the two legal 
constructs, both encode the idea that the IP enclosures imposed 
on creative practice must leave room for purposes that are 
central to the performance or enactment of expressive agency. 
In contemporary copyright law, such purposes tend to include 
criticism, educational use, and research, as well as new, often 
born-digital forms of creative expression that rely fundamentally 
on the copying and reusing of existing aesthetic artefacts (such as 
sampling, remixing practices, and other forms of user-generated 
content).’1 Copyright law’s fairness exceptions, in other words, 
1 For a survey of fair use issues in the context of cultural production and 
creative expression, see Aufderheide and Jaszi 2018; for a collection of 
critical perspectives on fair dealing issues, see Coombe, Wershler and 
Zeilinger 2014. As noted, the concepts of fair use and fair dealing are not 
interchangeable, but share important similarities. In principle, all copyright 
law embodies the idealistic (and idealized) notion that creative expression 
is to be encouraged and fostered for common good. This encouragement, it 
is assumed, can be achieved by creating incentives for expressive activities. 
In utilitarian perspectives on copyright law, the incentive is economic in 
nature, and takes the form of limited-term exploitation rights, which allow 
the author/creator/owner of a copyright-protected artefact to reap the 
rewards of the intellectual labour that went into the creation of the artefact.
120 are meant to protect expressive agency from undue restrictions 
in the form of overreaching IP enclosures. But digital contexts 
pose difficult problems for how these ideals can continue to be 
meaningfully applied, both in theory and in practice. In the pre-
vious chapter, I identified the compilation and analysis of data for 
“machine reading” purposes as one area in which the applicability 
of fair use and fair dealing rules remains uncertain.
In my view, expressive activities that test the limits of what IP 
law considers fair constitute a crucially important enactment of 
expressive agency. This is evidenced, for example, in the many 
conceptual and legal disputes that have been (and continue to 
be) provoked by appropriation art in its many forms. Arguably, 
appropriation can yield its most powerful critiques of IP regimes 
not simply because it may interfere with legally recognized 
ownership rights, but also because it challenges the humanist 
foundations on which the conceptualization of these rights 
rests. The ability to defend allegedly infringing expressions and 
practices as fair is itself an important performance of expressive 
agency. When this is felt to be impeded by the law, copyright is 
sometimes critiqued as a contemporary form of economically 
motivated censorship that functions on the basis of wide-ranging 
restrictions of creative practices (see Sunder 1996; Vaver 2006; 
Coombe, Wershler and Zeilinger 2014; Tehranian 2015). Fair 
use and fair dealing are thus situated at the conflicted inter-
face between expressive agency and its legal regulation. They 
delineate the conceptual and practical limits of the reach of IP 
law, and of the exclusive rights of copyright owners. As such, 
when expressive agency is in conflict with the enclosures of IP 
regimes, it contributes importantly both to the production of and 
the critical reflection on what the interdisciplinary humanities 
scholar Jane M. Gaines has called the propertization of “con-
tested culture” (1991). As I have suggested throughout the pre-
vious chapters, in the context of AI these issues can take on the 
additional significance of exploring new figurations of the very 
121concept of agency, along with the potential impact on existing 
ownership models.
Because each creative expression differs from the next in its 
form, intention, purpose, scope, etc., there can be no hard rules 
by which to easily determine whether an expression’s use of 
copyright-protected materials is fair. To accommodate this com-
plexity, the copyright exceptions encapsulated in the fair use 
and fair dealing definitions are formulated such that they can 
be “subject to varying methods of interpretation;” they are, in 
other words, “described in a vague and general manner in order 
to allow a flexible, case-by-case analysis” (Zygmunt 2016, 56). 
Crucially, this means that the law intends for any determination 
of whether an unauthorized use of copyright-protected materials 
can be considered fair to be difficult to undertake. Unsurprisingly, 
such determinations will depend on the context-specific assess-
ment of many factors that vary from one example to another 
(Burk 2019, 287).
Determining fairness on a case-by-case basis is complicated and 
time-consuming, in part because most copyright statutes include 
formulations designed to make straightforward, rule-driven 
copyright adjudication virtually impossible. As such, fair use and 
fair dealing delineate complex and dynamic norms and standards 
that reflect shared social values concerning expressive agency 
and cultural ownership. This represents what I described in the 
introductory chapter as a crucially important interface between 
law, culture, and technology. As legal tools, fair use and fair 
dealing form counterpoints both to the restrictions that copyright 
law is capable of imposing on creative expression, and to the 
property enclosures that the law prescribes. In a cultural land-
scape dominated by rigid and vigorously enforced IP enclosures, 
creative expression that relies on fair use and fair dealing 
exceptions can therefore be understood as a powerful, but also 
inherently risky performance of creative agency. 
122 All of this is further complicated when AI is additionally taken 
into consideration. AI-driven DRM systems require that complex 
legal norms and standards regarding the fairness of expressive 
copying activities are encoded in much-simplified rules that can 
be enforced algorithmically. By necessity, any effort to do so must 
rely in part on problematic assumptions regarding the “effectively 
computable” nature of creativity. But a perspective that is critical 
of such assumptions suggests that it may be impossible for AI 
systems to deliberate fairly on the legality of creative expres-
sions that draw on copyright-protected materials, and that an 
extremely problematic curtailing and recalibration of expressive 
agency may be the inevitable result.
Minimally Agential DRM and the Blackboxing 
of Copyright Adjudication
I have suggested that Adam Basanta’s artificially intelligent art 
factory is designed to speculatively play up the non-human and 
post-humanist aspects of the expressive agency embodied in 
the system. The result is that at least conceptually, it becomes 
difficult to sustain conventional allegations of copyright 
infringement directed solely at a human participant identified 
as a singular, unified author figure (in this case, the artist). But 
what are the critical stakes of relegating agency to a non-human 
system in cultural contexts that reach beyond artistic experi-
mentation? What if a blackboxed, minimally agential DRM tool 
is tasked with the quasi-adjudication of copyright, and in the 
process becomes a kind of “anti-art factory”? On the basis 
of invoking humanist ideals of creativity and originality and 
the restrictive cultural ownership models to which they lend 
themselves, such a system is likely to determine that whenever 
“copying” of any sort is detected, the rights of narrowly conceived 
author figures are being infringed upon. Importantly, in the out-
sourcing of such determinative processes to algorithmic systems, 
123it becomes difficult to mount and sustain defences against 
infringement allegations.
This can be observed very clearly on online platforms such as 
YouTube, which serve as repositories for user-generated con-
tent (UGC). Content ID, the proprietary AI-driven DRM tool 
used by YouTube to determine the permissibility of creative 
expressions uploaded to the platform, encapsulates this issue 
perfectly. First deployed in 2007, Content ID is an automated 
filtering system designed as a corporate response to what was 
perceived as a rising tide of copyright-infringing uploads. The 
system automatically compares submitted content to a vast 
database containing “digital fingerprints” of existing, copyright-
protected content.2 If matches are found, the submitted content 
is flagged as a probable copyright infringement, after which the 
presumed rights holder can affirm or reverse this automated 
decision.3 As a dynamic filtering system that effectively converts 
copyright adjudication into a privatized form of algorithmic con-
tent management, Content ID is an early example of a broader 
2 The functionality of Content ID relies on a growing archive of metadata that 
uniquely identifies copyright-protected materials including films, TV con-
tent, and sound-based works. Rightsholders who wish to make use of the 
service must provide this information for reference, and the dataset used 
to train the Content ID system now contains over 50 million reference files, 
which allows the system to handle 98% of the YouTube platform’s copyright 
management (e.g., Titlow 2016). Incidentally, copyright is not the only area 
in which YouTube employs such technologies. The platform has noted that 
a similar percentage of videos removed due to extremist content is also 
flagged by machine-learning algorithms (Wojcicki 2017).
3 Here is a more detailed outline of how a Content ID infringement claim 
unfolds: once the system has flagged content as infringing, the uploader 
can either “(a) accept the restrictions or (b) dispute the claim. If the claim is 
disputed, the rights holder has 30 days to either (a) release the claim or (b) 
uphold the claim. From here, the user can either (a) accept the restrictions 
or (b) issue an appeal. At this point, the rights holder can either (a) release 
the claim or (b) submit a DMCA notice” (Edwards 2018, 70).
124 trend4 toward AI-based copyright enforcement that can also be 
described as “AI-driven negative speech control” (Wu 2019, 2016).
Certain kinds of copyright infringement, such as the uploading 
of an entire music video, will be easy to recognize for even the 
most minimally agential DRM system. But a growing body of 
legal research challenges, as a matter of principle, the idea that 
AI-based tools are capable of identifying “fair” exceptions to 
copyright restrictions. Fair use and fair dealing, as I have noted, 
are designed to carve out exceptions in areas where the limits 
imposed by copyright law on expressive agency would other-
wise be excessive. In this context, it is important to note that 
fair use and fair dealing can only be invoked in defence of an 
expression that has already been made (when it has been “pub-
lished” and “perceived,” to use the juridical terminology), and 
once its creator has been accused of infringement. This means 
that the fairness of an unauthorized use of copyright-protected 
materials can technically not be a certainty until an infringement 
complaint has been raised and rejected (the reverse is also 
true: the success of an infringement allegation may depend on 
the defeat of a fair use/fair dealing defence). This is sometimes 
interpreted as a conceptual weakness of copyright exceptions, 
based on the assumption that a more prescriptive, clearly 
defined set of permitted uses or “user rights” could offer reliable 
guidance regarding what constitutes infringement. Against this 
perspective, I would argue that the law’s inclusive and open-
ended formulations are precisely what empowers creativity and 
encourages its proactive enactment (these issues are discussed, 
for example, in Elkin-Koren 2017 and 2019). After all, what is the 
defence of an unauthorized use as fair, if not a critical perform-
ance of expressive agency? And what, in turn, is the relegation of 
4 Facing issues concerning the need to monitor overwhelming amounts of 
UGC, many platforms have developed their own tools, so that by 2017, “plat-
forms employing AI-driven, automated copyright enforcement schemes 
included Scribid, 4shared, Dropbox, YouTube, Facebook, SoundCloud, 
Twitch, TuneCore, Tumblr, Veoh, and Vimeo” (Sag 2017, 539).
125copyright enforcement capabilities to an algorithmic system that 
is blind to such defences, if not a problematic enacting of human 
non-agency through AI means?
Recent analyses of Content ID in legal scholarship highlight 
a number of problematic issues pointing in this direction. To 
begin with, Content ID shares a key characteristic with many 
machine learning applications, namely the potential to improve 
the efficiency of its functionality over time. In the given context, 
this means that over time, the system will be able to identify 
presumptive infringement in ever more minute details of the 
content it analyzes (Heldt 2019, 61). The system may as a con-
sequence become more difficult to circumvent, as its filtering 
processes are also taking on a self-reinforcing quality. Previous 
determinations of infringement are likely to shape future deter-
minations, especially when the decisions are not disputed. Over 
time, Content ID can therefore get better at identifying what it 
perceives as infringement, but its mistakes will also be amplified. 
This is important because Content ID cannot, of course, detect 
infringement as such; it is capable only of mutely recognizing 
matches between value patterns in newly submitted content and 
the training dataset of reference files (Burk 2019, 297). Framed in 
the language of Crawford and Paglen (2019b) and many critics of 
algorithmic governance, this means that the determinations of 
Content ID are characterized by self-amplifying biases through 
which, in this case, decisions of a minimally agential com-
putational system designed to monitor creative expressions will 
be experienced as law.
Another concern is that the inner workings of AI-driven DRM 
tools are generally blackboxed, either as a result of corporate 
strategy to protect valuable proprietary technology, or also 
because they are part of computational processes that are simply 
so complex that they are no longer legible for human agents 
(on this subject see Berry 2019, Deeks 2019, Pasquale 2015). 
Algorithmic adjudication of copyright offences is thus prone to 
“limits of explainability,” in the sense that software “can often 
126 explain how it reached a decision, but not why” (Wu 2019, 2021). 
Here, algorithmic adjudication directly contradicts ideals of legal 
philosophy according to which the prescriptions of the law must 
remain human-comprehensible. Calls for AI explainability, in this 
sense, mirror the ideal of explainable jurisprudence. Systems 
such as Content ID, by contrast, represent what the sociology and 
technology scholar Zeynep Tufekci calls “stealthy gatekeepers,” 
whose operations are “unaccompanied by transparency and 
visibility” (Tufekci 2015, cit. in Edwards 2018). Notably, when 
Content ID flags an upload as infringing, this process does not 
automatically initialize a formal copyright dispute. The legal 
procedure that normally accompanies a copyright complaint, 
and which is designed to safeguard the expressive agency of the 
accused, here becomes an algorithmically enacted, automated 
process that I would describe as no more than para-legal in 
nature. Conceptually, this extends the blackboxing of copyright 
adjudication from monitoring into the domain of enforcement, 
i.e., from the domain of the execution of software code to that of 
the enforcing of legal code. This also means that it can become 
entirely impossible for the uploader to enact the expressive 
agency that copyright law would afford them, in the form of their 
right to defend their use of the material as fair.
This curtailing of agency is veiled by an economically motivated 
procedural aspect of how Content ID functions. Ultimately, the 
goal of YouTube’s corporate copyright enforcement strategy is not 
the deletion of offending material, but rather its monetization. In 
YouTube’s business model, both the content owner and the plat-
form operator derive income whenever users access uploaded 
material and watch the advertisements that frame the content. 
It is therefore in the interest of content owners and the platform 
owners that uploads remain online, even when it is alleged that 
they infringe copyright law. When, following the automatic flag-
ging of uploaded content, a rightsholder decides that the material 
does indeed infringe their copyright, they are nevertheless 
incentivized to allow publication of the content, because they can 
127then claim any advertisement-related income derived from page 
visits.
This might appear to be a good solution in theory: infringing 
material is allowed to remain accessible, the rightsholder receives 
a share of the advertisement revenue as compensation for the 
commercial harm that the infringement might otherwise cause 
them—everybody wins. But in reality, as the IP scholar Matthew 
Sag argues, this leads to a negative feedback loop that encour-
ages rightsholders to permit publication of materials that are 
conveniently flagged as infringing by a biased algorithmic system, 
while users will be indirectly discouraged from appealing the 
AI system’s decision since their content is, after all, allowed to 
remain online (2017, 541f). This may give the appearance of a 
relatively permissive copyright policy. I would argue instead that 
the process is highly exploitative and represents an extreme 
curtailing of expressive agency. The functioning of Content ID 
makes it possible not only for rightsholders to prohibit trans-
formative expressions that copyright law may well deem fair, 
but also to commercially exploit them (sharing the profit with 
YouTube). As Sag notes, to subject copyright-related fairness 
determinations to monetization efforts “places a burden on 
expression and creativity” (2017, 558), in a way that undermines 
the ideals and objectives of the law. YouTube’s algorithmic 
copyright adjudication tool is therefore designed not with the 
goal of facilitating the equitable enforcement of copyright law, 
but with that of maximizing monetization revenue. It does so by 
perpetuating a notion of singular, unified authorship that justifies 
the relegation of authorship and ownership claims from UGC 
creators to IP content owners. As such, Content ID represents a 
particularly powerful example of the impact AI can have at the 
intersection of agency and ownership. 
A comparison to Adam Basanta’s All We’d Ever Need Is One Another 
is again useful here. In the installation, the use of AI decenters 
authorial control and proposes a tongue-in-cheek deniability of 
human agency. This can serve as a speculative defence against 
128 infringement allegations, and furthermore as an indication that 
the outputs of this art factory—and the outputs of the underlying 
posthumanist agential assemblage—resist assimilation into the 
property-oriented circuits that have come to structure the con-
temporary cultural landscape. The operational logic of Content  
ID signals the opposite, namely that the aim here is to maximize 
the efficiency of the commercial exploitation of propertized 
expressions. In the process, the AI-driven tool curtails human 
expressive agency. 
Regarding Basanta’s project, I have also argued that it under-
mines the temporal logic of copying (i.e., that a copy exists in 
a clear before-after relationship with an original, from which 
it is derived), since the installation constitutes a sandboxed 
generative system that produces what could be described as 
copies without originals. Content ID, too, represents an inter-
vention in the temporal logic of creative expression, but in this 
case, this occurs through a narrowing down, rather than open-
ing up, of how creative expression is conceptualized and legiti-
mized. Specifically, Content ID inverts the temporal logic of 
how infringement issues are dealt with: DRM systems such as 
this one can produce situations in which creative expressions 
are flagged and blocked before they appear online; situations, 
in other words, in which creative expressions are determined 
to infringe the copyright of other works before they can be 
perceived as such by human audiences. Content ID thus collapses 
the normal sequence of expression–complaint. Since YouTube 
itself could become liable for infringement complaints if it hosts 
unauthorized content, its filtering protocol operates predictively 
rather than reactively. This means that algorithmic DRM aims to 
adjudicate ex ante, i.e., before publication of the presumptively 
infringing content on the platform.5 Fair use and fair dealing 
5 See YouTube Help (n.d.): “Content ID continuously compares new uploads 
to the references for [the copyright owner’s] assets. Matching videos are 
automatically claimed on behalf of the asset, and [the content owner’s] 
specified match policy is applied to the claimed video before they are 
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copyright-protected expression must be judged ex post, i.e., after 
the content has been published. 
As I argued, All We’d Ever Need Is One Another problematizes 
whether a non-human-legible expression that remains 
sandboxed in a computational system can be meaningfully 
described as a “copy.” Content ID goes a step further, and 
problematizes the ontology of “expression” itself: here, the 
algorithmically encoded assumption appears to be that 
perception through a human agent (rather than a DRM bot) is 
not necessary in order for an audio-visual artefact to infringe 
copyright. The problematic corollary of this is that established 
processes of dealing with infringement issues are fundamentally 
undermined, including the uploader’s ability to defend their 
expression as fair after it has been published. (It is possible to 
appeal the decisions of Content ID; however, such appeals are 
initially deliberated in a para-legal sphere. For a layperson, it is 
exceedingly difficult to escalate such appeals to a court of law.) 
This interferes with the law’s procedural logic of the fairness 
defence, and thus, again, with the enactment of expressive 
agency on behalf of the accused. While Basanta’s art factory 
prevents publication of anything that does not match the digital 
fingerprints contained in its dataset of reference files, Content 
ID limits the externalization of everything that does. Or, put dif-
ferently: All We’d Ever Need Is One Another provokes infringement 
allegations that are not easily justified; Content ID inverts 
this approach, and produces allegations that cannot easily be 
contested.
A system such as Content ID is built to enforce rules that 
are “simple to understand and enforce but lack nuance and 
published on YouTube.” (Note: ‘match policy’ refers to a content owner’s 
registered preference regarding whether offending content should be 
monetized, blocked, or merely monitored.) On the topic of filtering before 
publication, see also Heldt 2019.
130 flexibility” (Burk 2019, 287). The copyright exceptions framed by 
the concepts of fair use and fair dealing, however, are meant to 
express complex legal norms and standards that are “flexible 
and context-sensitive but lack clarity” (ibid.). Without the nuance 
emphasized by Burk, it is practically impossible to defend the 
fairness of expressive activities that involve copyright-protected 
materials. The legal mechanisms by which the fairness of an 
unauthorized use of copyright-protected material are meant to 
be judged therefore cannot function according to the binary logic 
of right or wrong that is encoded into the analytical routines of 
Content ID (Edwards 2018, 68). Algorithmic adjudication, in this 
sense, “will drive a shift in norms toward ‘codified’ (that is, rule-
driven) justice, as opposed to equitable justice” (Re and Solow-
Niederman 2019, 246f.). 
This kind of conceptual flattening has problematic implications 
for creative practices, and for the unencumbered digital circula-
tion of information more generally. It would seem plainly obvious 
that creativity can never be evaluated according to a binary logic; 
and yet, systems such as Content ID are now controlling large 
swathes of the digital cultural landscape. With regard to issues 
of creative agency and cultural ownership, here the notion of 
“computational thinking” returns with a vengeance: instead of 
accommodating the complexities of expressive agency and the 
relationality of creativity, a gatekeeping system such as Con-
tent ID will shape how those it affects think of the processes it 
governs.6
6 Following Gillespie, Burk outlines a long list of problematic issues that run 
alongside these changed expectations, and which will inevitably arise in and 
through algorithmic copyright enforcement. Familiar from other studies 
on the self-reinforcing socio-economic impact of algorithmic bias, these 
include: the “illusion of objectivity,” i.e., the assumption that the binding, 
quasi-legal determinations of the Content ID system do not involve human 
bias, which tends to create “the unwarranted perception of impartiality and 
objectivity;” “patterns of entanglement,” i.e., the changing of user behaviors 
“under the influence of the algorithms they depend on;” and, perhaps most 
disturbingly, the “production of calculated publics,” i.e., a self-reinforcing 
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shifting functions and meanings of the law under this new, 
algorithmic copyright regime, with the result that the general 
understanding of permissible fairness exceptions—and, experi-
entially, the nature both of creativity and of copyright law 
itself—will change, to the detriment of those whose expressive 
agency the law is meant to safeguard. Arguably, informed deter-
minations concerning the permissibility of unauthorized creative 
expressions are effectively incomputable. In copyright contexts, 
the “ghost in the machine” of adjudication is the human ability 
to interpret creative expressions with nuance, and in all their 
relational complexity. Basanta’s art factory foregrounds and 
highlights these crucial aspects of the new, speculative forms of 
creativity that posthumanist agential assemblages can make pos-
sible; Content ID, in turn, forecloses this possibility.
In combination, all of the issues outlined—Content ID’s flattening 
of complex standards and norms into computable rules; its 
blackboxed and automated adjudication protocols; its reliance on 
ex ante presumptions of infringement; and its habituation of its 
subjects to its own decisions and decision-making processes—
translate into a severe curtailing of human expressive agency. 
Content ID is therefore aligned, “materially through its com-
putational procedures, economically through its monetization 
practices, and rhetorically through its published legal positions 
and community guidelines” (Edwards 2018, 62), with a restrictive 
and narrow perspective on expressive agency and ownership, 
which translates into a bias against the complexity of the kinds 
of relational creativity that fair use and fair dealing are meant to 
facilitate. Instead of framing dynamic and equitable engagement 
with creative expression, Content ID relegates control over it 
pattern of interpretation, application, perception, and influence whereby 
the audience expectations vis à vis an algorithm and its behavior in response 
to the audience’s behaviors are taken up more broadly throughout society 
(including by courts, policy-making bodies, etc.) and invade shared social 
and cultural norms as well as law and policy (Burk 2019, 285–95).
132 to private arrangements that are codified and enforced in the 
shadow of the law.
What Content ID shares with All We’d Ever Need Is One Another is 
that both systems relegate the power of making determinations 
regarding the permissibility of digital expressions from the 
human to the non-human; what distinguishes them is that the 
purpose of this shift is reversed. All We’d Ever Need Is One Another 
invokes “similarity” to provocatively determine the artfulness of 
a digital artefact. Content ID, by contrast, will always consider 
similarity as an indication that the artefact under consideration 
is not eligible for the protection that copyright law offers for 
certain transformative copying activities. In Basanta’s project, 
every non-match is deleted because it does not satisfy the 
similarity thresholds by which the system recognizes a generative 
output as a work of art. Content ID, in turn, permits only that 
which matches nothing, and in doing so it perpetuates an ide-
alized romantic myth of the singularly original outputs of human 
creative genius. Here, similarity is indicative not of the relational 
and embedded nature of creative expression, but automatically 
of unlawful trespass on the enclosures of modern intellectual 
property. This is certainly not a posthumanist perspective on 
creativity, but, rather, one that dehumanizes creativity.
By contrast, the complex layering of generative and evaluative 
processes through which Basanta’s art factory creates its outputs 
imply a posthumanist form of distributed creative agency that 
is embedded, dialogic, and relational in nature, and which may 
become incompatible with the conventional value propositions of 
contemporary IP regimes. But what does this mean for dehuman-
ized IP-enforcement through DRM systems such as Content ID? 
Where algorithmic entities gain the power to police and curtail 
expressive agency, the loop between Content ID and All We’d 
Ever Need Is One Another closes. Basanta’s project entangles 
human creativity with other, non-human agencies, such that the 
human participant(s) must relinquish authorial control; Con-
tent ID does not redistribute agency across multiple human and 
133non-human entities, but only empowers a minimally-agential 
non-human system to judge expressions. The key difference 
is that while Content ID frames creativity through simplistic 
notions of originality that are derived from the humanist model 
of the artist and the artwork in order to further extend existing 
private property enclosures, Basanta’s project implies a type of 





Tactical of AI Art
At the outset of this book, I noted that the question of whether 
AI can be creative interests me only insofar as it represents an 
opportunity to rethink what “creativity” means in AI contexts, 
and how AI impacts issues of expressive agency and cultural 
ownership. In subsequent chapters, I discussed some examples 
of this impact, noting that even where AI becomes agential and 
presumptively creative, human agency persists. In my discussion 
of Portrait of Edmond Belamy, this has meant that non-human 
creativity is framed anthropocentrically and imagined as a 
“human-like” expressive agency somehow embodied in AI. In my 
discussion of Content ID, by contrast, it has meant that when an 
AI system is trained on narrowly conceived humanist notions 
of creativity, it cannot accommodate new kinds of expressive 
agency, but will instead perpetuate problematic ideals of unified, 
singular authorship. I have described these examples as strategic 
because they instrumentalize an anthropocentric concep-
tualization of creativity that sustains—or even amplifies—the 
economically motivated intellectual property (IP) models that 
characterize contemporary cultural landscapes. At the opposite 
136 end of the spectrum I have located tactical uses of AI, which 
disturb narrow conceptualizations of expressive agency and 
creativity instead of sustaining them. My main example of this 
has been that of Adam Basanta’s art factory, in which agency 
is redistributed across multiple participating elements (human 
and non-human alike). I call such uses of AI tactical because they 
force a rethinking of what is meant by originality, authorship, 
and creative expression, of the political and aesthetic ideologies 
these concepts have traditionally relied upon, and of the 
socio-economic and legal regimes they serve. To round out my 
sketch of the becoming-tactical of AI in digital art practices, this 
chapter now brings into play a number of recent AI art projects 
that focus on the distributed nature of expressive agency in post-
humanist agential assemblages.
I begin this discussion with Machine Learning Porn (2016) and Zizi 
(2019), two projects by the British artist Jake Elwes that enact a 
deliberate queering of AI and dataset politics. Both problematize 
the normative aspects of established perspectives on agency, 
with an explicit focus on sexual identity and an implicit focus on 
cultural ownership issues more generally. Following this, my final 
example is the Slovenian artist Maja Smrekar’s ongoing project 
!brute_force, which introduces another form of intelligence to 
the interface between the human and AI. In !brute_force, canine 
intelligence becomes part of an experimental AI training regimen, 
in an effort to explore co-constitutive qualities of human and 
non-human knowledge ontologies. All of these projects go 
to considerable lengths to produce what I call posthumanist 
agential assemblages, featuring complexly entangled relational 
systems of decentered, co-constitutive, and intra-actional subject 
positions that reconfigure agency and cultural ownership beyond 
humanist, anthropocentric horizons.
137Queering AI
Much of Jake Elwes’ work engages critically with datasets and 
the politics around their compilation and use in AI contexts. As 
such, several of the artist’s projects explore how queer sub-
ject positions and agential constellations can be framed by 
AI technology, but also what kinds of new constellation might 
emerge through such a framing. Regarding the practicalities of 
his approach, Elwes (2019b) has emphasized his strong interest in 
practices of appropriation. In the specific context of his work, this 
refers to the use of pre-existing datasets as well as pre-existing 
protocols of how neural networks interpret data for analytical 
and generative purposes. Elwes’ appropriation-based approach 
differs from the methodologies of AI artists who favor the 
creation of original datasets, such as Anna Ridler or Helena Sarin. 
In an earlier chapter, I have suggested that artist-created datasets 
foreground the human element in computational creativity, 
something that can serve to perpetuate traditional notions of 
authorial control. Additionally, such approaches can reinscribe 
an anthropocentric framing of creativity expressed in the works, 
highlighting the human artist behind the work. The conceptual 
starting point for many of Elwes’ projects is pitched differently. 
It resonates more closely with Crawford and Paglen’s emphasis, 
in “Excavating AI” (2019b), on the importance of critiquing bias 
encoded in pre-existing data, rather than of reinscribing singular 
human agency in computational processes. In this sense, a basis 
for effective critique will involve existing bodies of data that can 
then undergo recalibration and reconfiguration, in ways which 
expose and challenge biases inherent either in the dataset itself 
or in the computational protocols to which it is subjected. This 
problematizes existing normative interactions between data, AI 
applications, and human agents.
Zizi, one of Elwes’ most recent works, revolves around the AI-based 
generation of gender-fluid, androgynous drag portraits (fig. 7). 
In its first iteration, commissioned by Drew Hemment for the 
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Edinburgh-based Experiential AI initiative, the project offers a 
powerful critique of biased assumptions concerning gender 
identity that are encoded in training datasets commonly used 
for AI-based image-generation (see Elwes n.d.; Hemment 2019). 
Exhibited as a 135-minute video loop, Zizi features generative por-
traits of fictitious drag artists that continuously morph between 
recognizable faces and colorful abstraction. This output is 
achieved through the use of a pre-existing neural network using 
the StyleGAN architecture, which was trained on Nvidia’s open 
source Flickr-Faces-HQ (FFHQ) dataset. The system was then 
re-trained on a new dataset of roughly 1,000 portraits of drag 
performers, which had been scraped from various websites and 
social media profiles. The resulting video footage produces an 
[Figure 7] Jake Elwes, Zizi (ongoing). Video still image used by permission of the artist.
139exhilarating impression of diversity and difference, while at the 
same time also conveying a sense of continuity and community 
across the generated portraits.
When AI generates realistic images of human-like faces, the 
training datasets that are used will inevitably prescribe a horizon 
of possibilities concerning the outputs, no matter how much 
the rhetoric framing of the system might wish to emphasize 
the “unpredictability” or “originality” of the generated images. 
(Portrait of Edward Belamy, discussed in chapter 4, is a case in 
point; because it draws on the art historical canon of classic 
portraiture, it embodies many familiar, staid conventions of the 
form, even though it was supposedly created anew by an artificial 
intelligence.) Zizi highlights this contradiction and challenges the 
appearance of difference that generative AI gives. The critical 
position projected by the work is that generative systems syn-
thesizing “new” images of human faces actually tend to amplify 
existing biases and will likely exclude large demographics, simply 
based on the nature of the training data and the generative 
algorithms that are being used. It is only by injecting difference 
into the training data that Zizi can itself highlight the lack of 
diversity and representation in mainstream AI. As a critique 
of the spectularized “newness,” “originality,” or “creativity” of 
AI-generated outputs, Zizi suggests that dataset bias will in fact 
accentuate and perpetuate a normative sameness that is con-
cealed beneath the problematic rhetoric veneer of AI-based, non-
human expressive agency.
This message takes on an additional critical edge through the 
project’s thematic focus on drag. Reminiscent of other GAN-
style systems that can generate portraits of non-existent human 
figures, Zizi outwardly appears as a relatively straightforward 
image-synthesis tool. But in its speculative alignment between 
generative machine learning and drag, the project challenges the 
presumptive originality that is often assigned to AI-generated 
images. As a cultural form with an important critical dimension, 
drag itself draws powerfully on playful techniques of imitation, 
140 defamiliarization, and mimicry—techniques that can also be 
located in the functionality of GANs as described in earlier 
chapters. Drag’s performance of difference and its underlying 
problematization of essentialist gender norms is partly based 
on copying practices, and highlights, as Judith Butler (1998) and 
many other since have noted, that gender itself is an imitation 
without an original. Zizi thus foregrounds a speculative align-
ment between drag and generative AI, but also emphasizes a 
key difference: while both drag and generative AI might appear 
to operate by way of amplifying stereotypes and accentuating 
difference, drag inherently challenges what generative AI rein-
forces. In the fictitious, morphing portraits Zizi generates, the 
“permanent becoming of a GAN” resonates with the “fluidity, 
ambiguity and transition of drag” (Hemment 2019). With regard 
to critical issues of agency and identity, however, the message 
leveraged through Zizi is that the posthumanist potential of 
AI-based expressive agency is not realized in the mainstream 
systems and datasets generally used for GAN-style image 
synthesis.
The 1,000 drag artist portraits used for retraining the main-
stream AI system on which Zizi is based were scraped without 
seeking permission, which might raise some ethical concern. 
But I would argue that the artist's decision to proceed in this 
fashion underlines the conceptual integrity of the project. The 
appropriative gesture aligns with the formal and ideological 
approaches of drag itself; the use is non-exploitative and, in 
fact, critical of exploitation; and the appropriation functions as 
a reminder that extensive datasets used in many commercial 
applications—including the FFHQ dataset itself—tend to be based 
on the massive-scale unauthorized appropriation of private 
information.1 As Elwes notes, none of the drag images that were 
1 Note that  for new iterations of Zizi, Elwes has been actively collaborating 
with drag performers (personal correspondence with the artist, May 24, 
2020). One result of such collaboration, The Zizi Show, was released online in 
mid-March 2021.
141used make direct reference to individuals, nor do the resulting 
outputs render specific drag performers recognizable. Rather, 
the approach produces a “queer amalgamation” that is intended 
to challenge the normative and exclusionary identity politics 
projected through the pre-existing network. In other words, the 
approach here is a tactical critique of an existing dataset based 
on the injection of disruptive elements, rather than the strategic 
exploitation of misappropriated training data. This entails a 
recalibration of the evaluative and generative processes critiqued 
in Zizi, a sort of repetition with a difference that exposes hetero-
normative biases encoded in mainstream image datasets.
Again, this highlights how generative AI tools that are framed as 
capable of generating novel and original outputs may instead 
merely perpetuate objectionable attitudes encoded in the under-
lying training data, and, indeed, help to normalize these attitudes. 
This echoes an argument made earlier with regard to AI-based 
gatekeeper systems such as Content ID, which habituate users 
to norms encoded in and amplified through AI systems, rather 
than allowing users to attune to difference. In this sense, Zizi 
emphasizes the work that is required to ensure that mainstream 
networks do more than merely generate exclusionary sameness 
and disguise it as difference. In the project’s appropriation of 
drag aesthetics and ethics, and in its injection of these into the 
FFHQ ecology, the repetition of training and generative processes 
does indeed produce radical difference.
One of Elwes’ earlier projects, Machine Learning Porn (2016), 
follows a similar approach. Here, the open-sourced open_nsfw 
network, designed by the tech giant Yahoo to identify online 
image content that may be considered sexually explicit or 
offensive (including pornography, sexual violence, but also mere 
nudity), is reengineered so that the classifiers used for content 
recognition become parameters for generating image content 
(fig. 8). The resulting video output is unsettling and strange: it 
never fully resolves into anything entirely representational, but 
nevertheless conveys a vague “porn” quality that leads viewers 
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to question the prejudices on which their own interpretations 
of “offensive” audio-visual content are based. Inevitably, this 
involves asking what norms for “inappropriate content” may be 
encoded in the underlying dataset, what algorithmic processes 
of habituation viewers are exposed to when they browse content 
that is pre-filtered by tools such as open_nsfw, and how the biases 
on which such filtering is based may ultimately become encoded 
in the viewers’ own interpretive faculties. By turning a filtering 
system into a generative system, Machine Learning Porn pushes 
a neural network originally designed to censor images in a new 
direction, and coaxes it into transgressing normative boundaries 
of anatomy, gender, and sexual identity on which filtering net-
works may otherwise rely. Machine Learning Porn thus engenders 
[Figure 8] Jake Elwes, Machine Learning Porn (2016). Video still image used by permis-
sion of the artist. (Video available at https://vimeo.com/213923669.)
143a system that behaves “progressively” both because of and 
despite the biases of the underlying training data.
Like Zizi, Machine Learning Porn appropriates pre-existing neural 
networks and data. This includes an influential visualization 
technique developed by Ahn Nguyen et al. (2016) for the 
Evolving AI Laboratory, as well as experiments based on this 
technique, conducted by Gabriel Goh (n. d.; Vincent 2016).2 
A brief comparison between Machine Learning Porn and the 
operational logic of these mainstream AI experiments helps 
to clarify the becoming-tactical of AI that is evident in Elwes’ 
project. Nguyen et al.’s underlying research focuses on the 
deveopment of ways to visualize momentary states of net-
work neurons at any given moment during a learning/training 
procedure. Somewhat problematically, the project setup implies 
that machine learning “thought processes” are analogous to 
known human brain functionality, and that on the basis of this 
anthropocentric analogy, it is possible to objectively visualize 
diachronic snapshots of artificial neural network nodes. Gabriel 
Goh’s subsequent work applied the earlier findings to Yahoo’s 
open-sourced open_nsfw neural network. Using Nguyen et al.’s 
technique, Goh fine-tuned a system trained on the Yahoo dataset 
in order to investigate the specific thresholds used in Yahoo’s 
filtering system for determining what characterizes a given image 
as “not safe for work.” In the documentation for the project, Goh 
references the Yahoo project website’s declaration that “Defining 
NSFW material is subjective” and that “what may be objectionable 
in one context can be suitable in another.” But Goh’s work does 
not take into account what strikes me as the most important 
implication of these statements, namely that open_nsfw encodes 
and reifies the biases of the Yahoo engineers and clickworkers 
who classified the training data. Instead, Goh uses the dataset 
to assign descriptors such as “clearly pornographic” or “only 
2 Note that Goh’s work, referenced in the following paragraphs, is no longer 
online. At the time of writing, a snapshot of the relevant page, including 
exemplary image material, is archived on Gwern Branwen’s website.
144 seemingly innocent” (emphasis in original) to the generative 
outputs of the newly created system.
As Goh puts it, “Once you see the true nature of these images 
… it becomes impossible to unsee” (n. d.). It would seem to me 
that this assertion harbors a fundamental confusion regarding 
the nature of non-human expressive agency. The “true” nature 
of the generated outputs is, of course, inscribed through 
human-created labels in the dataset. In this sense, Goh fails to 
acknowledge that the system’s outputs are variations of norms 
encoded in the underlying dataset. Biases and ideological 
frameworks inscribed in the training data and the classification 
system are thus ignored, and once more, the agential assem-
blage generating the images is itself framed anthropocentrically. 
Ultimately, the experimentation undertaken in Goh’s project 
lacks criticality and is oriented toward the kind of technical mas-
tery described by the concept of computational thinking. Other 
experiments at the intersection of AI and pornographic content 
share this orientation. On a Reddit thread devoted to the topic, 
many of the listed projects focus on the reverse engineering 
of commercial tools, but none of them aim to develop new, 
critical ways of seeing. Instead, virtually all of the listed projects 
endeavor to streamline the efficiency of consuming normatively 
classified pornographic content (“Machine Learning Porn”).
In the framework I have established here, such experiments have 
to be described as strategic, and stand in stark contrast to the 
conceptual thrust of art works such as Zizi and Machine Learning 
Porn, which appropriate and redeploy existing technologies in 
order first to point at the problematic anthropocentric norms 
inscribed in them, and then to push beyond these. Elwes’ 
work adopts existing registers of sexual identity politics and 
technological protocols of biased data evaluation only in order 
to subject all of this to a tactical queering. AI is thus speculatively 
pushed into a sphere of posthumanist expressive agency that 
may reflect back some of the anthropocentric distortions, 
exclusions, and exploitations effected through the technology, 
but which does not perpetuate them.
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Computation
Slovenian artist Maja Smrekar’s ongoing AI project !brute_force, 
which intersects digital art, behavioral psychology, and AI devel-
opment, moves in a similar direction. Here, a series of ludo-
scientific experiments that involve humans, dogs, and AI-based 
participants aid in a speculative rethinking of the co-constitutive 
and co-determinative nature of different agential entities and 
the subject positions they inhabit. !brute_force revolves around 
iterative interactions of the project participants within a three-
dimensional sculptural grid consisting of movable panels (fig. 
9). A human and a dog are guided by an AI system in traversing 
the structure, while also responding to the behaviors of one 
another and producing data that informs further computational 
processes. All of the participants represent performers as 
much as test subjects, evaluative tools as much as training data 
sources. They are networked with the aim of distributing agential 
attributes and characteristics across them. The grid is modelled 
on the molecular structure of serotonin, a human neurotrans-
mitter associated with the feeling of well-being and happiness, 
whose metabolic function has been crucially shaped by the 
co-evolution of human and dog. In each iteration of the project, 
the AI system—a convolutional neural network, or CNN—guides 
the artist and her dog companion as they navigate the modular 
grid structure, with the uncertain ambition of creating a state of 
equilibrium across biometric diagnostic data collected from both 
participants (see fig. 10). The data collected in each iteration is 
evaluated by the AI system and used in reconfiguring the grid’s 
layout for the following iteration. This open-ended feedback 
loop of co-determinative learning, training, and action crosses 
human/non-human boundaries, and invokes the inter-species, 
co-evolutionary development of the serotonin molecule itself.
!brute_force explores fundamental agential entanglements 
between the human, the canine, and AI, and rejects as humanist 
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fantasy the centrality or supremacy of a presumptively singular, 
unifi ed human agent. Beyond the revisionist notion of inter-
species subjugation that is sometimes used to characterize the 
[Figure 9] Maja Smrekar, !brute_force (ongoing). Still image from video doumentation 
used by permission of the artist.
[Figure 10] Maja Smrekar, !brute_force (ongoing). Still image from video doumentation 
used by permission of the artist.
147domesticated dog, the project asks whether non-human inter-
actions can instead open up toward a new “symbiotic code” of 
posthumanist agency (Smrekar n.d.). In its iterative feedback 
cycles, !brute_force produces just such an agential assemblage, 
in which all elements co-determine and continuously refine new 
knowledge and training data for one another. The assemblage 
thus constituted does not feature a clear center, and the inter-
actions and learning processes afforded by it produce new types 
of emancipatory, equitable, posthumanist relationships between 
the AI system, artist, and dog participants.
The iterative format of !brute_force is designed to invoke, but 
also to challenge conventional expectations regarding the pro-
ducts of art-making, research, and AI development. In this way, 
the project undermines humanist ideals of meaning-making 
that would dictate outcomes such as finished artworks, repro-
ducible results from scientific experiments, or high-efficiency 
machine learning algorithms. What the entanglements between 
the project participants in !briute_force develop instead is a more 
open-ended cognitive mode through which boundaries between 
human agency and its computational and animal others can 
be redrawn. Notably, this is done not in order to augment the 
human, but instead to better understand how human agency 
is always dynamically co-determined by and through its inter-
actants. When the participants navigate the iteratively recon-
figured grid structure, what emerges is a cognitive vocabulary of 
co-contingent subjectivity and action that is shared across the 
entire agential assemblage.
As Smrekar notes, creating such a vocabulary “is not a suggestion 
for improving the algorithm, as it usually is the case in automated 
procedures within machine learning, it rather addresses the con-
structs of ideological markers that (re)shape our cognitive reality” 
(“Towards the Final Concept Frame”). Crucially, this vectorization 
of agency manifests not only in a dog’s ability to navigate the 
grid calculated for it by the AI system, but simultaneously in the 
human ability to build the structure, and in the ability of the AI 
148 system to remodel the grid designs based on its observation of 
the project participants’ interaction with them. In this sense, the 
central question that drove !brute_force when Smrekar began 
to develop the project—“What Can Artificial Intelligence Learn 
from Dogs?”—now appears as a bit of a ruse: while the ques-
tion invokes conventional machine learning aims of perfecting 
prediction algorithms, the project methodology actually con-
tradicts the conventional approaches this would imply. In their 
place, other, more interesting questions arise. What could AI 
learn about humans from the ways in which they have sought 
to shape canine agency over time? How could humans use AI to 
better understand, in a self-reflexive mode, the co-contingent 
emergence of human and canine agency? How are these various 
training and learning modalities encoded in (and expressed 
through) the histories of dog training and the work now done to 
train AI?
A key conceptual point of departure for !brute_force is that 
technological infrastructures have always been linked to “a 
plethora of nonhuman actors,” such as entanglements with 
weather, rocks, fungi, and so on (Smrekar, “What Can Artificial 
Intelligence Learn from Dogs?”). Based on the manifold presences 
of non-human actors in the ontological universe constructed and 
inhabited by human intelligence, Smrekar proposes that human 
actors need to “include non-human agency into the frame of 
re-thinking our place in the world, while addressing the ques-
tion of where our technologies will take us in the future” (ibid.). 
To do so could mean, for example, to develop new posthumanist 
ontologies of affect, immediacy, and immanence—i.e., new 
modes of knowing and being that emerge from diagnostic, eval-
uative, and generative feedback cycles such as those afforded 
by !brute_force. Such ontologies bear markers of the tactical, 
rather than the strategic: they do not lend themselves well to the 
order of unified, singular subject positions, nor to the cultural 
ownership models or property regimes that rely on such subject 
positions.
149This becomes evident in the project’s appropriation-based 
approach to data collection and evaluation. When navigating 
the grid structure, both the artist and her dog collaborator wear 
customized electronical devices that record biometric data such 
as heartbeat and body temperature. These devices are hacked 
versions of commercially available electronic fitness trackers. The 
data they collect feeds into an archive maintained for the project 
itself, but also into the cloud-based storage system Apple Inc. 
uses for its mass-scale analysis of customer-supplied biometric 
data. As such, the collected data serves a double purpose. The 
first one, as already noted, is to provide training data for the 
!brute_force convolutional neural network, which then goes on to 
compute further iterations of the serotonin-based grid structure 
for the project participants to navigate. The second purpose 
is to infiltrate Apple Inc.’s proprietary health data ecology, in a 
speculative extension of the co-evolutionary transformations 
effected on and by the serotonin neurotransmitter. Because 
the hacked fitness tracker devices used in the project maintain 
an uplink to Apple Health, biometrical “data gathered from the 
dog’s body gets routinely processed within the Apple cloud,” 
where it represents a “disruption of the corporate statistics of 
human health” (Smrekar 2020). It is, of course, impossible to 
know how these rogue data uploads will be interpreted, or what 
effects they may have on the system. The injection of canine 
biometric information into Apple Inc.’s massive-scale, blackboxed 
mining operation of human-scraped health data is nonetheless 
a compelling tactical intervention. It highlights that digital health 
data analytics is not merely about health or well-being, but also 
raises important issues concerning ethics and privacy issues 
surrounding the collection and evaluation of such data.
In the current cloud-based, corporate-controlled information 
ecology, the data politics of Apple Health and similar services 
also entail strict IP enclosures that are being established when-
ever individuals agree to use health tracking services. Both the 
amount of relevant health data stored in corporate data vaults 
150 and the worldwide saturation of proprietary tracking/data-mining 
devices is immense. The consequence is that massive collections 
of private biometric data held by Apple and other corporate 
tech giants now constitute datasets of immeasurable economic 
and biopolitical value. This has been demonstrated with great 
urgency during the COVID-19 pandemic: coronavirus track-and-
trace apps developed by tech corporations appear to outperform 
similar efforts developed at the state level (cf. French et al. 2020). 
As Smrekar (2020) notes, the first wave of the pandemic swept 
across Europe while !brute_force was in development; it was in 
this context that the emphasis on the politics and economics 
of health data took on a more important role in the project. 
Mass-marketed diagnostic wearables and the AI-based health 
monitoring technologies that operate in the background relate to 
highly sensitive personal information in extremely problematic 
ways. Who, Smrekar asks, will develop and control health com-
munication protocols, who “will own our health data and who will 
have access to it?” (2020). These concerns regarding data privacy 
and the massive-scale commercial exploitation of users’ health 
data point exactly to the agency and ownership issues that I have 
sought to highlight throughout this book.
!brute_force explores how new agential figurations challenge 
the teleological, predictive, and property-oriented ontologies of 
human agency as it has been traditionally conceived, and as it 
is now encoded and amplified in the computational sphere. The 
project’s title is informative here: in programming, “brute force” 
refers to the solving of a problem through sheer computing 
power, while many programming languages use “!” as an operator 
signifying “not equal.” The canine-human-computational assem-
blage that !brute_force constitutes thus speculates on a new, 
posthumanist agency of a “non-brute force” type. As Smrekar 
notes, contemporary views on AI continue to impose “our” 
understanding of human thinking processes onto non-human 
contexts. In this sense, “brute force computation” refers, first 
and foremost, to the strategy of eradicating a problem through 
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cognitive process. A frequently invoked example of this approach 
is the victory of the Deep Blue chess computer over Garry Kas-
parov in 1996, in which the human player was overpowered by the 
computer’s ability to predict and evaluate every possible move 
including all of its possible consequences.
But similar effects can also be identified in other, seemingly more 
equitable approaches to advanced computation and artificial 
intelligence. An example of this is the astonishing success of the 
AlphaGo project, in which DeepMind Technologies (now owned 
by Google) developed an entirely self-taught AI system capable 
of beating the world’s highest-ranked player of Go. The ancient 
board game of Go has far fewer rules than chess and affords 
the player more freedom to choose how to proceed through 
the game. It is, for these reasons, much more difficult to master 
than chess. The complexity of the game is such that the cal-
culation and evaluation of all possible combinations of moves 
is technically impossible. While Deep Blue demonstrated that a 
game of chess can be won following a brute force strategy, it was 
until recently assumed that playing Go requires a more tactical 
approach, of which AI systems were considered to be incapable. 
When AlphaGo beat Lee Sedon in 2016, the event was widely 
hailed as a huge milestone for a type of next-wave AI technology 
that is immensely powerful, and additionally also described as a 
fundamentally accessible technology because it follows from-
the-ground-up (rather than top-down) training methods (this 
view is still espoused by many; cf. du Sautoy 2019 and Miller 
2019). It must be recognized, however, that achievements such as 
these are in fact not possible without the extreme consolidation 
and centralization of privately-owned resources and processing 
power. In various guises, the “master/slave” framework under-
lying strategic brute force computation therefore continues to 
ripple outwards from simple hardware contexts to the complex 
socio-economic, cultural, political, and philosophical issues of 
152 infrastructure ownership, inequitable power dynamics, privacy, 
access to knowledge and, ultimately, agency.
For now, the development of ever-more powerful AI technologies 
continues to take the form of self-reinforcing feedback loops 
in which the very idea of artificial intelligence circulates 
anthropocentrically, in the form of attempts to (re-)produce 
and control the activities and agential processes of human-like 
thinking machines.3 In such contexts, the development of any 
presumptively non-human agency still hinges on brute force 
ideologies and imaginaries, in which power, control, and own-
ership are of central importance. !brute_force, by contrast, 
explores cognitive and computational vectors that gesture 
toward the co-determinative, symbiotic processes through 
which the affective and agential capabilities of human and dog 
were shaped. It is plainly evident how these diverge from the 
exploitation of clickworker labor, the blackboxing of proprietary 
predictive algorithms, or the massive-scale mining of private 
data, but also from the ways in which AI as such remains mod-
elled on anthropocentric notions of intelligence and expressive 
agency.
In my reading, one of the key propositions of Smrekar’s project is 
that just like the brute force training methods to which dogs have 
at times been subjected, the iterative reward-based feedback 
cycles on which contemporary machine learning conventionally 
relies can never hope to achieve more than transposing a 
reductive humanist ideal of agency to non-human contexts. 
!brute_force imagines a system that draws on something other 
than the centralized power structures dominating humanist 
thinking and being, in order to then facilitate the emergence of 
something other than anthropocentric notions of agency. The 
3 Here, it is useful to acknowledge the etymology of “computer” as denoting 
a human agent who performs computational activities. For critical and 
artistic commentary on this, see Grier 2005, and also the American artist Jeff 
Thompson’s project Human Computers (2020).
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concept of agency must reshape itself when it opens up to non-
human subjectivities that are characterized by emancipatory 
qualities. Early in the development of the project, Smrekar 
noticed that once a dog had mastered a task, in follow-up 
encounters it began to approach this task playfully, and thus 
less predictably and, in the logic of computational thinking, less 
successfully (“Canine Training Data”). It is virtually impossible 
to model this “dog factor” algorithmically; more importantly, it 
also represents an element of canine agency that contradicts 
revisionist fantasies of humanity’s “top-down” domestication of 
the dog. The behavior is evocative of de Certeau’s tactical cunning 
(see my discussion in chapter 2), and thus itself takes the form 
of a challenge to the statistical order of computational efficiency 
that often structures AI development.
Similar to AI, dogs have long served as a kind of canvas 
onto which humans have projected their various notions of 
intelligence, creativity, and agency, many of them anthropocen-
trically framed by and reified in relationships of presumed 
domination and control. In this sense, I interpret the perception 
of the dog as an intelligent agent at least partly as a narcissistic 
affirmation of the imagined supremacy of a kind of human agency 
that is expressed precisely in its efforts to mold non-human 
agencies. As Smrekar notes, “any strategy for living in today’s 
world depends upon attention to the here and now, and not to 
the illusory promises of computational prediction” (“What Can 
Artificial Intelligence Learn from Dogs?”). What implications, 
one wonders, could insights emerging from a non-brute force 
human-dog-AI paradigm have for anthropocentric property 
regimes and their efforts to strategically subsume human agency, 
algorithmic entities, and live non-human subjectivities? Perhaps 
one provisional answer to this question lies in the tactical subver-
sion of IP enclosures that the posthumanist agential assemblage 
of !brute_force performs on proprietary collections of human 
health data.
154 Tactical approaches to AI critically re-engineer emerging 
technologies. In doing so they enable reflexive, exploratory, and 
transformative interventions in the ideological substrates that 
organize AI and machine learning today. In the examples I have 
discussed, this has meant exploring the existing and emerging 
politics of complicated overlaps between agency and ownership 
in AI contexts, and resisting the assimilation of AI into regimes 
of capital, surveillance, and exploitative forms of algorithmic 
governmentality. Tactical uses of AI feed into opposition to such 
regimes, or can help, at least, to create speculative frameworks 
that make it possible to imagine such opposition. Rather than 
using AI merely as an aesthetic tool, tactical approaches explore 
and reconfigure what the technology itself is capable of hacking.
Where strategic AI hacks and disables the potential for radically 
new forms of distributed, posthumanist agential assemblages 
to emerge, tactical AI opposes the blackboxing of technology, 
its financialization and propertization, and any anthropocentric 
framing that continues to insist on elevating the human author-
qua-owner above those non-human agencies with which is entan-
gled. !brute_force encapsulates these qualities: it is inclusive, 
public-facing, and expansive, rather than exclusive, private, and 
restrictive. It appropriates and rethinks AI both at the level of 
the apparatus (algorithm, infrastructure) and at the level of the 
corpus (data). In this case, the becoming-tactical of AI in digital 
art points toward an “artistic intervention in the digital public 
sphere” (Smrekar 2020), or what I will call, in the last chapter, a 
posthumanist commoning of AI.
[ 8 ]
AI Art for a Posthumanist 
Cultural Commons
From the co-constitutive human-AI-canine knowledge ontologies 
envisioned in !brute_force to the defamiliarizing appropriation 
of AI functionality in Zizi, from the legal provocations of All We’d 
Ever Need Is One Another to the clumsy declamations of non-
human creative agency in Portrait of Edmond Belamy, and from 
the uncloaking of AI bias in ImageNet Roulette to the problematic 
enactment of human non-agency in the Content ID system—
what commonalities, productive contradictions, and critical 
potentialities reverberate across the examples discussed in the 
preceding chapters?
Throughout this book, I have considered my examples in relation 
to new kinds of agential assemblages that involve human and 
computational actants alongside one another. I identified agency 
and ownership as key concepts in exploring why such agential 
assemblages matter, what sort of meanings they create in con-
temporary socio-cultural landscapes, and how they can disturb 
existing anthropocentric paradigms of creative expression. As 
I have argued, agency and ownership are so important for this 
discussion in part because these concepts link together the 
156 entangled aesthetic, philosophical, legal, and socio-economic 
foundations underpinning the intellectual property (IP) 
enclosures of digital cultural landscapes. When AI manifests 
alongside its presumptively singular, individualized, and unified 
human counterparts in what I have called posthumanist agential 
assemblages, these enclosures lose their footing. And when a 
critical art of AI engages this development tactically, it has the 
potential to drive a radical decentering, redistribution, and recal-
ibration of agency, such that humanist perspectives on creative 
expression, anthropocentric ideals of creativity, or restrictive 
views on human-only authorship may become unviable. One 
speculative consequence of this development is that own-
ership models which feed on these perspectives can themselves 
become subject to AI-driven critiques that undermine the cultural 
logic of IP.
What remains is to consider in more detail what sort of concep-
tual space is constituted by the becoming-tactical of AI in digital 
art projects. What are the critical stakes and implications of 
pushing past the ontological frameworks within which the art-
work, the author, and the owner have traditionally circulated? 
What sort of political project is invoked when a critical art of 
AI speculates on the emergence of a new discursive matrix, a 
new environment—really: a new ecology—that manifests in 
and through the posthumanist agential assemblage as I have 
described it?
Having argued throughout that AI art can challenge anthropocen-
tric perspectives both of the kind of agency conventionally 
required for creative expression, and of the ownership models 
that control the circulation of such expressions, this chapter 
rounds out my larger project with some thoughts on the pos-
sible critical trajectory implied in the becoming-tactical of AI. To 
do so, I follow a few strands from earlier chapters: I begin with a 
brief elaboration on my earlier discussion of GAN-style machine 
learning and GAN-based AI art. In that context, I revisit the 
problem of AI creativity in relation to IP frameworks, and expand 
157on my suggestion that certain outputs of presumptively agential 
AI can be fundamentally incompatible with anthropocentric per-
spectives on creativity, originality, and authorship. Because such 
outputs resist assimilation into the property-oriented ownership 
models espoused by copyright, some recent scholarship suggests 
that they should be automatically relegated to the public domain. 
A short critique of this perspective will then bring me to the final 
part of my argument. The disturbances caused by AI with regard 
to agency and ownership call for more than merely the relegation 
of AI outputs to the insecure cultural commons of the public 
domain, which is, in effect, just another resource pool for further 
private property enclosures: what is needed instead is a post-
humanist cultural commons that is co-constituted and co-deter-
mined—in a spirit of unownability rather than of property-to-
be—by the works and the workings of the posthumanist agential 
assemblage.
GANs as “Generative Adversarial  
Copy Machines”
Artificial intelligence, I suggested in chapter 4, is a useful tool for 
challenging anthropocentric notions of what it means to create, 
to author, and to own. But this capability is not always realized 
tactically. My main example of this has been the GAN-style AI 
artwork Portrait of Edmond Belamy, which instrumentalizes AI 
strategically. As I argued, the work embodies a notion of AI 
creativity in which the humanist author figure and their creative 
genius are simulated computationally, and which aligns with 
anthropocentric ownership models. There is no consideration 
of the critical potential that may be enacted by new types of 
posthumanist expressive agency constituted in and through AI 
(unless one is inclined to accept spectacular claims of a “disrup-
tion of the art market” as such a potential). GAN functionality 
relies fundamentally on pre-existing data, from which it appears 
to “learn,” and on the basis of which it can project the appearance 
158 of being capable of approximating (or even exceeding) 
human abilities of creative expression. In digital art contexts, 
descriptions of the technology tend to convey this through the 
rhetoric of art forgers trying to fool interlocutors into believing 
that their “fakes” and “copies” are “real” and “original” (cf. Sarin 
2018; Ridler 2020; discussed in Zeilinger 2021). And yet, there is 
no doubt that the outputs of GAN systems can indeed be novel, 
and that they satisfy many conventional criteria of anthropocen-
trically framed creativity and originality. While such outputs 
may appear to successfully transpose aspects of human-style 
creativity to AI, they therefore also contradict humanist con-
ceptions of creativity. Based on this paradox, in my discussion 
of Portrait of Edmond Belamy I argued that GAN systems syn-
thesize new kinds of “copies without originals,” which cannot be 
meaningfully described as reproductions of training data.
The members of Obvious Collective did not seem to see 
themselves as participants of a posthumanist agential assem-
blage. Situating Portrait of Edmond Belamy as a valuable and 
unique aesthetic artefact, they instead proposed that con-
ventional views on creativity, originality, and ownership models 
can persist in AI art. When it became clear that the collective’s 
appropriation of Robbie Barrat’s underlying work in fact violated 
these same views, from a conceptual standpoint their proposition 
fell apart. In elaborating on this argument, I want to suggest 
that to use GAN systems tactically is to foreground—rather 
than obfuscate – the relational entanglements between human 
and non-human participants, between existing expression and 
generative novelty. Here, GANs become “generative adver-
sarial copy machines,” rather than tools that are idealistically 
and naively framed as approximations of human creativity even 
when their outputs ultimately appear unimaginative and rather 
expectable.
In technical terms, it is clear that a GAN system iterates over 
training data until it can reliably surpass the threshold at which 
the Generator’s outputs convince the Discriminator that a 
159generative “fake” is, in fact, a “real” original. GAN “creativity,” 
it follows, works within an horizon of originality that is 
fundamentally anchored in repetition. Some current views 
ignore this and instead proceed along a different human-AI 
analogy: in recent publications by du Sautoy (2019) and Miller 
(2019), for example, the yardstick for measuring AI creativity 
is, once again, the art-historical manifestation of the romantic 
artist figure and its creative genius capable of producing unique 
aesthetic artefacts. Against this perspective, I would argue that 
in AI contexts, such outputs, no matter how compellingly they 
might appear to approximate anthropocentric norms of creative 
originality, are better described as a new kind of Baudrillardian 
simulacra.
To spin this thought further: if GAN outputs—framed as art-
works—constitute copies without originals, then GAN systems—
viewed as agential assemblages with expressive capabilities—
resemble bodies without organs. Katherine Hayles (1999), 
Patricia Pisters (in Braidotti and Hlavajova 2018) and others have 
pointed out that this concept, borrowed from Antonin Artaud 
and popularized by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, is useful for 
critiquing the Enlightenment notion of autonomous subjectivity. 
In the given context, I would argue that the workings of a GAN 
system itself can constitute just such a critique: the “adversarial” 
interplay (or intra-action) between Generator and Discriminator 
may appear to project a kind of split personality, a simple com-
petitive duality revolving around “copy” and “original,” “fake” 
and “real;” but more importantly, it also represents a decentered 
agential assemblage that will not and cannot conform to the 
conventions by which the unified agency of the humanist artist 
figure has traditionally been identified. A GAN system engaged 
in presumptively creative processes that might be interpreted 
as capable of yielding novel, unique, and original aesthetic 
artefacts thus also always represents “wider distributions of 
agency,” to use Jane Bennet’s (2009, 122) formulation, across the 
160 porous boundaries of the AI system’s co-constitutive generative 
elements.
These distributions, in my view, extend beyond a GAN system’s 
computational components, and manifest as “mutual con-
stitutions of entangled agencies” (Barad 2007, 33) that integrate 
computational and algorithmic components with their human 
designers, programmers, owners or operators, and likewise with 
the information, biases, and subjectivities expressed in training 
data sets. In this view, the entanglements that characterize 
GAN-style AI art can be seen to result in expressive outputs and 
behaviors that are not likely to align with how agency is conceived 
in and through humanist paradigms of creativity, originality, and 
authorship, nor, again, with the ownership models underpinned 
by these.
Joanna Zylinska recently commented that “much of current AI 
art, especially of the computer- and data-based kind, ends up 
generating an odd combination of the fuzzy, the mindless and the 
bland” (2020, 72). Yet GAN-style AI is perhaps not quite as dumb, 
boring, predictable, or meaningless as it can appear to be. Yes, 
easy analogies between surprising, novel GAN outputs and the 
traditional notion of the unknowable creative genius of human 
artists are shallow and trite. But in any case, neither the expres-
sive “minds” of AI systems nor the expressions they are capable 
of producing are ultimately consistent with the romantic model 
of singular expressive agency that AI art is popularly meant to 
invoke. Instead, such systems align much more closely with the 
ways in which posthumanist thought conceptualizes agency. 
Artificially intelligent agential assemblages here emerge as 
decentered and relational, rather than as internally unified and 
singular. “Creativity” now can no longer be argued to work from 
the blank slate of pure inspiration (as if it ever had); rather, in the 
ways in which it manifests in GAN outputs it becomes another 
reminder that this blank slate does not, in fact, exist. Operating 
as relational systems, GANs have become embedded in cultural 
and technological ecologies, which they access through training 
161data and the subjectivities inscribed through human agents who 
are inevitably involved in the generative processes that an AI 
system may be capable of.
It might be objected that the notion of relationality does not map 
smoothly onto AI. In Craig and Kerr’s writing on the (im)possibility 
of AI authorship (discussed in depth in chapter 3), the authors 
note that the same characteristics which render authorship 
relational and dialogic also require the recognition of authorship 
as a “communicative act that is inherently social,” which is marked 
by a “cultivation of selfhood” (2021, 44) not accessible to AI. But 
approaching the expressive agency of AI through a posthumanist 
framework allows for relational and dialogic processes to 
become decoupled from an anthropocentric focus of human-only 
social and communicative interactions (and also from human-
only-made artefacts), so that relationality can persist in entan-
glements in which both human and non-human agential entities 
participate. The point of insisting on this distinction is that the 
disaggregated expressive agency of artificial intelligence, when it 
is framed in this way, ultimately aligns more closely with exactly 
the kind of progressive view on a human creativity of the dialogic/
situated self through which critics of the romantic author figure 
have long sought to disrupt narrow conceptions of authorship 
and ownership. As Karen Barad notes with regard to the spe-
cific example of writing, such expressive activity represents “an 
iterative and mutually constitutive working out, and reworking, 
of ‘book’ and ‘author’” (2007, x). Applied to the use of GAN-style 
AI systems for creative expression, this observation can surely be 
read as suggesting that critical uses of AI are capable of achieving 
something other than merely an imitative approximation of 
human creativity.
My argument, ultimately, is that even when GAN-style AI art 
tends to be evaluated based on how effectively it embodies the 
“external hallmarks of human creativity” (Craig and Kerr 2021, 
73), it also structurally undermines the ontological and concep-
tual integrity of that idea of creativity. In conjunction with the 
162 qualities of relationality and decenteredness that I have identified 
in the speculative expressive agency of GANs, this means that 
when AI art destabilizes the concept of the human artist figure, 
it cannot likely replace this subject position by another unified 
(non-human) author. This has serious critical implications not 
only for the aesthetic interpretation of AI art, but also for socio-
economic perspectives on originality, the AI art author figure, and 
the legal status of the AI artwork itself.
AI Beyond the Public Domain
My discussion of the potential for AI creativity in chapter 3 cast 
doubt on the extent to which the expressions of a posthumanist 
agential assemblage could be accommodated within legal frame-
works that rely on humanist, anthropocentric notions of author-
ship. Some of the theoretical perspectives I introduced as part 
of that discussion challenge the notion that AI outputs can be 
defined as human-authored expressions; other critical voices 
insist that AI cannot be properly recognized as having “authored” 
its outputs. Given these concerns, what framework of cultural or 
legal ownership could accommodate the outputs of expressive 
AI?
Some recent legal scholarship proposes that AI outputs cannot 
seem to satisfy the legal requirements necessary to qualify for 
copyright protection. The logic underlying this suggestion implies 
that if human agents cannot legitimately claim authorship of 
AI-generated works, and if an AI system itself cannot be granted 
the agency required for it to qualify as an author figure and/or 
owner of IP rights, then such outputs must be placed in the public 
domain, where they would become freely available as a common 
source of inspiration for further human-authored creative 
expression.
Sarit Mizrahi, for example, offers a comprehensive discussion 
of quasi-autonomous AI and robotic outputs and suggests the 
inclusion of such works in the public domain as the only sensible 
163approach, for the simple reason that current copyright legisla-
tion does not apply to “faux-riginal” (2019) works. Ana Ramalho 
(2017) arrives at a similar conclusion, on the basis of arguing 
that AI-generated outputs, for all intents and purposes, are in 
fact authorless. What these insightful essays do not consider in 
enough depth is whether the automatic placing of AI outputs into 
the public domain can become the foundation for a radically new 
perspective on the interfacing of AI and IP. It would appear, after 
all, that such a move situates AI-generated expressions outside 
the immediate reach of many of the privatization and prop-
ertization effects that are otherwise immediately imposed by 
contemporary IP regimes. But this potential remains unexplored 
in these examples; both Mizrahi and Ramalho structure their 
arguments as pragmatic responses to current limitations of IP law 
with regard to AI copyrightability.
In the most general sense, the public domain is conceived as 
a conceptual sphere containing creative works that are not 
covered by exclusive IP rights. This may be because such rights 
were waived, have expired, or simply because no such rights 
apply to the works in question. This does not mean, however, 
that materials contained in the public domain cannot become 
someone’s private property. In the utilitarian logic of IP, the public 
domain is seen as a resource pool of freely accessible materials 
out of which authors-to-be can appropriate source materials, 
which will then, as new expressions, once again be subject to 
the access and use restrictions stipulated by IP law. The public 
domain, in other words, is a legal construct that exists alongside a 
framework of private intellectual property enclosures rather than 
outside it. It may draw its contents from these enclosures, but it 
simultaneously also feeds into them.
The public domain thus both parallels and precedes property 
enclosures. Some of the arguments formulated in John Locke’s 
Two Treatises on Government (1690), frequently invoked when 
political theory, philosophy, or legal theory debate the origins and 
teleology of the private property enclosures facilitated by IP law, 
164 are a good example of this. According to Locke, property arises 
out of that which “Nature hath provided” (§26), i.e., that which is 
contained in a vaguely delineated commons. As Locke famously 
proposed, “every man has a ‘property’ in his own person,” and 
therefore also in the “labour of his body, and the work of his 
hands” (ibid.); from this, it follows that by mixing one’s labor with 
anything sourced from the commons, private property can be 
appropriated from this commons. This logic lends itself well for 
expansion into the realm of creative expression. Peter Jaszi is 
among many legal theorists who have elaborated how Locke’s 
labor theory of property “at least implicitly identified the individu-
al’s proprietorship over himself as a function of ‘authorship’” 
(1991, 470). Reference to Locke’s theory is thus found throughout 
early authorship disputes and copyright statutes, where it was 
drawn upon both for legitimizing and for critiquing the notion 
that authors are owners, but also for conceptualizing the vaguely 
defined cultural commons that became the public domain (see, 
for example, Rose 1995; Boyle 2008).
Let me return to the question of whether AI works should be 
placed in the public domain. It is clear that such a move could 
have dramatic consequences. In economic terms, it would 
mean that the monetary value bound in AI works might escape 
immediate capture through some of the corporate entities 
that drive AI development. In more philosophical terms, the 
automatic placing of AI works in the public domain could also 
imply an in-principle disavowal of the possibility that AI can be 
granted authorial agency or personhood, even if its behaviors, 
abilities, and outputs were to match (or exceed) the definitional 
thresholds by which human creativity is conventionally deter-
mined. According to du Sautoy (2019) and others who emphasize 
the effective computability of creativity, it seems inevitable that 
AI will develop in that direction; but from a legal perspective, 
even works that perfectly resemble creative, original, authored 
works would currently have to be denied recognition as such. 
Assuming that AI will continue to inch in the general direction of 
165“AI-completeness,” and that the human capacity to distinguish 
between AI-generated and human-generated works will continue 
to diminish, a decision to exclude AI works from the purview of 
copyright as a matter of principle would end up contradicting 
(and potentially invalidating) established juridical baselines for 
defining and determining copyrightability more generally. This, I 
would argue, is the radical implication of the automatic relegation 
of AI works to the public domain.
Neither Mizrahi nor Ramalho frame their proposition to place AI 
works in the public domain as a gesture towards disturbing or 
disrupting the ownership models facilitated by the logic of IP. The 
points they raise are nevertheless important, since they high-
light the significant economic values that are now embodied in 
AI-generated outputs. What Mizrahi and Ramalho clearly imply 
is that society at large could derive immense benefit if AI works 
were to become freely accessible for further use. However, given 
the fact that ready-made and far-reaching legal regulation—
such as that offered by copyright law—already exists, it is highly 
unlikely that the economic values represented by AI-generated 
outputs will be relinquished in this way. What the history of 
expansive, overbearing IP suggests instead is that established 
frameworks are much more likely to be reconfigured only to 
such a degree that AI works can be comfortably assimilated 
into existing regimes, most likely as human-authored works, 
and they will thus remain subject to already-existing IP rights. 
This assumption can also be inferred from Craig and Kerr’s 
observations. The more likely it is that AI outputs are perceived, 
from an aesthetic perspective, as creative, the less likely it is that 
in economic contexts they will be perceived as authorless. Once 
again, “the romantic author can be seen racing into action—as 
it has, historically—in service of economic interests and the 
continued expansion of copyright’s domain” (Craig and Kerr 
2021, 73).
Perhaps the fact that Mizrahi and Ramalho do not explore the 
disruptive potential of their proposal to put AI works in the public 
166 domain can be read as cautionary pragmatism. I remain uncon-
vinced, in any case, that the public domain is an appropriate 
vehicle to counteract the restrictive enclosures of IP. In Locke’s 
labor theory of property, the commons is understood as a sphere 
of public (or shared) property that facilitates the engendering of 
private property. Within the broader context of contemporary 
IP regimes, the value of the public domain in this sense consists 
precisely in its intimate connection to the ownership models 
that it ultimately helps to sustain by providing freely accessible 
materials as the basis for further enclosures. The public domain, 
then, does not strike me as a viable ecology for accommodating 
the works of posthumanist agential assemblages, in part 
because it effectively frames its contents for assimilation into the 
anthropocentric IP enclosures into which it feeds. A more radical 
gesture would be to place the works of the posthumanist agential 
assemblage not in a context of “becoming-IP,” but instead in a 
context that might better accommodate its speculative quality of 
what I have earlier described as unownability.
Unownability in the Posthumanist  
Cultural Commons
Following the trajectory of my arguments throughout this book, 
what the emergence of the posthumanist agential assemblage 
calls for is not a public domain for AI works, but instead a more 
fundamental rethinking of the commons for posthumanist con-
texts. A key question that such a rethinking needs to be able to 
answer is what sort of commons can accommodate such works 
beyond the reach of intellectual property enclosures. Where 
and how can a critical art of AI that contests humanist notions 
of agency and ownership, as well as the underpinning Enlight-
enment values of the centrality, singularity, and supremacy of 
the human artist/author figure, be contained? In what conceptual 
space, and by what aesthetic, philosophical, ethical, ideological, 
or legal frameworks could such containment be delineated?
167As noted, the public domain was itself conceived as a kind of 
cultural commons, a concept that predates the appearance of 
IP enclosures by several centuries.1 Lewis Hyde, a wonderfully 
eloquent and insightful thinker on the general subject, uses 
the terms more or less interchangeably (e.g., Hyde 2010); the 
IP theorist James Boyle, similarly, discusses the public domain 
in relation to a “commons of the mind” (2008). But continuities 
across the two concepts also mean that the cultural commons 
itself is subject to some of the same criticisms outlined above 
concerning the public domain. In Locke’s labor theory of prop-
erty, for example, the commons appears as what Hyde calls a 
rather implausible “primordial state” (2010, 20) that implies not 
only the centrality and supremacy of the human, but which also 
invokes colonialist ideologies (Locke himself reportedly wrote 
the Second Treatise on Government with “America” in mind). In 
the influential writing of the English jurist Sir William Blackstone 
(1723–1780), the commons was similarly conceptualized as an 
“immediate gift of the Creator,” from which everyone can take “to 
his own use such things as his immediate necessities required” 
(Morrison 2001). Notably, both Locke and Blackstone invoke the 
commons in direct relationship to ownership: the commons is 
the “general property of mankind,” writes Blackstone, and as 
such it serves as a resource pool for the kinds of appropriation 
which, following Locke, engender private property. This framing 
of the commons as a type of (non-private) preternatural property 
enclosure persists; it is still evident in how the public domain is 
conceptualized, and has helped determine the organization of 
most contemporary cultural commons (including the Creative 
1 The first explicitly framed enclosures of cultural commons are generally 
traced to the granting of privileges to printers in mid-15th century Venice 
(see, for example, Hyde 2010); in legal history, Great Britain’s Statute of Anne 
(1710) is considered one of the first copyright statutes of note. This statute 
also encoded explicitly the concept of terminal copyright protection as well 
as the notion of a public domain into which works, once out of copyright, 
were to be placed.
168 Commons initiative, as well as various communities in the Free 
and Open-Source Software [FOSS] movement).
But Blackstone goes beyond describing the commons as a source 
from which private property enclosures arise. He also sees it as 
a sphere that belongs to humankind “exclusive of other beings.” 
This reaffirms again that the commons itself resembles an 
abstract property enclosure, and also means that the concept 
assumes both the unified, singular nature of the human sub-
ject who is entitled to exploit it, and the centrality of this human 
subject. The commons, in other words, exists for the benefit of 
the human agent (and the communities or collectives of which it 
may be a member), but at the expense of every other non-human 
system within which the human itself may be embedded. The 
legal philosopher Merima Bruncevic (2018) is certainly correct 
in emphasizing that this anthropocentric perspective of the 
commons—as a sphere revolving around the human subject’s 
exclusive privilege to appropriate from it articles of private prop-
erty—is of questionable usefulness for any posthumanist project.
There are, of course, contemporary perspectives on the 
commons that branch off from the more traditional views just 
introduced. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, for example, work 
with a notion of the commons that “does not position humanity 
separate from nature, as either its exploiter or its custodian, 
but focuses rather on the practices of interaction, care, and 
cohabitation, in a common world, promoting the beneficial and 
limiting the detrimental forms of the common” (Hardt and Negri 
2009, viii). In a comprehensive reframing of the commons within 
the domain of posthumanism, Bruncevic expands on this view 
to develop a perspective in which the commons is perceived 
as a fundamentally relational concept, rather than merely as a 
boundary-setting device that makes future property enclosures 
possible. Bruncevic defines the commons “as an ecology, as the 
in-between or the entanglement of personhood-property space” 
(122), which does not favor “clear divisions between physical/
intellectual; between human/non-human; between commons/
169commoneers” (145). Here, the commons contradicts not only 
anthropocentric hierarchies of human supremacy, but more 
generally any perspective that separates “the human from its 
environments and surroundings” (146).
Importantly, the existence of the commons as an “entanglement 
of personhood-property” highlights the agency of those who are 
(and of that which is) contained in the commons. This amplifies 
what is at least partly already implied in Hardt and Negri’s vision 
of the commons: the non-human is now included not simply as 
part of the exploitable resource pool, but instead it becomes an 
integral part of a chorus of agencies that co-determine the exis-
tence, but also the functioning and safeguarding of the commons 
itself. The non-human, in other words, is no longer only object, 
but also subject of the commons.
How can such a commons accommodate the non-human beyond 
the natural, and extend itself to the works and workings of 
the posthumanist agential assemblage as I have described it? 
How can it take into account exteriorizations of the human that 
also include, in alignment with Bernard Stiegler’s concept of 
“technics,” computational technologies such as AI? Following 
on from criticisms of the public domain as a type of cultural 
commons that remains constricted through its connection to 
private property enclosures, I suggest that a posthumanist 
cultural commons must satisfy at least two requirements: it has 
to exist beyond assumptions of the centrality of human agency; 
and it must be able to withstand the immediate and constant 
threat of being assimilated into anthropocentric IP enclosures. 
It is certainly possible to theorize the formation of such a 
commons; what is more difficult is to imagine how it might be 
safeguarded through the types of legal frameworks that have his-
torically been available.
Bruncevic, who, like me, formulates her definition of a post-
humanist commons in relation to art and IP theory, draws on the 
concept of the hyperobject as a key tool in her discussion. Coined 
170 by the cultural philosopher and object-oriented ontology theo-
rist Timothy Morton (2013), the concept is useful for discussing 
extremely complex phenomena (such as climate change) that 
defy pinpointing in time and space, and which are character-
istically decentered as well as massively distributed. As Bruncevic 
argues, the characteristics of the hyperobject, which is by 
definition a complicated and multifaceted construct, map well 
onto a discussion of art in the context of law and the commons. 
I will highlight only a few of these characteristics, which, I would 
suggest, also apply very well to the concept of the posthumanist 
agential assemblages through which the critical AI art projects I 
have discussed throughout this book are instantiated.
In particular, Morton’s hyperobject is viscous (it has a tendency 
to spread and cling to material and conceptual contexts beyond 
itself); nonlocal (it is distributed in time and space, and its 
nonlocal qualities can outweigh its local manifestations); and 
interobjective (it connects to a multiplicity of other objects and 
concepts, and its existence or significance may reveal itself most 
powerfully in these entanglements). Following this framework, 
Bruncevic classifies art itself as a hyperobject,2 and as Morton 
and a host of collaborators (Morton et al. 2018) have shown, 
this view can also be extended to creativity more generally. But 
what about AI art more specifically? In chapter 2, I described 
as artificially intelligent any assemblages of technologies, 
operations, functions, and effects that can be meaningfully 
perceived as resulting from intelligent (or creative) behavior, or 
which can be identified in outputs that are the results of such 
behavior. As I have argued, in digital art projects that align 
with such a definition and which approach AI tactically, both 
intelligence and creativity can become decoupled from the 
human, and the centrality of human agency is challenged when 
it comes to humanist and anthropocentric notions of authorship, 
2 Bruncevic’s discussion of art in relation to Morton’s concept of the hyper-
object is considerably more extensive, and extends to all five of the core 
characteristics Morton describes; see, in particular, Part 2 of her book.
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and political systems. All of this, it seems to me, is captured 
well when AI art itself is considered as a hyperobject. The 
designation also clarifies that the kinds of critical AI art I have 
discussed cannot easily be contained by a traditionally con-
ceived cultural commons, nor by the anthropocentric, humanist 
property enclosures to which such a commons is linked. In critical 
works of AI art and the posthumanist agential assemblages that 
produce them, the viscosity, nonlocalness, and interobjectivity of 
Morton’s hyperobject feed directly into the posthumanist cultural 
commons itself.
This perspective helps overcome what I see as an important 
problem harbored in the concept of the commons. Traditionally, 
that which is contained in the commons also facilitates con-
stant threats to the continued existence of the commons, since 
everything in the resource pool is by definition subject to appro-
priation into private property enclosures. But the posthumanist 
cultural commons as I envision it functions differently: here, 
that which constitutes the commons instead can undermine 
the possibility of its own removal from the commons. Take, for 
example, an AI-generated artwork that eludes copyright because 
it cannot technically be recognized as an authored expression. 
Its uncertain legal status is arguably determined not merely by 
some static quality encapsulated in a presumptively authorless 
aesthetic artefact, but very importantly also by the operational 
logic of the agential assemblage that produced this artefact. 
GAN-style AI art, as I have described it earlier in this chapter, is a 
case in point. It speculatively contradicts the property enclosures 
to which aesthetic expressions are conventionally subjected, and 
it does so not because it was created by a machine, but, more 
importantly, because both the assemblage that created it and the 
workings of this assemblage elude the traditional definitions of 
creativity on which IP enclosures conventionally hinge.
Thus, the two key requirements for my posthumanist cultural 
commons—persistence beyond assumptions of the centrality 
172 of human agency, and sustained resistance to assimilation into 
anthropocentric IP enclosures—are satisfied both in GAN-style AI 
artworks and in the agential assemblage that will have produced 
them. The non-human is no longer only object, but also subject 
of the commons. Or, more specifically: the posthumanist cultural 
commons is co-constituted both by the works of the post-
humanist agential assemblage (certain types of AI art, AI expres-
sions, or, simply, AI outputs) and by its workings (its functionality, 
operational logic, or perceived behaviors).
This suggestion should not be misinterpreted as technologically 
deterministic. As I hope to have shown throughout, in its critical 
figurations the posthumanist agential assemblage does not 
operate “by design,” simply enacting algorithmic routines that 
execute predetermined protocols. Instead, such an assemblage 
can continually afford all of its constituent parts all kinds of 
actions and interventions, and these, in turn, co-determine its 
functionality, behaviors, outputs, meaning, as well as its very 
existence. Because these characteristics are inevitably conferred 
on the posthumanist cultural commons itself, the workings of 
the posthumanist agential assemblage can also be described as a 
posthumanist commoning.
Commoning is generally understood as the process of 
maintaining or reclaiming a commons (Linebaugh 2007). But 
while this understanding usefully identifies an intimate con-
nection between commons and commoner, it also conveys the 
notion, well established in political economy and economic 
theory, that the commons is a resource to be managed (see, 
for example, Hardin 1968; Ostrom 1990). Conceptualized as a 
posthumanist ecology, however, the commons no longer relies 
so fundamentally on resource management through those who 
are also entitled to exploit it. Instead, when the posthumanist 
agential assemblage, as hyperobject, disturbs the integrity and 
perpetuation of IP enclosures, or when it resists assimilation 
into them, it is itself engaged in a posthumanist process of 
commoning.
173AI, without doubt, manifests in many forms that can amplify the 
property-oriented logic of capital. My key question, throughout 
this book, has been what radical interventions AI might never-
theless also be able to stage in this logic. In the figuration of the 
posthumanist agential assemblage, what sort of a political agent 
can AI constitute? How is the becoming-agential of AI entan-
gled with human agency? How does the posthumanist agential 
assemblage figure into existing AI systems that criss-cross cap-
ital, surveillance, and new forms of algorithmic governmentality? 
And how, by contrast, can a critical art of AI feed into tactical 
opposition to such regimes? The feminist and anarchist scholar 
Silvia Frederici (2012) writes that commoners can (re)produce 
themselves as the subjects of the commons. This is precisely 
what I mean when I think of the “becoming-tactical” of AI: the con-
tribution of artificial intelligence to a larger critical posthumanist 
project is that it can facilitate a tactical commoning to structurally 
undermine anthropocentric property enclosures. The commons 
has become entangled in the struggle of commoning.
The emergence of the posthumanist assemblage in which the 
agency for expression, creativity, or authorship might be dis-
tributed across multiple entities (human and non-human alike) 
hinges on a radical rethinking of what property means and how it 
operates, what we mean by cultural ownership, by creativity, by 
calling something a creative expression. As I have argued, inter-
faces between technology, culture, and law are important sites 
of conflict, resistance, and speculative exploration in this regard, 
since it is here that different domains of human (and non-human) 
expression are folded into broader socio-economic systems. 
Artistic experiments with AI are already pushing and recon-
figuring the boundaries I’ve outlined in the preceding chapters. It 
is through experiments such as Adam Basanta’s All We’d Ever Need 
Is One Another or Maja Smrekar’s !brute_force that it becomes 
possible to imagine how anthropocentric property relations, in 
the ways in which they currently manifest in aesthetic artefacts 
and our dealings with them, may be transcended. In my mind, a 
174 core marker of posthumanist art is, in this sense, the emergence 
of aesthetic hyperobjects that afford defiance of anthropocentric 
ownership models in all their permutations.
Earlier, I have described the effects of the posthumanist agential 
assemblage as the production, against the logic of human 
author- and ownership, of a kind of unownability that manifests 
in the works and workings of tactical AI. In this spirit, I end my 
speculative exploration of AI art’s critical potential with a ques-
tion: is posthumanist expressive agency a fundamentally post-
ownership concept?
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